

## ONCE AGAIN ON THE IMPACT OF THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL CHOICES SOCIOLOGISTS MAKE IN COURSE OF RESEARCH ON RESEARCH FINDINGS – THE CASE OF MEASURING PRO-CAPITALIST AND PRO-SOCIALIST VALUE ORIENTATION IN SERBIA SINCE 1989

**Summary:** The aim of this paper is to revive an interest of colleagues sociologists in collective and individual self-reflection on often assumed but neglected impact of a priori theoretical, methodological and practical political choices sociologists assume before a research carrying on to every research phase, on the example of case study evidencing the dependence of validity of a particular survey measuring instrument of pro-capitalist and pro-socialist value orientation changes accompanying transformation of societal reproduction relations in Serbia since 1989, on initial social hierarchical structuration/stratification research paradigm choices and social development practical preferences of authors and critics of the measuring instrument. The measuring instrument in case is the result of a cooperation of a prominent sociologist Mladen Lazić, author of common theoretico-methodological research framework and manager of all three surveys conducted in 1989, 2003 and 2012, with two talented younger sociologists specialised in applying statistics in sociological research. These three surveys collected data used for testing hypotheses on trends in dissonance between pro-socialist or pro-capitalist value orientation among main classes in Serbia with an accent on the middle class (alias: old and new small bourgeoisie in terms of research paradigm and social development strategy preferences assumed by this author) and prevailing normative-institutional order. More precisely, this paper questions the claim of prominent sociologist and his younger colleagues, that market liberalism and redistributive statism present mutually conflicting value orientations in the economic sub-system, which express dominant values of two fundamentally different modes of societal reproduction and institutional-normative orders, socialism and capitalism. The author of this paper argues instead that since 16th century, in the class prehistory of humanity, there exists just a cyclical shift between predominantly market or state regulation mechanisms of social reproduction organization all within one and the same contradictory system of capital accumulation on a world scale. The main finding of the outlined critical analysis of survey statements

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<sup>1</sup> vesna.stankovic.pejnovic@gmail.com

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chosen as indicators and measuring instruments of pro-capitalist and pro-socialist value orientations, as well as of the secondary analysis of relevant survey data, is that from the standpoint of explicitly defined alternative research paradigm and value orientation, more valid measuring instrument of anti-capitalist or pro-socialist value orientations presents the attitude of respondents toward private ownership understood as legal expression of class division of labor than the attitude toward state intervention in the economy

**Key words:** socialism, capitalism, value norm dissonance, middle class, small bourgeoisie, private ownership, class division of labor, measuring value orientations

## INTRODUCTION

A quarter of the century passed after an explosive manifestation of a systemic crisis of self-proclaimed regimes of “really existing socialism” in former East European member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) symbolized by the 1989 tearing down of the Berlin wall. In 2007-8 again erupted permanently latent systemic crisis of self-proclaimed “democratic” regimes of really existing capitalism in the Organization for European Economic Co-Operation member states. Common effect of both crises is rising unemployment and inequality between individuals and groups as measured by the concentration at the top of the hierarchical national income distributions of economic wealth in both groups of countries (Lakner and Milanovic, 2013: 45, OECD report, 2011).

This shift of systemic crisis of “really existing socialism” with systemic crisis of “really existing capitalism” challenges sociologists inclined toward survey methods of gathering empirical data to make the attempt to understand and explain past course of social structural transformation processes speeded up by this shift, describe their present state, as well as to predict future course of transformation processes on the basis of longitudinal measuring of changes in value orientations of respondents affiliated to different social classes who are affected in the opposite way by the protracted systemic crisis of globally dominant capitalist mode of social reproduction.

The prominent sociologist in Serbia, Mladen Lazić, the well known and respected Serbian and Yugoslav sociologist synthesizing theory and research since the middle of 1980’s, joined in the first two decades of the XXI century by Slobodan Cvejić and Jelena Pešić, his younger colleagues well known for their specialization in application of statistics in sociological research, all three active in the Institute for sociological research of the Belgrade University Faculty of Philosophy, bravely met this challenge in our sociological community by pioneering the task of constructing and longitudinally implementing the measuring instrument for monitoring changes in pro-capitalist and pro-socialist ideal typically defined value orientations of main classes in Serbia from 1989 to 2012 accompanying changes in class structuration of contemporary society in Serbia.

The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the impact of theoretical, methodological and value orientations choices of sociologists on every

phase of research on the example of a case study evidencing the dependence of validity and reliability of a particular survey measuring instrument of pro-capitalist and pro-socialist value orientation changes, on initial social hierarchical structuration/sratification research paradigm choices and social development practical preferences of the measuring instrument authors, on the one side, and on the alternative research paradigm and social development strategy choices of the critic challenging the adequacy of the measuring instrument, on the other. Explicit definition of own theoretical, methodological and practical preferences or biases is in consonance with repeated calls of this author to colleagues sociologists to collective and individual self-reflection on influence of our contradictory small-bourgeois place and role in class division of labor on our research (most recently Vratusa, 2014: 1040). This demonstration is needed because ubiquitous impact of the starting premises of sociologists on adequacy of our research hypotheses formulation, operationalization of main concepts, construction of measuring instruments and methods of survey data analysis and presentation of findings, is often only implicitly assumed in our research community, but almost completely neglected in research practice.

Due to space limitations, in this demonstration the greatest attention will be accorded to the impact of theoretical, methodological and value preferences of authors and critics of a particular measuring instrument on its validity and reliability. Mladen Lazić, author of common theoretico-methodological research framework and (co)manager of one international and two national surveys collecting relevant data in 1989, 2003 and 2012 (Lazić, 2014: 27), and his two talented younger colleagues specialising in applying statistics in sociological research, used the measuring instrument in case for testing hypotheses on trends in dissonance between pro-socialist or pro-capitalist value orientation among main classes in Serbia with an accent on the middle class (alias: old and new small bourgeoisie in terms of research paradigm and social development strategy preferences assumed by this author) and prevailing normative-institutional order. More precisely, this paper questions the claim of the prominent sociologist and his younger colleagues, that market liberalism and redistributive statism present mutually conflicting value orientations in the economic sub-system, which express dominant values of two fundamentally different modes of societal reproduction and institutional-normative orders, socialism and capitalism (Lazic and Cvejic, 2011: 814; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 288).

In this demonstration two main methods will be used: a) critical analysis of adequacy of claims contained in statement chosen as measuring instruments for measuring pro-capitalist economic liberalism value orientation, with an accent on the statement on desirability of state intervention in economy; b) secondary analysis of the same survey data b1) by applying alternative measuring technique to deal with the problem of the sixth “do not know” answer modality introduced in the 2003 and 2012 surveys in the original 1989 formulation of the questionnaire items chosen by Lazić and his younger colleagues for measuring instrument, and b2) by applying alternative measuring technique on the proposed alternative measuring instrument (statement on progressiveness of private ownership)

which this author proposes as more valid for measuring of pro-capitalist or pro-socialist value orientation.

### **DEMONSTRATION OF DEPENDENCE OF MAIN HYPOTHESES FORMULATION ON THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL CHOICES OF CRITICIZED AUTHORS AND OF THE CRITICIZING AUTHOR**

The brief summary of main theoretical, methodological and value orientations preference of Lazić and his younger colleagues is made easier and more reliable by the fact that these three authors in their recently published studies (Lazić, 2011; Lazić and Cvejić, 2011; Lazić and Pešić, 2013; Lazić, ed. 2014), themselves summed up general analytical framework of their survey monitoring trends in dissonance between predominant system of values determining desirable aims and models of social thinking and acting from the standpoint of reproducing and legitimating the “old” socialist system of social relations or constructing the alternative, “new” capitalist one, on the one hand, and prevailing normative-institutional order of regulating rules and sanctions assuring the use of systemically acceptable means for attaining valued aims and functioning of the “old” or “new” system of social relations, on the other.

*The concept and theory of value orientations changes lagging behind the normative’ institutional changes*, Lazić and his younger colleagues traced back to the theses of well known German and British sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf who elaborated neo-functionalist theory of institutionalization of from ever and forever existing conflicts over differential distribution of authority between superordinates and subordinates in the economy and state spheres of “post-capitalist” societies on the West side of Iron curtain (Dahrendorf, 1967). This theory Dahrendorf applied to research of “revolution” in former societies of self-proclaimed really existing socialism after the breakdown of USSR and dissolution of the economic and military organization of eastern European countries. Dahrendorf predicted that in countries east of the Berlin wall, individually and collectively interiorized socially desirable aims and ways of thinking and acting, would change more slowly than institutional settings and normative rules which sanction new socially acceptable means for attaining new aims. This lag in value orientations changes enable the simultaneous existence of mutually conflicting value orientations typical for allegedly qualitatively different and opposed modes of societal reproduction regulation systems.

Lazić and his younger colleagues monitored these value-norm dissonance trends among members of basic social classes - especially of the middle class - in Serbia throughout three periods of post-socialist transformation of societal reproduction relations. The first period of transformation they named “*socialism*” in crisis before its breakdown and located it at the *end of the 1980’s*. During this period according to Lazić and younger colleagues “*old*” socialist normative institutional order was still predomi-

*nant*. Cvejić and Pešić follow Lazić in ideal-typically defining socialist mode of societal reproduction and normative-institutional order as characterized by *undifferentiated* “*political–economic monopoly of ... communist nomenclature*” (Lazić and Cvejić: 2011: 809) and “*regulated by command (plan) norms*” (Lazić, Pešić, 2013: 285). This definition is derived from the conception of socialism which Lazić, inspired by Georges Markus (Feher, Heller, Markus, 1983), elaborated early on in his career of sociologist as the sectorially undifferentiated, static, autarchic new class mode of command regulation, centrally planned hyper production of means of production under the exclusive monopoly of control over social regulation and planning roles in social division of labor by affiliates of the nomenclature ruling class. This supposedly new mode of societal reproduction is according to Lazić *qualitatively different* from and *only in external relations* with the surrounding capitalist mode of production, sectorially differentiated, politically pluralistic and characterized by separation of lawmaking, executive and judicial power in multiparty electoral representative democracy, market competition regulated and private profit accumulation motivated (Lazić, 1987). The stimulus for supposedly qualitative systemic transformation of mode of socialist societal reproduction came in the late 1980s, under the *outside pressure* of the breakdown of the socialist order in Eastern Europe (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011:808; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 284). *Structural crisis of socialist order in late 1980's manifested itself in “substantial penetration of value orientations characteristic for the “new” capitalist order*, primarily individualism, liberalism and meritocracy, propagated mainly by internationally mobile affiliates of the highly educated “middle class” (Lazić and Cvejić, 814).

Lazić and his younger colleagues have named the second period as “*blocked*” (in fact just slowed down) *transformation* of social relations and accompanying institutions and regulating norms during 1990's. During this period parts of the old nomenclature class of collective owners “*converted their political and organizational capital into economic capital*”, expressed in terminology Lazić and his younger colleagues overtook from Pierre Bourdieu (1986). This part of old nomenclature class used the “old” socialist values, primarily authoritarianism, collectivism and egalitarianism, homologous to values characteristic of traditional predominantly small peasant society, for mobilization of wide layers of population for attainment of nation state building aims, in general conditions of violent dissolution of former Yugoslavia, followed by 4-years-long wars and international economic and political isolation of the country (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011: 820).

Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić named the third period “*debloked*” or speeded up social relations' transformation and located it after October 5 2000 toppling of the government lead by self-proclaimed socialist party, by coalition of opposition self-proclaimed democratic parties. On the level of social class structuration, there came according to Lazić and his younger colleagues to “*substantial change*” *in conditions for the formation of both the upper class and the middle class, so that the structure and composition of these groups has been “significantly changed”*: economic re-

production based on dominance of private ownership places the control of economic resources/capital (as opposed to command regulation) in the centre of the social-class differentiation (Lazic and Cvejic, 2011: 808, 810; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 284). Cvejic and Pešić follow Lazić in defining social class by its “*role in the reproduction of a specific system*” of production relations, and from this class role they derive “a class position” of respective class. They further supplement this relational definition of class position as hierarchically unequal level of “control” over “economic, organizational and cultural resources necessary for material production, social regulation and systemic integration”, which on the most concrete empirical level of analysis of social structuration/stratification lead to “unequal life chances” of individuals belonging to different classes/layers (Lazić, 2011: 18-53; Lazic and Cvejic, 2011: 809; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 283). Lazić and Cvejic proceed to suggest that *there is qualitative and not just quantitative difference between* a) “the *political-economic monopoly* of the former communist nomenklatura”, on the one hand, and “*interlocked positions of economic and political dominance* of the same group”, on the other (Lazic and Cvejic, 2011: 809); b) “*mediation of command roles towards the workers*” on the basis of “derived (delegated) command authorities” from the ruling nomenklatura affiliates, on the one hand, and “*performance of professional (expert) roles*” on the basis of “*autonomy*” of control over “*cultural resources* (formally crystallized in the form of university education)” or over “*organizational resources*” in the form of “*transferred managerial authorities in state and private firms*”, on the other (Lazic and Cvejic, 2011: 813); c) “*marginal*” position of “*small entrepreneurs... outside the dominant class relations*” of “*command regulation*” within “Yugoslav (quasi) market socialism (Lazic and Cvejic: 2011: 810; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 299) and their intra systemic position after the enactment of the first Law on transformation of social capital in 1989.

These theoretical premises and empirical emphases Lazić, Cvejic and Pešić operationalised by constructing and empirical testing *7 class respondents' classification model* (reducible to 5 classes) in previous articles and monographs (Lazic, 2000; Lazić, 2011; Lazić and Cvejic, 2004; Lazić and Cvejic, 2007; Lazić and Pešić, 2012): Seven classes contain: 1. Ruling class (political elite, high managers and big industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs), 2. Lower managers and middle and small entrepreneurs, 3. Highly educated specialists, 4. Clerks and technicians with middle education 5. Qualified workers, 6. Unqualified workers 7. Small family farmers. This 7 class model Lazić, Cvejic and Pešić sometimes reduce to the 5 class model (as copied in Table 1, Economic liberalism/ redistributive statism A, column 1 in this paper).

During period of “debloked” transformation, old and new “political and economic elites” according to Lazić, Cvejic and Pešić attempt to stabilize and legitimate their private ownership gains through legal sanctioning of “*new*” *capitalist norms and rules* regulating social action and dissemination of “*new*” capitalist values needed for smooth reproduction and legitimating of accumulation of capital. “New capitalist order” Lazić and younger colleagues define by qualitative separation between social sub-



systems of pluralist “political” and “market economy” competition (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011: 809). In third transformation period “new” capitalist institutional order encounters deeply entrenched “old” socialist values interiorized by significant part of population, including parts of the middle class (Lazić, 2011; Lazić, Cvejić, 2011: 813; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 288).

Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić focused their monitoring of value - normative dissonance among basic classes in Serbia on the observation of changes in the degree of normative-value dissonance among affiliates of the middle class, since they *consider the middle class to be the main mediator of value orientations or social-integrative consciousness from the top of the social hierarchy toward its bottom*, ensuring thus the establishment and reproduction of the supposedly “new” capitalist social order (Lazić, Cvejić, 2011:808; Lazić and Pešić, 2013:284). *Systemic-stabilizing role of the “middle class” is to “propagate liberal value orientations, and thereby to secure the continuity of capitalist transformation”* (Lazić, Cvejić, 2011: 808-9), or “normalization’ of capitalist system of socio-economic relationships”, through “transfer of liberal values toward the lower parts of social ladder” (Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 301).

The brief summary of the basic underlying *alternative theoretical and methodological hypotheses and practical political value orientations preferences and choices* which this author made in the course of critical analysis of the adequacy and validity of economic-liberalism or pro-capitalism value orientations measuring instrument construction and implementation by Lazić, Pešić and Cvejić can be resumed as follows:

1. In former societies of the so called really existing socialism in late 1980’s there *did not happen the “establishment of a new capitalist order”*. *In these societies happened only the finalization of the formal legal restoration of the old capitalist order which was never fully eliminated* in societies of the so called really existing socialism due to two factors: a) strong remains of class division of labor of potentially universal human praxis into the planning and commending work tasks monopolized by the minority and alienated and alienating (Marx, 1845/1932) manual and repetitive executing work tasks reserved for and imposed onto the dispossessed, exploited and oppressed majority; b) market mediated profit oriented economic reforms soon after the exhaustion of extensive methods of state capitalist speeded up industrialization and urbanization of predominantly agrarian societies politically organized into semi-colonized states on the semi-periphery of the European and world system of capitalist economy (Wallerstin, 1974/2011; Vratusa, 2012a: 96-104). Within this research paradigm and value orientation, *socialism* is understood and practically pursued as *only potentially qualitatively different societal reproduction mode*, the future realization of which is conditioned by the overcoming of class divided, alienated and alienating labor.

2. *Conditions for the formation of both the upper class and the middle class did not “substantially change”, so that the structure and composition of these groups has not been “significantly changed” in the end of 1980’s* – small bourgeois property as basis of “snail slow” accumulation of big capital was encouraged at the least quarter of the century earlier, by the

enactment of the clause 22 of the *SFRY 1963 Constitution*, which legalized the hiring of the labor power of other people. The role of the class in the reproduction of a specific system of societal reproduction does not determine class position of respective class, but it is derived from the monopoly position of the respective class in class division of labor legally defined as monopoly ownership relation toward main means of production, management and communication. This inversion between class role and class position explains why Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić gave priority to quantitative and external factors of systemic transformation and reveals that their seven class classification model cited above, is inspired by the choice of a combination of neo-Weberian conflict and relational class variant and neo-Durkheimian and neo-Parsonian, consensual and gradualist variant of the positivist functionalist (Vratuša: 1995c; 2006) social inequality and hierarchical structuration research and policy paradigm. Their model, namely, differs from the neo-Weberian Goldthorpe's classification models (Goldthorpe, 1987; 1992) only by explicit mentioning and attempt at empirical research of the class of big private entrepreneurs within the upper class. Their neo-Weberian conflict variant of the positivist functionalist social hierarchical structuration research paradigm, slides into the neo-Parsonian (Parsons, 1977) consensual and strata gradualist variant of the same paradigm when they insist on the necessity of value – norm consonance especially among the affiliates of the middle class layers or strata (Vratuša, 2013). Perceiving less educated “lower social strata” as prone primarily to be “mobilized for change by members of social groups seeking to impose their own dominant social position” (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011:280) and expressing their concern about their propensity for “undemocratic mobilisation” (Lazić and Pešić, 2013:298), three authors demonstrate that the common theoretical denominator of both consensual gradualist and conflict relational versions of the positivist-functional social inequality and hierarchy research paradigm, presents unhistorical interpretation of class division of labor as eternal hierarchical distribution of work functions in a specialized interdependent technical division of labor on those who perform functionally unequally important roles of “thinking” and “acting” (Kingsley and Moore, 1945). Paradoxically, Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić in the end provide themselves the empirical evidence for the claim of this author that there just happened the intrinsic transformation, driven by homegrown interests of one part of the local nomenclature ruling class of group owners of state and social ownership and of one part of the “old” small bourgeoisie (peasants and artisans working themselves and their family members with the means of production in their possession) who became capitalist private owners and employers of wage laborers, into comprador bourgeoisie (Vratuša, 1983; Vratuša, 2010; Antonić, 2012) subservient to interests of profit accumulation of locally absent world ruling class of financial oligarchy creditors militarily organized into NATO. The main recruiting pool of the compradore bourgeoisie, “new” small bourgeoisie of highly educated intellectuals and professionals who possess in personal private ownership socially recognized professional knowledge in the form of university diploma, existed throughout the period of the so called really existing socialism and gave



major contribution to finalization of formal legal restoration of capitalism back from the most socialized version of state capitalism in the class pre-history of humanity so far (Vratuša, 2013:46-63).

3. The “*middle class*”, primarily its highly educated small bourgeois social scientists part, have the possibility not to choose to “propagate liberal value orientations, and thereby to secure the continuity of capitalist transformation”, but on the contrary to put their professional knowledge – power into the service of co-creation of alternative post-capitalist transformation contributing to simultaneous emergence of the new conceptual model of anti capitalist mode of production, as well as of social actor formulating it and realizing it through dialectical synergy of revolutionary, simultaneously individual and collective self and social circumstances transformative theory and practice, overcoming class division of labor (Vratuša, 2012b).

This brief summary of functionalist-positivist social structuration research paradigm and pro-capitalist social development strategy preferences of Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić, on the one hand, and critical –dialectical paradigm and pro-socialist strategy preferences of this author, on the other, will serve as orienting starting standpoint for further demonstration of determining influence these preferences exert on construction and implementation of the value orientations measuring instrument.

### **DEMONSTRATION OF DEPENDENCE OF DATA, MEASURING INSTRUMENT AND MEASURING TECHNIQUE CHOICE ON THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL CHOICES OF CRITICIZED AUTHORS AND CRITICIZING AUTHOR**

Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić deduced from their just critically analyzed theoretical, methodological and value orientations research preferences one of their hypothesis that *normative-value systemic dissonance may be expected to decrease, as the “new” capitalist institutional normative principles and legitimacy patterns of order reproduction strengthen* (Lazic and Cvejić, 2011: 812; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 285).

The empirical base for the testing of their hypotheses on trends in normative-value dissonance in three above mentioned periods of social relations’ transformation were data collected during three survey observations: 1) survey conducted in 1989/1990 within the *Changes of Class Structure and Mobility in Yugoslavia* research project, on a nationally representative combined quota sub-sample for Serbia numbering 3,660 respondents (Lazić, 1994); 2) survey conducted in 2003 within the *South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP)* on a nationally representative sub-sample for Serbia numbering 2,997 respondents (Simkus, 2007); and 3) survey conducted in 2012 within the ISIFF research project *Challenges of the New Social Integration in Serbia: concepts and Actors*, on a multi-step sample for Serbia numbering 2.557 respondents (Lazic and Cvejić, 2011: 810-813).

In both 1998 and 2003 surveys the categorization of respondents into classes ‘dominance’ approach was used (cf. Erikson, 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992, 28–47), which means that unemployed and inactive members of households were assigned class positions of their spouses or parents, or, in the case of pensioned or temporarily unemployed singles, their previous class positions (Lazić, Cvejić, 2011: 813). After conducting preliminary statistical analysis of 2012 survey data, however, Lazić and his younger colleagues decided to choose smaller sample of 1.464 economically active respondents from which they excluded retired respondents and other economically inactive respondents. Authors explained this decision by the fact that their preliminary analysis of entire sample revealed that retirement status significantly influences economic position of respective respondents and their value orientations, changing thus the class determinants of core categories measured in research (Lazić, Pešić, 2013: 288). We will soon see that this is not the only *methodological decision which influences the findings by excluding from their calculations* the responses of more than a half of respondents from the original sample, who due to their permanently low or conjecturally lowering economic status and social interests derived from such material position, tend to opt for values which authors dubbed as characteristic of “old” socialist mode of societal reproduction and normative order, *contrary to their theoretically expected and practically desired decrease in the systemic normative-value dissonance* in both political and economic subsystem with all social groups in general and middle class in particular at the time of strengthening of the new normative order (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011: 819; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 285).

For the purposes of empirically monitoring trends in systemic normative-value dissonance between the allegedly “new” capitalist institutional order and inherited “old” socialist values among population of Serbia in general and among members of the middle class in particular, Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić constructed two ideal-typical pairs of value orientations: political liberalism vs. authoritarian collectivism within the sphere of political relations and market liberalism vs. redistributive statism within the sphere of economic relations. They constructed indicators for these pairs of opposed value orientations out of several statements measured with the Likert type scale, arranged in a way that a higher score expresses a more liberal attitude. In order to enable comparison of differences in the distribution of respondents’ responses on these scales in three periods of observation of social transformation processes and accompanying value changes, they gave priority to “only four questionnaire items”, two for each of the two value orientations from the 1989 survey, which were repeated in 2003 and 2012 surveys: for the political liberalism value orientations, (i) complete freedom of speech today leads to disorganization of society (ii) in the last instance, judiciary must serve the authorities; for the market liberalism value orientations, (iii) the interest of the collectivity is more important than the interest of the individuals (iv) the less government intervenes in economy the better is for Serbia (Lazić, Cvejić, 2011: 821; Lazić, Pešić, 2013: 288).

In this paper, due to space limitation, we will concentrate just on the

reexamination of the validity of the last mentioned item (iv) on the desirability of state intervention in economy to be used as the measuring instrument of the forward oriented and in that sense “progressive“ value orientations of respondents toward the emerging allegedly “new” capitalist normative order, or the backward looking and in that sense “retrograde” value orientations of respondents toward the past “old” real socialist normative order, understood as *“mutually conflicting” value orientations dominant in “two fundamentally different institutional-normative orders, socialism and capitalism“* (Lazic and Cvejic, 2011: 814; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 288)

The claim that different degrees of acceptance/rejection of the item concerning the desirability of regulatory role of the state in the economy express value orientations of respondents towards two qualitatively different normative-institutional orders, capitalism and socialism, overlooks the historical fact of the existence of cyclical systemic worldwide accumulation of capital crisis, which periodically manifests itself in the form of the “surplus” goods and services that cannot be sold, as well as in “surplus” productive capacity and labor power which cannot be employed with profit. At the height of depression, ideological small bourgeois representatives of the ruling class of the “strong” national states within the center of the world system of capitalist economy (Wallerstein, I. (1974/2011), advocate together with Maynard Keynes (1936/2002) the abandonment of the regulatory mechanism proposed by Adam Smith – the invisible hand of the market competition (Smith, 1776/2007) in favor of the very visible centralized state intervention into the economic flows. Neo-Keynesians are seeking to restore the payment capable demand through the investment of public funds in infrastructure building, nationalized industry and conducting of re/colonization wars. Common to both is an attempt to preserve the capitalist relations of accumulation of capital in world proportions, which explains active participation of governments of countries typical for both varieties of capitalism within the same military organization (NATO). Neo-Smithean “shock therapy” (Klein, 2007) variety of capitalism only more obviously contributes to “destruction of society”. The neo-Keynesian welfare state variety of capitalism and other “third ways” between accumulation of private profit and development of human capacities of each individual as condition of such development for all, like the attempt to develop “entrepreneurial society” and ward of the intrinsic tendency of concentration and centralization of capital by legal protection of collective forms of ownership from local to national level, cannot be counted on to “reconstitute” society (Bolčić, 2013) previously destroyed through private profit aim of production, since all varieties of capitalism leave the destructive exploitative and oppressive internal contradictions of this production mode intact. Violent imperialist conquering of control of the territory, raw materials, cheaper labor power and market outlets of the “weaker” states in the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system of capitalist economy, ideological representatives of the ruling class in countries of all varieties of capitalism are misrepresenting as the result of conflicts between different ethnic or race groups oriented toward different cultural or civilization values (Huntington, 1993; Vratusa, 1995a), instead as the

main tool of “statist” violent imposition of capitalist private ownership relations to all collectivistic forms of relations between people concerning the conditions and means of their life reproduction since the protracted XVI century (Vratuša, 1995b: 115-154) .

**CURIOUS FINDINGS OBTAINED THROUGH APPLICATION OF INADEQUATE MEASURING INSTRUMENT AND INADEQUATE MEASURING TECHNIQUE FOR MEASURING PRO-CAPITALIST AND PRO-SOCIALIST VALUE ORIENTATION AND PROPOSAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURING TECHNIQUE**

Curious findings of Lazić and Pešić that the working class respondents became in 2012 the most market liberally or pro-capitalist oriented class in Serbia (Lazić and Pešić, 2013:292, Table 3, see here below Table 1, *Economic liberalism/ redistributive statism A*, column 4), substantiates the need to re-examine adequacy of the statement on desirability of state intervention in economy as an indicator and measuring instrument of pro-capitalist or pro-socialist value orientations.

<i>Table 1. Economic liberalism/ redistributive statism A</i>		
Statement: the less government intervenes in economy the better is for Serbia		
Measuring technique: - average score of respondents on the Likert type scale where 5 designates complete acceptance and 1 complete rejection of the respective statement		
column 1	column 2	column 3
Class	1989	2003
upper class	3,66	3,02
middle class	3,47	2,87
intermediary class	2,81	3,00
working class	2,51	3,01
Farmers	2,82	3,08
Total	2,89	2,99

The finding of Lazić and Pešić on the most developed economic liberalism value orientations among respondents workers is unexpected not only from the neo-Marxist theoretical and pro-socialist political standpoint of this author, but also from the combination of neo-Weberian and neo-Durkheimian theoretical and pro-capitalist political standpoint of Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić. It is namely hard to convincingly explain these findings as the

result of theoretically expected and practically wished for “spreading” of liberal and economic pro-capitalist values down the social ladder from the upper and the middle class beyond the theoretical middle point 3 on the 5 point measuring scale for the first time in 2012 after the 1989 historical turning point, when at the same time respondents belonging to the upper and middle class who should transfer liberalism in favor of state intervention into economic flows (Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 292-293, 299-300).

At this point one more factor should be pointed out which might have inflated findings on the market liberalism orientation of respondents workers and deflated findings on the distributive statism orientation of middle class respondents, especially of highly educated professionals, theoretically presented and practically encouraged by Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić as the main social disseminator of pro-capitalist values. Even though the authors claim that they chose the item on desirability of state intervention in the economy because it was repeated in all three surveys (Lazić, Pešić, 2013: 288), they fail to mention in this text that there have been important changes made to this survey item and measuring instrument between different surveys: 1) change in the formulation of the statement itself (in the 1989 respondents expressed their disagreement with the oppositely formulated statement that “the government should have more influence in economy today”; 2) the transfer of the answer modality “strongly disagree” and “disagree” from the first two places in the questionnaire to the fourth and fifth place in the 2003 survey. The most problematic change is 3) the introduction of the sixth answer modality (“I do not know”) beside theoretical middle modality (“neither agrees nor disagrees”) that existed in the survey carried out in 1989. Especially the last formulation change in measuring instrument between survey retakes, lowers its capacity for longitudinal comparisons. The findings depend on the choice of the measuring technique for dealing with the newly added “do not know” answer modality.

After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain, from the authors themselves, some explanation of their curious findings in 2012 survey (that respondents workers are the most pro-capitalist liberal market oriented of all respondents according to their average score on the market liberalism -distributive statism scale), this author applied alternative measuring technique – summing up of the relative percentage of partial and complete agreement with the state interventionism statement, simultaneously including a percentage of “do not know” answer modality for each category of respondents in the calculation of the total. The summing up of the relative frequency with which respondents affiliated to a particular social class/layer choose extreme answer modalities (“partially dis/agree” or “strongly dis/agree”), depending on the ordering of answer modalities of the respective survey statement used as indicator and measuring instrument, acknowledges the fact that respondents by choosing the extreme answer modalities undoubtedly demonstrate that they actually have an attitude toward the content of the respective statement.



The decision to keep the percentage of “do not know” answer modality in the calculation of the total sum was based on the observation during the secondary analysis of data that there exists *class specific tendency of respondents affiliated to less educated social classes and especially unqualified workers, to choose “do not know” answer modality more often than their counterparts affiliated to the ruling class and their ideological representatives* in the “middle class”. Exclusion of “do not know” answer modality from calculation, measuring technique chosen but passed over in silence by Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić in their 2011 and 2013 studies, namely, leads to the exclusion of respondents opting for it from the sample, systematically raises the average level of acceptance of liberal market pro-capitalist orientation among workers and contributes to the diminishing of the representativeness of the original sample in favor of disproportional overrepresentation of respondents affiliated to top and the middle part of social hierarchy.

Observation of the sum of the partial and complete agreement with the desirability of state deregulation statement presented in column 3 (with “do not know” answer modality excluded from the calculation) in *Table 2. Economic liberalism/ redistributive statism B*, demonstrates that respondents less qualified workers occupy high, but *not the first rank* among all respondents according to their partial and total agreement with the statement that state should not interfere in the economy (49%), as it is suggested in *Table 1, Economic liberalism distributive statism A*, column 4 for all working class respondents. Even in this reduced sample which excludes “do not know” answer modality, the first rank with the greatest percentage of partial and complete agreement with the undesirability of state interventionism thesis (54%) hold respondents small entrepreneurs, big farmers and lower managers. When we, however compare middle and working classes as wholes, it is *the middle class who is the first ranked (46%)*, leading in front of the working class respondents just by 1 percentage point (column 4 of *Table 2, Economic liberalism/ redistributive statism B*). The finding that even in the distorted sample not containing “do not know” answer modality, respondents workers as a whole, and especially respondents unqualified workers are not the most market liberally oriented class, suggests that there must have happened as well some mistake in presentation of average scores of respondents in *Table 1 Economic liberalism, distributive statism*, column 4.

The difference in partial and complete agreement between “middle class” respondents and respondents workers with state deregulation statement is more convincing – 7 percentage points, 41% and 34% respectively - if the measuring technique including “do not know” answer modality in the calculation is applied (column 9 of *Table 2, Economic liberalism/ redistributive statism B*). Reduction of the sample through the application of the measurement technique which excludes “do not know” answer modality from data analysis, lowers the level of statistical significance of chi square based measures of correlation of ordinal data, like Cramer’s V, which is less affected by the size of the contingency tables and the number of degrees of freedom (*Table 2. Economic liberalism redistributive statism*

B, bottom row), suggesting that the chosen measuring technique which excludes “do not know” answer modality distorts the findings.

<b>Table 2. Economic liberalism/redistributive statism B</b>								
Statement: the less government intervenes in economy the better is for Serbia in 2012 survey								
	answer modality 6 excluded from presentation of responses of economically active respondents affiliated to 7(5) classes in %				answer modality 6 included in presentation of responses of the economically active respondents affiliated to 7(5) classes in %			
Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Class	1+2	3	4+5	Rank	1+2	3	4+5	6
Ia +Ib	39	29	32	VII	38	29	31	1
IIa+IIb	26	20	<b>54</b>	I	23	18	48	10
III	28	19	43	IV	34	17	<b>38</b>	12
IIa+IIb+III Subtotal			46				41	
IV	36	22	42	V	29	18	34	19
V	35	21	44	III	28	17	35	20
VI	38	12	49	II	26	8	33	32
V + V I subtotal			45				34	
VII	44	15	40	VI	31	11	28	31
Total	37	20	43	N 1294	23	16	<b>35</b>	19
C's V Apr.sign				.080 .099				

Legend: Answer modalities: 1. Completely disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. ambivalent; 4. Agree; 5. Completely agree; 6. Do not know.

Classes: Ia higher and middle level professional politicians; Ib big and middle entrepreneurs, higher and middle level managers; IIa small and micro entrepreneurs, big farmers; IIb lower managers; III highly educated professionals, liberal arts and highly educated selfemployed; IV middle educated clerks, technicians and self-employed; V more qualified workers; VI less qualified workers; VII small farmers

The answer to the question why Lazić and his younger colleagues decided to “solve” one of the most difficult problems in longitudinal survey researches of treating “do not know” answer modality when it does not exist in the first survey and appears in the subsequent ones, simply by excluding “do not know” answer modality from the calculation and remain silent about it, should be searched for in practical value orientations of these researchers. Distorted findings inflating agreement of “lower classes” with pro-capitalist values, namely, present simultaneously hypothesized a *wished for finding* from the standpoint of the constructors of economic lib-

eralism distributive statism research instrument: acceptance (or at least the acquiescence) of the lower strata of population with pro-capitalist economic liberalism values, enabling stabilization of “new” prevailing capitalist normative institutional order. It seems as if though Lazić and his younger colleague became “*impatient*” to find in collected data corroboration of the wished for finding that market liberalism orientation as measured by average score of all respondents in 2012 *finally passed the theoretical middle point 3* and attained 3,12 (Lazić, Pešić, 294).

Prompted by isomorphic, own value preferences’ oriented “impatience” to demonstrate that social production relations of capital accumulation cannot be so easily “normalized” to make exploited and oppressed working classes more market competition oriented than any other social class, this author proposed above described alternative measurement technique presented in columns 5 to 9 in Table 2, Economic liberalism distributive statism B. The alternative measuring technique helps us conclude that the fact that one fifth of all economically active respondents (19%) chose the sixth answer modality “do not know” in 2012. survey, accompanying another 16% respondents who chose the answer modality “neither agrees nor disagrees”, confirms the interpretation of Lazić and Pešić that there existed at the time of data gathering much confusion concerning the desirability of state interventionism. However, the analysis of relative frequencies with which respondents affiliated to different social classes/layers explicitly agreed and strongly agreed with the statement that less government intervention is better for the economy, presented in the column five of the Table 2. Economic liberalism distributive statism b, corroborates only the finding of Lazić and Pešić that respondents affiliated to the upper class in 2012 realized below average score on the economic liberalism scale (32% - 43% without “do not know” answer modality and 31% - 35% with it). Alternative measuring technique, however, intensively calls into question curious finding that respondents workers realized the highest above average score on this scale (3,27). Respondents workers as a whole, both more and less qualified, according to our measuring technique expressed one percentage point less frequently than average (34-35). The explanation for the under average agreement expressed by respondents affiliated to the top and the bottom of the social hierarchy with the statement suggesting less state intervention in economy, should be searched for in their common interest in strong state intervention, but with completely opposite goals in mind. Respondents workers together with respondents impoverished and aging small farmers, increasingly demand state intervention in order to survive, as layoffs, low wages or no wages at all for the work done, accompanied by a flooding of domestic market with imported goods and food, pushes them to the poverty level. The state, however, does not intervene in favor of impoverished population at the bottom of the social hierarchy. On the contrary, it serves the interests of domestic clients of the financial transnational capital. The local compradore bourgeoisie and global ruling transnational corporative and banking oligarchy ruling class needs the strong state ideological and physical apparatus to impose “liberal reforms” - from completion of the plundering privatization of all forms of collective

ownership, state deregulation of domestic and foreign trade, reduction of social, health and unemployment protection, to increasing taxation of the poor and lowering the taxation of the rich, limitation and elimination of elementary rights to trade union organization, collective bargaining and strike, lowering wages and pensions - onto the exploited and oppressed classes in Serbia, former Yugoslav republics, former societies of real socialism, people's democracies in former colonies and semi colonies as well as in former welfare states in societies of real capitalism.

Our secondary analysis of survey data reveals that in 2012 it were respondents private entrepreneurs, big farmers and lower managers, who expressed the highest above average percent of agreement with the reduction of statist interventionism (54-43% or 48-35), followed by the highly educated professionals and self-employed in the table including "do not know" answer modality in above average market liberal orientation (38-35%) (Table 1, Economic liberalism/ redistributive statismB, column 8). The most plausible explanation for the "return" of enthusiasm for economic liberalism and state deregulation in 2012 among respondents affiliated to the most "entrepreneurially" oriented parts of the "middle" strata alias old and new small bourgeoisie, resides in the fact that respondents affiliated to this strata tend to equate state interventionism with the taxation of their income realized in gray economy. On the other hand, the explanation of the finding of both Lazic and Cvejic (2011: 815) and Lazić and Pešić (2013: 299) that professionals more often than small entrepreneurs and lower managers supported the views of redistributive statism, can be explained by the fact that the professional layer of the ruling class in crisis time of shrinking industrial activity and great increase in unemployment, expects from the state interventionism the steady and above average paid job mostly in the public sector. In spite of this interest in state regulation, our finding that in 2012 it were precisely respondents members of all layers of the middle class, and not the respondents workers, who attained the highest score on the same scale, suggests simultaneously the conclusion that *highly educated professionals in Serbia still present the important social recruitment pool for the articulation and carrying out of neo-Smithean economic policy* in the interest of the local and global capital.

All these findings confirm not only the doubts about the adequacy of data presented in the fourth columns of the Table 1, Economic liberalism/ redistributive statism A. These findings strengthen above all the suspicions concerning the validity and adequacy of the item on state intervention in economy to be the measuring instrument of pro-capitalist or pro-socialist value orientations. Already the secondary analysis of 1989/90 data set (Vratuša, 1995d) revealed that in 1989 only respondents Croat directors or managers articulated a consistent neoliberal concept of market regulation of economic flows, judging by their greatest above average complete and partial disagreement with the statement that government should have greater role in the economy. In other federal units directors in 1989/1990 survey have expressed above average agreement with this neo-Keynesian statement. This finding suggests that affiliates of technocratic fraction of the ruling class of collective or group owners of social ownership, felt

not strong enough to secure capital accumulation without the protective measure of their “own” national state bureaucratic fraction of main means of production group owners in each Federal administrative unit to protect domestic market, and to expand into foreign markets (ibid: 488-489, Table 1, column VI; 510-511, Appendix Table 2). A survey among managers in the center of the world capitalist economic system would probably corroborate the thesis that the popularity of state interventionism in economy rises whenever sharpens the cyclical recession crisis caused by the intrinsic system contradictions between the potentially unlimited possibilities of development of social productive forces of labor, on the one hand, and the narrow economic production function motive – private profit, which systemically reproduces limited payment capable demand for produced merchandises.

### PROPOSAL OF AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURING INSTRUMENT

It is indicative that even though Lazić and his younger colleagues claim that they chose statism item because it was one of the only two items that were repeated in all three surveys relevant for measuring pro-socialist or pro-capitalist value orientations of respondents in the economic sub-system, they fail to mention in cited studies two more important facts. First, they avoided to mention in the first part of their studies the fact of which they were fully aware since they revealed it in the second part of their studies, that there existed another item in the questionnaire that could have been chosen for measuring instrument of pro-capitalist value orientation, which was *repeated in the same basic content formulation in all three surveys*. Observance of this elementary methodological rule for the periodical survey retakes necessary for securing longitudinal comparisons, makes this alternative item a *more reliable indicator and measuring instrument of pro-capitalist or pro-socialist value orientations of respondents*. The formulation of that item is: *“Private ownership will always be the basis of progress”*. The key concept used in this formulation refers to the fundamental characteristic of the worldwide dominant capitalist production relationship – private ownership as the legal expression of the class division of labor into managing and executing work functions exclusively performed by affiliates of antagonistic classes. Connotation of the key concepts used in the formulation of the alternative item, makes this item as well *more valid indicator and measurement of pro-capitalist or pro-socialist value orientations*, at least from the stand point of research paradigm of this author that gives primacy to relations of production instead to the relations of exchange in the definition of capitalist mode of production. Theoretical conceptualization of the mode of societal reproduction which accentuates relations of exchange (market regulation) instead of relations of production (place in class division of labor based in big capitalist private ownership), indicates even *without any sophisticated statistical factor analysis that statement on private ownership concerns “basic” characteristics of capi-*



*talist societal reproduction mode, while state interventionism concerns the “secondary” characteristics* (Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 301-302).

Could the reluctance of Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić to use from the start the statement on progressiveness of private ownership as more adequate measuring instrument of value orientations towards qualitatively different modes of production than the statement on desirability of state intervention in economy, present a part and parcel of a wider tendency among middle class alias highly educated small-bourgeois professionals: *tendency to avoid the critical research of privatization* as the process of radical restructuring of antagonistic ownership relationships and the key social class content of the “post-socialist transformation” (Vratuša, V. 2005)? Veselin Vukotić, one of the domestic propagators of the functionalist-positivist social hierarchy research paradigm and neo-Smithian market regulatory mechanisms of economic flows in Serbia, quite frankly revealed the class interest behind this avoidance: “Having in mind the revolutionary character of the changes which brings about the change of ownership, especially in the dominant way of thinking and ideological representations, the public presentation of attitudes at the least in the beginning, must not have been irritating” (Vukotić: 1993: 79). Lazić and Cvejić almost two decades later do tackle the “irritating” subject of ownership transformation, after first tackling the less irritating, but also less relevant subject of market vs state regulation of economic flows for the study of inter-systemic differences between capitalist and socialist modes of societal reproduction. In their 2011 study they just express their concern “that changes in Serbia have not yet taken a sufficiently firm hold for the self-reproduction of the new social form” (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011: 809), having in mind mostly undeveloped market institutions and that “support for the redistributive role of the state before a thorough structural economic transformation is complete is more likely to aggravate than to assist the economic and social development of the country” (Lazić, Cvejić, 2011: 819), ignoring data on the industrial production growth rates which reveal that these rates were higher in the period of “blocked” transformation than in the period of “debloked” transformation and that all the way up to 2012 industrial growth rates did not attain the level realized two years before the NATO bombardment (Vratuša, 2012: 241). Another reason why Lazić and his colleagues did not choose from the start to analyse and publish the findings on responses of respondents to the item concerning attitudes toward private ownership could be the fact that it is hard or even impossible to advocate private ownership, by definition comprising of exclusion of non-proprietors, in universalistic terms as benefiting all society members.

The findings based on the use of the item on private ownership as indicator of and measuring instrument for the pro-capitalist or anti-capitalist value orientations presented in Table 3. Pro-capitalism vs anti-capitalism in columns 3, 5 and 10, unambiguously confirm the expectations derived from the perspective of the critical new materialistic and dialectical social hierarchy research paradigm summarized in the second section of this paper (Vratuša, 1995c; 2006) that the affiliates of the upper layers of the ruling class accept private ownership as the basic value of capitalist system

with the greatest above-average frequency, while the affiliates of the lower layers of the exploited and oppressed class accept the same value with the greatest under-average frequency in all three observed periods.

Table 3. *pro-capitalism vs anti-capitalism*

Statement: Private ownership will always be the basis of progress

Measuring technique:

- summing up the percentages of partial and complete dis/agreement with respective statement

	Originally existed 5 answer modalities				answer modality 6 included in presentation of responses of the entire sample of respondents					answer modality 6 included in presentation of responses of the active respondents			
	1989				2003					2012			
column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Class	1+2	3	4+5	Rank	5+4	3	2+1	6	Rank	1+2	3	4+5	6
Ia	59	7	<b>33</b>	<b>X</b>	0	0	0	0		0	0	0....	0
Ib	31	7	<b>62</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>63</b>	5	28	5	II	20	26	<b>51</b>	3
Ia +Ib	44	7	<b>49</b>										
IIa	10	9	<b>81</b>	I	<b>82</b>	0	18	0	I	18	27	<b>47</b>	8
IIb	41	9	<b>50</b>	VIII	<b>55</b>	20	20	5	III	22	28	<b>29</b>	8
III	34	9	<b>59</b>	III	<b>53</b>	24	21	2	IV	35	23	<b>31</b>	11
IIa+IIb+III	33	9	60		58	21	19	2		33	25	32	10
IV	32	16	52	VI,VII	44	23	28	4	V	24	24	32	19
V	32	16	52	VI,VII	41	20	33	6	VI,VII	33	19	25	18
VI	33	30	37	IX	37	23	33	7	IX	28	20	23	29
V+VI	32	20	<b>48</b>		<b>40</b>	21	33	6		31	24	24	21
VII	14	27	59	IV	40	22	26	12	VIII	23	23	22	32
VIII	24	17	58	V	41	26	28	5	VI,VII				
Total	28	19	<b>53</b>	N 2963	<b>44</b>	22	29	5	N 1592	29	24	<b>29</b>	18
C's V Appr.sig.				.157 .000					.153 .000				

Legend: answer modalities: 1. Completely disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. ambivalent; 4. Agree; 5. Completely agree; 6. Do not know.

classes: Ia higher and middle level professional politicians; Ib big and middle entrepreneurs, higher and middle level managers; IIa small and micro entrepreneurs, big farmers; IIb lower managers; III highly educated professionals, liberal arts and highly educated self-employed; IV middle educated clerks, technicians and self-employed; V more qualified workers; VI less qualified workers; VII small farmers VIII unemployed

Before a further discussion of findings presented in Table 3. Pro-capitalism/anti-capitalism, it must be pointed out again that *direct com-*

*parison* of results expressed in relative frequencies of diss/agreement with statement on progressiveness of private property is *not possible* due to introduction of the sixth answer modality (do not know) in 2003 and 2012 surveys and exchange of places of agreement-disagreement answer modalities in 2003. Another serious limitation to comparison of pro-capitalist and pro-socialist orientation of main social classes in Serbia presents the availability of the representative sub sample of respondent higher and middle level *professional politicians* only for the 1989 survey. Let us therefore just point out here the finding from 1989 survey that just these respondents, affiliated to the politocratic fraction of the ruling class, expressed in 1989 *under average* agreement with progressiveness of private ownership (33%, 4 percentage points less than even less qualified workers who otherwise tend to have the greatest under average results on this survey item), bringing thus down the total average of the respondents affiliated to the ruling class agreement with progressiveness of private property four percentage points below the average for entire sample (49%, see *Table 3. pro-capitalism/ anti-capitalism*, 2012 column 3). This expression of significantly lower acceptance of the statement on progressiveness of private ownership by respondents politicians than the respondents “technocrats” and “entrepreneurs” of the domestic ruling class in 1989, can be explained not only by the interest of this fraction of the ruling class to retain control of main production means, infrastructure and banking system as the basis for transformation of political power into economic power and personal enrichment through control of the process of privatization of social property, but also for mobilization of domestic resources for national accumulation of capital. This finding about significant differences among respondents affiliated to the ruling class in 1989 in their attitude toward statement on progressiveness of private property, corroborates the theses of this author that Lazić and his younger colleagues tend to overemphasize the quantitative difference between a) “the *political-economic monopoly* of the former communist nomenklatura”, on the one hand, and “*interlocked positions of economic and political dominance* of the same group”, on the other (Lazic and Cvejic, 2011: 809).

The above mentioned secondary analysis of 1989/90 survey data set enables us as well to understand why „the middle class” played the key role *in toppling* the socialist regimes in Central and East European states, and was also the predominant source for the *recruitment of the old-new ruling class* that led the process of post-socialist transformation in these countries”, according to the findings of Glassman (1997), Longworth (1997), Szeleny and Szeleny (1995) to whom refer Lazic and Cvejic (2011: 808) and Lazić and Pešić (2013: 285) in their studies. The findings of this analysis suggest that the key domestic factor behind the process of privatisation of social and state ownership in former societies of real socialism was the interest of the technocratic fraction of the nomenklatura class of group owners of the main production means to *obtain in private ownership more secure mechanism of self-reproduction* in the privileged positions and roles in class division of labor, than the prevailing mechanism of nomination to ruling positions in the economic, political and cultural institutions by the

upper layer of the „bureaucratic“ fraction of the domestic ruling class of group owners of main production means (Vratuša, 1993: 53-68).

Findings presented in columns 4, 9 and 14 on the rank of respondents affiliated to 7-5 classes in Table 3. Pro-capitalism/anti-capitalism, call into question as well the thesis of Lazić and his younger colleagues that small entrepreneurs alias “old” small bourgeoisie, were in 1989 class on the margins and “outside” of the allegedly still dominant socialist normative institutional order, less inclined to support liberal values, not only in the political but also in the economic sphere (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011: 819; Lazić and Pešić, 299). Respondents small and micro entrepreneurs, namely, proved to be the first ranked supporters of the basic pro-capitalist value orientation in 1989 and 2003, before the second ranked entrepreneurial and managerial fraction of the ruling class. Only in 2012 survey, respondents small entrepreneurs less often than respondents big and middle entrepreneurs and top and middle managers accepted the private ownership statement and for the first time only relative majority of these respondents agreed with the progressiveness of private ownership.

The comparison of the frequency of strong and partial agreement with the statement on private ownership in 1989 and 2012 reveals sharp *average fall of belief in private ownership as the basis of progress among respondents affiliated to all social classes* (from absolute majority in 1989 (53%) to just 29% in 2012 (see columns 4 and 14 in Table 3. Pro-communism vs pro-capitalism. The invention of Lazić and his younger colleagues to eliminate the “do not know” answer modality from the calculation of the pro-capitalist economic liberalism value orientation, brings the average agreement with private ownership statement up to 35% in 2012, but does not reverse the falling trend, contrary to hypothesized and wished for research findings on “spreading” of liberal and economic pro-capitalist values down the social ladder from the upper and the middle class beyond the theoretical middle point 3 on the 5 point measuring scale.

The fall in agreement with the progressiveness of private ownership is the least expressed among the *top and middle level managers and big and middle entrepreneurs*. Mentioned elimination of the “do not know” answer modality from calculation of the average score and access to a subsample containing 205 respondents affiliated to “economic elite” controlling economic resources, contributed to the finding of Jelena Pešić (2014 in Lazić, 179) that in 2003, period of stronger penetration and consolidation of capitalist social relations, 75% of these respondent expressed partial and complete acceptance of the private ownership statement. This would mean an increase of 13 percentage points in comparison to such responses of respondents higher and middle level managers or “technocratic fraction” of the ruling class in 1989 period of socialism in crisis, when there existed only 5 answer modalities. Including the sixth answer modality in the calculation of the average on the basis of data made available to participants of the project “Challenges of new social integration in Serbia” 2012, eliminates this apparent increase. In the period of severe depression in 2012, differences in the findings on decreased agreement with the attitude of respondents controlling main means of production toward progres-

siveness of private ownership are the smallest - just three percentage points – irrespective which measuring technique is used (exclusion or inclusion of the sixth answer modality).

The explanation for the decline in pro-capitalist value orientations even among the respondents affiliates of the domestic ruling class in 2012 survey, should be searched for in the fact that the survey samples did not really include the typical members of the top layer of the domestic compradore bourgeoisie and its “strategic partners” or order givers within the domestically absent world ruling class. The decreased frequency with which the top of the ruling class respondents expressed their preference for private ownership should be understood as well in the context of the selective “fight against corruption” and prosecution of several wealthiest managers and big entrepreneurs.

The comparison of data presented in columns 4, 9 and 14 in the Table 3, Pro-capitalism/ anti-capitalism, reveals that the greatest fall in the rank of respondents affiliated to particular classes according to the relative frequency of partial and complete agreement with the private ownership statement, happened among respondents unemployed, small farmers, and highly educated new small bourgeois respondents. Since 1989, they are becoming increasingly skeptical about the possibility to improve their relative positions in social hierarchy through private entrepreneurship and/or stable employment in private sector. The drastic disappearance of private ownership pro-capitalist value orientations among respondents small farmers in 2003 and 2012 survey, should be understood in the context of speeded up differentiation among the farmers, opening up of domestic market to imported goods and sinking of the great number of old farmer households on the verge of poverty on the one hand, and appearance of big capitalist farmers or “latifundists” (Šljukić, 2004:277) on the other.

Decreased support for private ownership among highly educated professionals and self-employed, however, never went below the level of agreement with the private ownership statement of respondents affiliated to the working class. The difference between preferences of respondents belonging to the managerial and private entrepreneurial top layers of the ruling class and workers, steadily increased from 61:48=1.27 in 1989, over 62:48=1.57 in 2003 to 51:24=2.12 in 2012. Insistence of Lazić and his younger colleagues on the calculation of the average score on the five point scale and elimination of the sixth “do not know” answer modality, blurs this rising gap between the attitude toward privatization of the top of the social hierarchy and its bottom. It also blurs the fact that *the “middle class”, alias “old” and “new” small bourgeoisie, presents just the lower fraction of the local comprador bourgeoisie within state capitalism in the re-colonized periphery of the world capitalist economic system* (Vratuša, 2010).

Only among respondents clerks steadily rose the “spirit of capitalism” – their rank according to the acceptance of private ownership statement rose from the VIth and VIIth place, shared with respondents more qualified workers in 1998, to high third rank in 2012, held by highly educated professionals in 1989 and lower managers in 2003, suggesting that



society in Serbia is ever deeper *divided in just two classes* and not in seven or five.

Let us point out at this point of argumentation that Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić formulated their hypotheses and findings concerning the expectations of normative-value dissonance reduction in the period of “deblocked” transformation, under the strong influence of the fact that the period of “deblocked post-socialist transformation” went itself through two sub-periods: a) the sub-period of just apparent or virtual economic growth from 2003 to 2007 (due to the change in calculation of the basic macro-economic indicator from gross social product to gross national income, Kovačević, 2014), and b) the sub-period of the depression and systemic crisis of accumulation of capital. Their choice of the neo-weberian conflict and relational class variant of the positivist-functionalist social hierarchy research paradigm and the value orientations standpoint of the conservation or at the best reform of capitalist social relations (Vratuša, 1995c; Vratuša, 2012b: 234-261), prevented Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić to realize from the start that *intrinsic contradictions of capitalist mode of production would sooner or later falsify predictions and uncritical belief in the “trickledown effect” of economic growth stimulated by market competition* and from the chosen research paradigm and standpoint deduced expectations that further consolidation of market economy, accompanied by economic growth, improvement in economic position of broader social strata including lower layers of population and strengthening of the legitimization basis of private ownership, would lead to strengthening of the support to liberal values also among lower social strata (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011: 815; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 296/297).

Lazić and Cvejić in their 2011 study, still declined to interpret their finding on the high support of the middle class respondents to state intervention in economy in 2003 as the sign that affiliates of this class in Serbia “value-wise ‘geared’ to support the latest regulatory turn in the capitalist economy” (Lazić and Cvejić, 2013:819). They rather offered *the trans-systemic explanatory thesis* according to which the prevalent support for the redistributive role of the state detected in the 2003 survey among the affiliates of the middle class and all other social groups in Serbia, stems from the fact that “throughout its history, Serbia has never built a market economy and the state regulatory role in it always prevailed” (Ibid) . Lazić and Cvejić deduced from this *trans-historic continuity thesis* that such social and historic context “could be expected to support the conservation of existing relations, rather than the establishment of new ones” (ibid). Lazić and Cvejić failed to deduce from the trans-historic continuity thesis that the real-socialist “normative-institutional order” was not and could not be either fully fledged “new mode of production” from 1917 to 1989, or fully fledged “old mode of production” since 1989, qualitatively different from and independent from the surrounding dominant capitalist mode of production.

Lazić and Pešić in their 2013 study shifted even more the accent of their interpretation of the predominance of statist-redistributive value orientations among respondents in 2012 survey, away from the original

theses on inter-systemic transformation from “real-socialism” to “capitalism” and away from the modified thesis on historically inherited obstacles to gradual diminishment of retrograde inter-systemic dissonance between the new (capitalist) norms and old (real-socialist) values. Lazić and Pešić namely formulated new thesis that especially capitalist social system is *intra-systemically* changeable (Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 283-4). Newly adopted thesis on intra-systemic *cyclical shifts of regulatory mechanisms in different phases of accumulation of capital*, enabled Lazić and Pešić to interpret the prevalent statist-distributive value orientations among middle class and other respondents in 2012 survey as the expression of the progressively oriented intra-systemic value-norm dissonance, searching for the optimal mode of regulation of economic flows in different phases of capital accumulation (ibid).

Lazić and Pešić indirectly expressed themselves doubt in the validity of their conclusions based just on the use of the statement on desirability of state interventionism as the measuring instrument of the value orientations toward qualitatively different normative-institutional orders, when they decided to use wider set of indicators, so that “conclusions could be better argued” and “more valid” (Lazić and Pešić, 293-4). It is indicative that the first item in this “wider set of indicators” is precisely the statement on private ownership: i) Social progress will always rest on private ownership. Together with statements ii) All sorts of public services would better function if they were privatized and iii) Without privatization enterprises would be in an even worse situation than they are today, Lazić and Pešić only in this second phase of their research present as empirical statements which refer to “*basic*” general economic liberalism or capitalist orientation. Only in this second phase of their research Lazić and Pešić also admit that the item which they used as the indicator of economic liberal or capitalist value orientations of respondents, the statement iv) The less government intervenes in economy, the better it is for Serbia, together with statements v) Privatization functions in theory, but not also in practice and vi) Government should not try to control, regulate or meddle in any other way in private firms, present as empirical statements which refer just to “*historically specific*” form of economic regulation paradigm according to which state interventionism gets ever greater role within dominant capitalist market economy (Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 296). The resulting factor scores based on the analysis of the first group of statements referring to general liberal or basic capitalist value orientations, do not contain any unexpected findings on alleged greater economic liberalism among respondent workers than among affiliates of the “higher”, “middle” or “intermediate” class/stratum in all three observed periods. These unambiguous results induced Lazić and Pešić to formulate conclusion which corroborate our results presented in Table 3, pro-capitalism/anti-capitalism: “groups on the higher and middle positions in social hierarchy in majority share the values which are on the most general level, characteristic for capitalist system, while lower groupings significantly less accept these values”(Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 296).

Presenting the state intervention in the economy as one of the basic characteristics of “socialism” and not of capitalism, lead Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić to ignore in the first phase of their research before explosive manifestation of 2007/8 systemic crisis, the facts on constitutive role of the state interventionism in establishment and reproduction of capitalist social relations. Even after the manifestation of the crisis, they exclusively define it as the crisis of historically specific and phenomenal neo-liberal form of accumulation of capital regulation and not as the crisis of basic relations of accumulation of capital as such (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011:815; Lazić and Pešić, 2013:303). Influence of pro-capitalist value orientations is discernable as well in the claim of Lazić and Pešić(2013:508) that “historical alternative is not even foggily formed”, ignoring that even if this claim was true, that “middle class” or highly educated new small bourgeoisie is contributing to such ideological situation as long as it chooses to assist the ruling class to impose on the majority of population the ideological hegemony of secondary and basic values legitimizing capital accumulation as being without alternative and even as desirable and progressive, instead to join emerging social movements like Coordinating bureau of workers’ and peasants’ protests which began to link scattered fights for defense of work places in social and state enterprises and agricultural land from robbery privatization, contributing to further articulation of the alternative to capitalist mode of production, which systemically lead to concentration and centralization of economic, political and cultural wealth and power in the hands of minority. In a similar fashion, German sociologists Max Weber before them, a self-identified “class conscious bourgeois” (Kieran, 2004), all the way to the outbreak of World war I for redistribution of colonies among the “old” and “new” imperialist powers, could construct his *ideal type* of “economic”, “market” or peacefully competitive and rational capitalism, advocating for colonial policy of Germany in order to better compete with “old” colonial powers, without explicitly demonstrating systemic connection of colonialism with “*political*”, “*state*” or *imperialistically violent and avanturistic capitalism, as its permanent potential other face* (Weber, 1921/1976).

The choice of the combination of neo-Weberian conflict and neo-Parsonian consensual variant of the positivist-functionalist social hierarchy research paradigm and the choice of the practical political value orientations and standpoint of the reproduction of capitalist social relations of bourgeois society, prevented Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić to deduce logical conclusions from their discovery that respondents middle-class members, together with the respondents members of the ruling social strata expressed significantly higher degree of political and economic “liberal” or pro-capitalist value orientations than the respondents workers (especially less qualified ones) when they are asked to express their diss/agreement with statements referring to the basic value of capitalist mode of production – private ownership. Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić, continued to focus the research of value orientations of the “middle class” respondents as if they presented a separate class equidistant from the ruling and the subjugated classes, instead as lower layer of the ruling class, its main recruitment pool

and ideological representative of that fraction of the ruling bourgeoisie which is dominant in a given phase of the cyclical systemic crisis of the accumulation of capital on the world scale.

Remaining faithful to their preferred functionalist positivist social structuration research paradigm and economic liberalism economic policy paradigm, Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić could not even consider the possibility to construct and implement *reduction of the model of class structuration of society to just two classes* in the last instance, working class, especially less qualified manual producers on the one hand, and all the rest, on the other. Two class model would enable the clear-cut empirical research of the swings in the medium and long term trends in “old” pro-capitalist and “new” anti-capitalist value orientations on the basis of the attitude of respondents toward basic value of capitalist mode of production - private ownership over life reproduction resources, as the juridical expression of class division of labor between conductors and conducted.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

The critical theoretical and empirical reexamination of the original hypotheses and their later modifications of Mladen Lazić and of his younger colleagues Slobodan Cvejić and Jelena Pešić concerning the choice of survey statements as indicators and measuring instrument of the economic liberalism or pro-capitalist value orientations of the main classes and layers in Serbia with the accent on the middle class alias old and new small bourgeoisie affiliates, clearly demonstrated that measuring instrument construction, implementation and findings depend on the previous researcher's choice of theoretical and methodological social structuration research paradigm and practico-political value oriented standpoint concerning desirable organization of social reproduction relation. Starting from the alternative perspective of research paradigm and practical political standpoint chosen by this author, the main conclusions of this critical reexamination can be resumed as follows:

1. “*Market liberalism versus redistributive statism*” does not present a pair of “*mutually conflicting value orientations* in the economic subsystem” which express “*the dominant values of two fundamentally different institutional-normative orders, socialism and capitalism*” as Lazić and younger colleagues claim (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011: 814; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 288). This pair of value orientations presents only neo/Smithean and neo/Keynesian *variants of managing of the cyclical crises of capital accumulation on the world scale*, leaving dominant class division of labor and capitalist relations of production which generate social inequality and hierarchy untouched. Even though Lazić and Cvejić had to acknowledge that actual systemic economic crisis in the world, imposed state regulation as the basic instrument to overcome the crisis (Lazić, Cvejić, 2011: 819), and even more explicitly Lazić and Pešić state that there exists intra-systemic normative – value dissonance within different phases of capital accumulation influencing strengthening or weakening of a given historical form of

market regulation (Lazić and Pešić: 286), they did not use the statement present in all three surveys which better expresses the dominant values of two fundamentally different institutional-normative orders – “private ownership will always be the basis of social progress”. The reason for this omission should be searched for in the fact that Lazić, Cvejić and Pešić do not have in mind the elimination of private ownership as legal expression of class division of labor and social generator of enlarged reproduction of inequality, since they believe in the trickle-down effect of economic growth set in motion by free market competition, expecting that “consolidation of market economy – accompanied by economic growth” would improve economic position of wider, also lower, social strata and strengthen legitimation basis of private ownership and with it would lead to lowering of value-norme dissonance (Lazić and Cvejić, 2011: 813; Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 297).

2. The empirical findings on the pro-capitalist economic liberalism value orientations as measured by the statement on private ownership as the basis of progress, unequivocally point out to the falling average partial and complete agreement of respondents affiliated to all social classes and class fractions, but above all respondents unqualified workers and small farmers, with this statement. These findings indicate that *pro-capitalist “post-socialist transformation” in the meaning of plundering privatization, lost all legitimacy*. Domestic compradors and locally absent order givers, however, still attempt to “finish” privatization of remaining social and state ownership, even though the absolute majority (often above 60% of all respondents, with highest above average results for respondents workers) in 2012 survey declared that they are completely against privatization of public utilities and services like electricity, water and sewage systems, telecommunication infrastructure, schools, hospitals). This means that the main “dissonance” is not between “old” real socialist values and “new” capitalist norms, but the *rising “dissonance” or discrepancy between social interests and preferences of the relative or absolute majority of respondents concerning privatization in Serbia on the one hand, and the related legislative regulation and economic policy praxis of the ideological and political representatives of the local comradore bourgeoisie and locally absent world ruling class of financial capital within the state apparatuses, on the other*.

3. The statistical analysis of the responses to the statement on private ownership presented in Table 3 pro-capitalism /anti-capitalism clearly reveals that there exists a trend of growing differentiation between the attitudes toward progressiveness of private ownership between the respondents affiliated to the domestic ruling class on the top of the social hierarchy, on the one hand, and the respondents unqualified direct producers, on the bottom of the social hierarchy on the other. Respondents affiliated to different layers of the “middle class” alias old and new small bourgeoisie, as a rule express above average agreement with private ownership statement symbolizing the basic value of the capitalist mode of production, legal expression of class division of labor as basic generator of enlarged reproduction of social inequality.

4. The “middle class” alias “new” small bourgeoisie, is not a separate class but a lower fraction of the ruling class, articulating and implementing the legitimizing ideology in the service of interests of the dominant fraction of the ruling class in a given phase of the contradictory process of accumulation of capital in planetary proportions. Part of highly educated domestic new small bourgeoisie is using its knowledge - power to advance the interest of local and global big capital by presenting further privatization of all public infrastructure and natural wealth as inevitable and desirable condition for betterment of social standard in the future, instead of revealing that this path leads to perpetuation of colonial occupation and exploitation through outflow of profits of transnational banks and corporations, deindustrialization, trade deficit and indebtedness, unemployment and asphyxiation of domestic research and innovation (Menzinger, 2013).

5. Multi-class and multi-layer neo-Weberian model of social hierarchy is not adequate for the explanation and understanding of the social processes of qualitative and not just quantitative transformation of dominant social relations of production and ownership. For elucidation and interpretation of qualitative overcoming of class division of labor as the main source of social inequality and hierarchy, it is necessary to construct and test in national and international empirical research the two class model of social hierarchical structuration and pro and anti capitalist value orientations measurement instrument.

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Vera Vratuša

**JOŠ JEDNOM O UTICAJU TEORIJSKIH, METODOLOŠKIH I PRAKTIČNIH ODLUKA SOCIOLOGA TOKOM ISTRAŽIVANJA NA NALAZE – SLUČAJ MERENJA PROKAPITALISTIČKIH I PROSOCIJALISTIČKIH VREDNOSNIH ORIJENTACIJA U SRBIJI OD 1989. GODINE**

**Rezime:** Cilj rada je ponovo zainteresovati kolege sociologe za pitanja kolektivne i individualne auto-refleksije na podrazumevani a često zanemaren uticaj *a priori* teorijskih, metodoloških i praktičnih političkih izbora tokom istraživanja. To se čini na primeru zavisnosti validnosti upitnika kojim se mere promene u prokapitalističkim i prosocijalističkim vrednosnim orijentacijama koje prate transformaciju društvene reprodukcije u Srbiji od 1989, od početnih izbora paradigme društvene hijerarhijske stratifikacije i ličnih preferenci autora u vezi sa društvenim razvojem.

Merni instrument na koji se fokusiramo rezultat je saradnje Mladena Lazića, istaknutog sociologa i autora teorijsko-metodološkog istraži-

vačkog okvira i rukovodioca tri istraživanja izvedenih 1989, 2003. i 2012. godine, i dva talentovana mlada sociologa koji su se specijalizirali u oblastima primenjene statistike u sociološkim istraživanjima. U ta tri istraživanja prikupljali su se podaci kako bi se proverile hipoteze o trendovima u razlikama između prosocijalističkih i prokapitalističkih vrednosnih orijentacija u okviru glavnih klasa u Srbiji, sa akcentom na srednjoj klasi (staroj i novoj sitnoj buržoaziji, kako ih naziva autor ovog rada) i dominantnom normativno-institucionalnom uređenju. Tačnije, ovaj rad dovodi u pitanje stav pomenutih autora da tržišni liberalizam i redistributivni statizam predstavljaju suprotstavljene vrednosne orijentacije u ekonomskom podsistemu, tj. da one predstavljaju dominantne vrednosti dva suštinski različita načina društvene reprodukcije i institucionalno-normativnih poredaka, naime socijalizma i kapitalizma. Umesto toga, autor ovog rada iznosi tezu da od 16. veka, od klasne predistorije čovečanstva, postoji samo oscilovanje između tržišnih mehanizama organizacije društvene reprodukcije i onih kojima upravlja država, a sve to u okviru istog protivrečnog sistema akumulacije kapitala na svetkom nivou. Glavni zaključak je da bi validniji instrument merenja antikapitalističkih i antisocijalističkih vrednosnih orijentacija bio odnos ispitanika prema privatnom vlasništvu shvaćenog kao pravni izraz klasne podele rada, pre nego li odnos prema državnom intervencionizmu u privredi.

**Ključne reči:** socijalizam, kapitalizam, razlike u vrednosnim stavovima, srednja klasa, sitna buržoazija, privatno vlasništvo, klasna podela rada, merenje vrednosnih orijentacija.