

THE LINGUISTIC GROUNDWORK FOR COGNITIVE POETICS

The objective of the paper is to highlight the interconnectedness of the fundamental concepts studied by cognitive linguistics and the character of narrative analysis as performed in cognitive poetics. For this reason, we deal with only two fundamental processes underlying communication, and therefore narrative discourse: conceptualization and categorization, both relevant for better understanding of how narrative construction, as well as reception, ultimately function. Cognitive and cultural models, as relevant for literary interpretation, are discussed for the purpose of explicating how it is possible, firstly, to achieve specific meaning in the process of narrative progression; secondly, how these structures enable, influence and facilitate comprehension both on the level of elements and the entire discourse, but also how they guide attention and support salience – motivate the prominence of some elements as opposed to other. In this paper, cognitive poetics is discussed as an instrument or method which facilitates the manner in which narratives are interpreted – a methodical perspective rather than a substitute for literary theory and criticism.

Key words: cognitive poetics, conceptualization, categorization, interdisciplinary approach, narratology

Introduction

Narratology owes its development to the structuralist tradition that sought to systematize and place the various perceivable structures and elements of literary works into a wider context, and classify them according to specific narrative-defining criteria. Undoubtedly, the focus of structuralist narratologists was not primarily narrative interpretation, but rather the process of its making, structure-wise. Such narratological perspective produced the initial working definitions of narratives, and their defining features, but also raised questions about the interrelatedness of the elements in narrative structure. However, it is the narrative turn in social sciences, as Milutinović

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points out in his article “The Cognitive Basis of Postclassical Narratology,” that places narrative as “central to many areas of culture, from autobiography, history and psychology, to natural sciences, banking, and even sport” (2015: 522). The focus of this paper is to produce an overview of the fundamental concepts pertaining to cognitive linguistics present in cognitive poetics as the starting point for any narratological analysis. The theoretical framework of this paper relies on Croft and Cruise’s *Cognitive Linguistics*, and Gavin and Steen’s *Cognitive Poetics in Practice*, as well as Peter Stockwell’s *Cognitive Poetics*. The investigation into the nature of both fictional and non-fictional communication essentially relies on the tools developed by decades of research in the field of cognitive sciences – not only linguistics, but psychology as well. The aim of this paper is also to shed light on the benefits of approaching narrative from the point of view of cognitive sciences, but also present the issues provided by the structuralist tradition in narratology that the cognitive approach may have the answers to.

Narrative definitions

Narrative definitions in structuralism generally revolve around locating specific plot-types, or rather specific causal motivations in the text elements with the view of creating a set of generalized formal models that categorize all literary works into genres. Monika Fludernik’s theory, emerging from structuralist tradition, sees “events” as the “characteristic feature of narrated worlds” (FLUDERNIK 2009: 5), and Wolf Schmid sees “temporal connections” alone as implying the change of state necessary for a story to be considered narrative (SCHMID 2010: 5). Therefore, events or plots, or at least minimal changes of state, are perceived as the central, narrative-defining, element which is in line with the classical tradition as Dejan Milutinović notices, “the roots of narratology, as well as literary theory, can be found in Plato and Aristotle’s works” (2015: 521). Structuralist beginnings of narratology neglect, albeit due to the inaccessibility to knowledge that we have today, valuable narrative features rendering the definitions of narrative incomplete or inapt for wider application, but they do raise questions that will be the very focus of cognitive poetics and narratology – questions pertaining to the relationship of narrative discourse and story, our perception of literary genre and literary categorization, as well as the intricate issue of narrative reception. In “Narratology as a Cognitive Science,” David Herman suggests that “structuralist narrative theorists appealed to schematic world knowledge [...] themselves working on the problem of story comprehension” (2000). The structuralist tradition saw the interconnectedness of elements in formal structure as crucial to understanding literary work classification, which suggests that they

intuitively appealed to at least one of the fundamental mental processes analyzed today in cognitive sciences with the view of uncovering how it is that humans effortlessly discriminate minute features of objects in the world and classify them according to subjective experiential standards. Mieke Bal, a poststructuralist, essentially defines narratology as not only the theory of “narratives, narrative texts, images, spectacles, events; cultural artifacts that tell a story” (BAL 1999: 3), but also a set of “generalized statements” (*Ibid.*) pertaining to a specific aspect of reality. Bal’s definition of narratology, and concepts pertaining to its application on narrative texts, implies that narrative theory should be construed as an instrument for understanding the various processes pertaining to narrative creation – the process of storytelling, narrative reception and interpretation, which David Herman resonates with in *Story Logic* by defining narratives as communicative instruments (2002). In his essay “Systematic Place of Narratology in Literary Theory and Textual Theory” (2003), Titzman offers a view that narratives are not limited only to the literary tradition, but that they are continually, consciously and unconsciously, created and recreated in all manifestations of human activities. Moreover, Jerome Bruner, *The Acts of Meaning*, introduces the distinction between “narrative and paradigmatic modes of discourse” (1990: 94) where the narrative mode, or “emplotment” stands for the cognitive capacity to assign meaning to a sequence of events, and the paradigmatic mode for the logical mode that ensures that there would be no breaches in the narrative. According to Bruner’s theory, and in line with the poststructuralist view of narratives, the ability to produce and receive narratives is one of the fundamental and ‘built-in’ human cognitive capacities modeled through social interaction. This capacity does not only enable post-hoc representation of the reality of the individual, but rather enables its (re) configuration. It is exactly this feature of narrative mode of thinking, the capacity for mental model-world shaping and building that is the subject matter of cognitive poetics, and a direct link to the wide scope of research of cognitive linguistics. Reception and process oriented, cognitive poetics examines narratives using tools provided by linguistics, Gestalt psychology, etc. in order to uncover the nature of the processes instrumental for the creation, as well as understanding narratives.

The intersection of cognitive poetics and cognitive linguistics

In “Narratology as a Cognitive Science,” David Herman notices that “both language generally and narrative specifically can be viewed as tool-systems” for building mental representations of worlds (2000). Language and narratives are both viewed as resources for better understanding human cognitive capacities, developed and practiced through social interaction.

The focus of cognitive poetics is the narrative experience, or how it is that narrative discourse produces such mental states in the interpreter that a unique cognitive structure emerges upon reading, based on the discourse input in the form of a complex network of cognitive or cultural models. In addition to that, the cognitive approach to narrative also focuses on the mental processes triggered by narrative elements that allow insight into how the final effect of a literary work is achieved. In his article “Cognitive Narratology” (2013), David Herman notes that cognitive poetics focuses on the mental processes that allow “readers, viewers, or listeners to navigate storyworlds to the extent required for their purposes in engaging with a given narrative”. This includes investigating the specific narrative cues that capture the narrative recipient’s attention, maintain it and contribute to a certain number of narrative interpretations. However, this means that cognitive poetics, actually, can be perceived not as a subfield contributing to the overall explanation of human cognitive capacity on the basis of our mental processes engaged on narrative sense-making, but as a powerful resource for its comprehension. Narrative, as reflective of the productive scope of human cognitive abilities, is methodologically examined using empirically tested instruments provided by cognitive sciences (MILUTINOVIĆ 2015: 522), and it becomes “a cognitive artifact” (2015: 524), but also a tool for cognitive improvement. The conclusions gathered from the creative use of language, observed in narrative, yield insight into the complex abilities of the human mind to grasp and interpret the reality that surrounds it; but also the ability to reconfigure it conceptually and extend and project it onto other mental creations. The cognitive approach to narrative, therefore, benefits largely from the investigation of conceptualization, blending, deixis, etc. among other, in cognitive linguistics. Furthermore, Herman defines narratives in discourse as “a kind of cognition-enhancing logic in their own right” (2000) pointing to narratives being the product of a complex network of cognitive processes whereby language is manipulated in order to express the embodied experience of the world and grant it meaning. If the mental processes involved in the reading experience are definable in terms of what causes them, and what effects they produce on the reader, under variable yet, to a degree, conditions limited by the narrative discourse itself, then another goal of cognitive poetics is to determine what, and how, affects narrative interpretation on the basis of culture, global knowledge in the communicative situation (i.e. the context the reader is given in a particular literary work), and how it is possible to have disparate or even contradictory narrative interpretations. Such disparity is of special concern because it can provide knowledge about how the way we conceptualize the world affects narrative interpretation cross-culturally. In “Cognitive Narratology,” David Herman summarizes the objective of cognitive poetics as “research on

storytelling and the mind (that) can investigate how a culture's narrative practices are geared on to humans' always-situated mental states, capacities, and proclivities" (2013). Commenting on the nature of cognitive capacities pertaining to language use, Croft and Cruise, in the same vein, insist that "the organization and retrieval of linguistic knowledge is not significantly different from the organization and retrieval of other knowledge in the mind, and the cognitive abilities that we apply to speaking and understanding language are not significantly different from those applied to other cognitive tasks, such as visual perception, reasoning or motor activity" (2004: 2). Both Herman's and Croft and Cruise's views indicate that the same range of cognitive abilities is responsible for the ability to create (tell stories), interpret and understand narratives in a specific way. The sections that follow will be dealing with conceptualization and categorization, concepts pertaining to (cognitive) linguistics, which cognitive poetics draws on extensively.

Conceptualization

In the third chapter of her paper "Cognitive Linguistic Approaches to Literary Studies: State of the Art in Cognitive Poetics," Margaret Freeman observes that the traditional literary criticism focuses largely on the aesthetic and emotional aspects of narrative with the disregard for how meaning is achieved on the level of language – by what means the networks of meaning are attained in the first place, whereas cognitive linguistics focuses on "accounting for the way language characterizes meaning" (FREEMAN 2009: 4). In *Cognitive Linguistics*, Croft and Cruise propose three major hypotheses of cognitive linguistics that have direct influence on the foundations of cognitive poetics. Namely, the first hypothesis sees the cognitive faculty enabling communication via language as non-autonomous, and therefore not disconnected from non-linguistic abilities. More precisely, the same cognitive ability allowing for communication by means of language is responsible for the storytelling and sense-making capacities, among other, relevant for cognitive poetics (CROFT & CRUSE 2004: 1). Therefore, it may be argued that cognitive abilities allowing for the "representation of linguistic knowledge" (CROFT & CRUISE 2004: 2) are the same ones responsible for the human capacity to represent other conceptual structures outside the linguistic domain. In other words, exploring narrative structure or storytelling as a process by which a linguistic or other representation is invoked, actually means exploring the mental processes allowing for the sense-making ability whose final outcome is a cognitive structure. The ability to communicate by means of language then may be considered a unique cognitive ability, but

only if noted that its “component cognitive skills are not” (CROFT & CRUSE 2004: 2) unique to the domain of language only.

The second hypothesis pertains to the ability to conceptualize. Basically, Croft and Cruise build on Langacker’s theory that “grammar is conceptualization” (2004: 1), and therefore, if this argument is extended to larger structures present in narratives, the very base or foundation of narrative creation seems to be rooted in the ability to conceptualize. Although the faculty allowing for conceptualization to occur is not specific to language, conceptualization is responsible for those aspects of literary works, or other narrative forms, that can be considered creative or artistic. Basically, humans have the ability to conceptualize and project or create mental spaces, in degrees of reference to the real world with coherence. Moreover, approaching the matter from the rhetorical point of view, Richard Walsh, in *The Rhetoric of Fictionality*, sees relevance as a more valid criterion in assessing narratives, and their social and psychological effects on the reader (2007). When it comes to mental spaces the truth condition only has value if it is examined in the context of that very mental space, and not the real world. Cognitive structures pertaining to possible worlds rely on the ability to conceptualize experience – not merely project or reflect it in line with the experience available in the real world. In terms of literary theory, and cognitive narratology and poetics, the ability to conceptualize is not only examined as the underlying principle making possible the understanding and interpretation of various narrative forms, but also accounts for their potentially subversive power. Both the cognitive and rhetorical approach rely on insights offered by cognitive psychology when it comes to “models of memory, perception, attention and categorization, especially in Gestalt psychology” (CROFT & CRUSE 2004: 3), and yet all of those essentially investigate the nature of conceptualization and models of conceptual structures as the underlying principles making any form of interaction and communication of the human embodied experience possible.

The third hypothesis presented in *Cognitive Linguistics* pertains to the nature of linguistic knowledge, or how this knowledge is acquired and put to use – “linguistic knowledge – knowledge of meaning and form – is basically conceptual structure” (CROFT & CRUSE 2004: 2). What Croft and Cruise propose is that linguistic knowledge is not unique or different from other forms of knowledge, but rather that its base is found in the cognitive ability to conceptualize. They argue that “conceptual structure is subject to construal, including the structure of categories and the organization of knowledge” (CROFT & CRUSE 2004: 3), and from the point of view of linguistics, “grammatical inflections and grammatical constructions play a major role in construing the experience to be communicated in specific ways” (*Ibid.*).

The argument is not new to narratology. Cognitive linguistics deals with the manner in which grammar is consistently used based on previous experience. More precisely, as language is learned through its use, the cognition of the appropriateness and effect of utterances is learned and produced depending on the occasion. Croft and Cruise term this process inductive learning, and state that “abstraction and schematization do not lose the conventionalized subtleties and differences found among even highly specific grammatical constructions or word meanings” (2004: 3). Furthermore, the production of narrative discourse in the process of storytelling inevitably follows the same principle – concepts used are modified or elaborated by means of various devices, appropriated in the inductive process of language use, in order to produce a novel cognitive structure. The concepts, then, are evaluated by the readers in the context of the available information and their general knowledge, with cues provided in the text, and with references pertaining to the text, or extending to other text as well. Cognitive poetics is especially interested in the problem of intertextuality and narrative interpretation by readers with variable background knowledge. Cognitive structures are built in the process of storytelling, throughout the discourse, creating a context of their own – a context that need not necessarily be fully compatible with that of the real world. Essentially, concepts do not appear randomly in the mind of the storyteller or speaker in everyday communication. In fact, their meaning and scope accrue layers through cultural and other exposure. The necessity to investigate the process by which concepts are organized has yielded, both in the field of cognitive science, psychology and research pertaining to artificial intelligence, models that facilitate the understanding of narrative reception. Namely, along with the information necessary for the creation of context, narratives also contain certain information gaps that are unconsciously overlooked in the process of reading. Cognitive poetics, similarly to cognitive psychology and linguistics, deals with the fascinating concept of frames, schema, experiential gestalt, script, etc. With essentially the same idea in mind, the aforementioned concepts strive to give an explanation to the issue of gap-filling that happens automatically upon receiving narrative information. The idea behind these concepts is that experience in social interaction, and overall world experience, provides basis for the reading experience. As a cognitive structure springing from the mind of one particular experiencer, the narrative discourse may be viewed as a complete unit. This claim, however, would be problematic across different genres and poetics. The reluctance of postmodern narratives to reach completeness would render the claim somewhat inaccurate, if the focus is on the discourse itself, and genres themselves are fluid, as well as purely conventional. However, as a structure, the narrative might be viewed as complete unit even if it does

not include all the information or details about every specific event, state or character because narrative understanding is ultimately contingent upon our ability to conceptualize. Moreover, the narrative may be considered complete even if the discourse lacks structure. Most of the information contained in the narrative discourse is contextual and requires active participation on the part of the reader. As mentioned, cognitive psychology isolates emplotment as the cognitive faculty which enables the recipient of the narrative discourse to sequence the given contextual information – temporally, spatially or referentially – but also fill in the necessary gaps with personal, individual, experience. Whereas the discourse, or what we see as a piece of text, may not always seem as a complete or unified cognitive structure, it is a subjective and engineered experience for, and even by the recipient whose task is to construct a story from the given information. The choice of concepts, or words, paired with specific grammatical constructions “evoke an understanding, or more specifically a frame; a hearer invokes a frame upon hearing an utterance in order to understand it” (CROFT & CRUISE 2004: 40). In addition to that, Croft and Cruise add that “all aspects of the grammatical expression of a situation involve conceptualization in one way or another, including inflectional and derivational morphology and even the basic parts of speech” (2004: 40) – for grammar relies on our ability to conceptualize. Construal operations which are used to shape meaning function almost unconsciously. Undoubtedly, cognitive poetics, similarly to the rhetorical approach to narratology presented by, among others, Richard Walsh, strives to explain how, on the one hand, different individuals produce similar if not nearly identical readings of a single literary work; and, on the other hand, how cross-culturally, and even intra-culturally, the readings of a single literary work may vary.

Categorization

Another question pertaining to the reading experience involves salience, or how our perception is more attuned to certain phenomena (UNGERER & SCHMID 2006: 16), therefore enabling for figure-ground relationship between certain presented objects in the discourse to focus and maintain the attention of the reader. Salience or “the focus of consciousness” (Croft & Cruise 2004: 47) is defined as a phenomenon that involves the human cognitive ability to perceive certain cognitive structures more readily than others, in degrees, thereby activating other “conceptual structures in a neural network of the mind” (CROFT & CRUISE 2004: 47). Unarguably, salience can be understood as a highly subjective experience of objects. It may be argued that salience depends largely on some of the basic patterns of human experience. Essentially,

there exists a propensity to perceive certain phenomena more readily than other, but also individual experience and knowledge contributes greatly, as well as the psychological state of the reader, on the outcome of the process. The perception of the world greatly influences the manner in which different phenomena are classified both on the individual, and general level. Therefore, the issue of categorization, fundamental to cognitive linguistics, also stands as the central issue of cognitive poetics. The question is what constitutes a genre – what features, shared and found consistently in what is classified under a single label, on the superficial level. The very issue of what makes a genre a separate category within a broader literary field relates to what elements the reader perceives as salient – what elements pertaining to a specific kind of text the reader notices as the most prominent, structure and content-wise. Prototypicality, as “the basis for categorization, with central examples acting as cognitive reference points in the middle of a radial structure” (STOCKWELL 2005: 29), is a concept that incorporates generic features of a single category, with its more prominent and less prominent members. Therefore, categories may “display prototypicality structure on the basis of our experience and the embodiment of conceptual systems” (STOCKWELL 2005: 31). Prototypicality functions in degrees, allowing, in the process of categorization, the interpretation of the object as a complete unit (a Gestalt whole), but also the distinguishing of attributes that do not necessarily stand as ideal category representatives. The process correlates to that of literary interpretation – of the text as a whole, the representation that remains upon reading – “that begins in our culture even before we begin to read the actual text” (STOCKWELL 2005: 32). This sort of text comprehension is a dynamic process in which layers of meaning are added upon layers of meaning, and this stage can possibly be followed by in-depth analysis that requires the deconstruction of individual text elements, as well as a ‘re-interpretation’ of specific elements that seem to have disruptive effect on the narrative. Such elements would be recognized as having attributes that do not necessarily comply with the generic or ideal attributes of the category, or the genre. Margaret Freeman notices that “a dynamic theory of prototypicality over time could explain how literary decisions as to what constitutes a literary text are made” (FREEMAN 2009: 4), and by extension it could provide more insight into how we classify specific formal or other narrative elements into specific genres, and based on what grounds, as well as how the perception of different genres changes over time. According to Stockwell “structures with very strong or definite arrangements tend to be the basis, human-scale features with which we are most familiar. It seems that we think in terms of basic level categories” (2005: 31), or that “reading is a skilled activity that relies on familiar knowledge and flexible, adaptive responses to novel situations” (GAVINS & STEEN 2003: 27). The

principle of “family resemblance” (GAVINS & STEEN 2003: 29) seems to be an adequate explanation to how people identify certain objects and immediately classify them according to the criteria they believe are the most prominent in the object and the already present prototype in their mind. However, the closeness of the exemplar to the prototype need not be the condition for the subject to classify it under one family. Also, the mental process enabling classification applies not only to objects, but to “other kinds of domains including action-based concepts, artistic style, emotion terms, medical diagnosis, and person perception” (GAVINS & STEEN 2003: 29). The flexibility of this mental process and its scope to classify and distinguish between categories may also account for the ability to recognize distinctive narrative discourse elements in literary works and classify them. For example, a gothic novel may contain such narrative passage written in lyrical style, which would be a breach of literary convention of sorts if conventions were taken as obligatory. Basic general knowledge of what pertains to the category of novel, for example, the gothic sub-genre, style and what is considered lyrical as opposed to descriptive, narrative, etc. would enable the subject to create a cognitive structure to serve as a blanket for the totality of the narrative discourse. Of course, the reader notices specific elements and categorizes them in the very process of reading, but it is only after the process is finished that the reader may understand the narrative as a Gestalt whole, and with the view of the particular aspects of its elements. Each individual categorization brings additional attributes into play, as well as subsequent beliefs, desires, thoughts, and other propositional attitudes that influence the creation of the final cognitive structure – the story extracted by the reader from the narrative discourse. Moreover, categories are not homogeneous, and have “fuzzy boundaries” (UNGERER & SCHMID 2006: 41). It seems safe to assume that concepts are interpreted, and categorized, in the context of the situation, but also that categories or the way we perceive them can change over time. The flexibility of concepts is reflective of the flexibility of categories as well, and according to the experiential prototype hypothesis, the prototype against which other concepts are categorized, this mental representation, is actually “some sort of cognitive reference point” (UNGERER & SCHMID 2006: 42), but not a closed set of members, or a fixed and rigid set of implied attributes. Namely, whereas abstract concepts may be interpreted with the view of the context in which they typically appear, the actual and specific context of the communicative situation calls for a new category organization whereby a concept would either be differently categorized or assigned additional attributes (UNGERER & SCHMID 2006: 45). Regardless of the level at which an analysis is performed, the level of a sentence or narrative, the context in which a category appears is not the sole basis on which meaning is construed.

In fact, this is the case of what Stockwell calls “the “leakage” of attributes” (2005: 33), where the construct becomes a conceptual or cognitive model. Concepts are put under specific categories and hierarchically viewed, but concepts on the lower levels of taxonomies are not less prominently perceived. Gavins and Steen claim that concepts such as “chair”, which is a subordinate concept in the category of “furniture,” may be more salient than the superordinate members of the category because they “reflect prototypical knowledge” (2003: 30) that the embodied experience of the world accounts for. In *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, Lakoff explains categorization as “essentially a matter of both human experience and imagination – of perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand, and of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the other” (1987: 8), correlating it, basically, to human biology and embodied experience. Furthermore, the variable extent to which individual enumerations of attributes for a particular category, as well as their complexity and quality, may differ is an argument in favor of conceptual or cognitive models, or “idealized and generalized patterns which find their manifestation of actualization in a variety of linguistic expressions” (STOCKWELL 2005: 33) – idealized cognitive models comprise connections between different categories as influenced by individual experience, social and cultural background, and serve as tools for facilitating interaction. Bearing this in mind, prototype effects are still present on all linguistic levels, including the level of the linguistic discourse. An issue that cognitive poetics has yet to investigate in-depth is how it is that genre depends on perhaps specific cognitive or cultural models.

In narrative discourse, words as standing for concepts do not alone account for the complexity of meaning. Rather, it is the intentional use and combination of concepts as represented by words, and the cues used for the purpose of accruing meaning, in specific or varied concepts, that participate in the creation of cognitive models. Moreover, cognitive models contain propositional structures by which elements that participate in them relate not only to each other, but also to different contexts. This is especially interesting in the case of narrative discourse because cognitive structures may not only relate to the internal content organization of the discourse, but also express intertextuality – make connections externally, to other texts. In addition to that, cognitive models also assimilate meanings or schemas, metaphors and metonymy, typically associated with specific cultures. Cultural cognitive models, therefore, can be distinguished as a special kind of cognitive structures enriched with content pertaining to the experience of the world of particular group of people. Such cognitive structures offer a unique kind of knowledge accessible only from the vantage point of the experience of a member of that particular cultural community. Both cognitive and cultural models may

overlap, and some cultural models may interpreted and experienced, with different degrees of difficulty, by non-members as well, but undoubtedly, the cultural aspects of cognitive models affect salience because they contain notions about the world, behavioral patterns pertaining to interaction, etc. Ungerer and Schmid explain cognitive and cultural models as “just two sides of the same coin” (2006: 52), stressing inter-individual and collective aspects, respectively. Attention, again, appears crucial when it comes to categorization in the reading experience as the process itself requires the reader to distinguish between elements of prominence, each with attributes that follow those element-concepts. The perception of certain concepts, therefore cognitive structures, and networks depends to on the reader’s socio-cultural situation, it is “a complex psychological ability whose different aspects can be most easily illustrated by visual ability: one can select one object or another to focus one’s attention on; focus of attention is surrounded by a scope of attention; one can take a more coarse-grained or more fine-grained view of a scene; and one can fix one’s gaze on a scene or move one’s eye over it” (CROFT & CRUSE 2004: 47) depending on one’s own active and intentional involvement in the reading process, personal experience, knowledge background, but also the successful connecting of concepts guiding the reader to reach desired mental images, etc. in a particular narrative discourse.

Metaphors and metonymy as “cognitive instruments” (UNGERER & SCHMID 2006: 118) are a fascinating aspect of the human cognitive faculties that enable interlocutors to successfully communicate by not actually uttering what they mean to say. Metonymy, on the one hand, relies on the fundamental human capacity to categorize by which the use of a subordinate member of the category can be sufficient to mean the actual category as a whole. On the other hand, metaphors are instrumental in linking both cognitive categories and cognitive models with the view of conceptualizing or explaining another concept. Both metaphors and metonymy are present in everyday discourse, as well as other discourses, and both have roots in social and cultural interaction and, especially in the case of the latter, social stereotypes (LAKOFF 1987: 79). Just like cognitive models function as the basis of our knowledge of the world, so metaphors and metonymy present a particular mode of cognition of the world and social interaction. Furthermore, the scope of meaning of both metonymy and metaphors varies depending on the cognitive structure to which they pertain in the context of the narrative – already enriching the concepts they refer to, both have additional layers of meaning and offer additional links to the concepts in their surroundings. Cognitive poetics bases its investigation of conceptual metaphors and metonymy on the idea that they stand for the process of “mapping of properties between the two spaces or domains” (STOCKWELL 2005: 107), whereby the target domain is modified or enriched, restructured, by

the use of the base domain, in the simplest of terms. In the sphere of narrative analysis and interpretation, metaphors can often be the source of ambiguity, or their existence may altogether be overlooked due to their being backgrounded by other elements of the text. Due to their content or purpose, metaphors in narrative discourse are often perceived as ornamental – expressive metaphors, for example, that enrich the meaning of a particular concept and/or extend it over several other concepts. On the other hand, explanatory metaphors can often go unnoticed because they are considered natural, as if hardwired into the way we conceptualize the world, and by extension into the linguistic means by which we communicate our experience. Metaphors need not be limited to a single target domain – they can extend to different target domains, have a wide scope, and thereby influence narrative comprehension by means of relating a network of cognitive structures in a literary theme. Considering that metaphors unite different categories or cognitive models, they also must be intentional. In narrative analysis, it is of importance whether metaphors are visible or invisible – obscured by other elements, or difficult to interpret in isolation since invisible metaphors can often be mistaken for stylistic idiosyncrasies on the part of the storyteller (STOCKWELL 2005: 107), as mentioned in relation to expressive metaphors. In addition to that, bearing in mind that metaphors draw their inspiration in social interaction and culture, more specifically cultural stereotypes, their function can also be subversive. The use of a particular metaphor in the context where it is not necessarily the most appropriate may not only be an exertion of the storyteller’s eccentricity, but rather an intentional logical breach in the discourse, recognized and acknowledged by the reader. Categorization then, as the capacity to relate, link and understand a chain of elements under the scope of a wider category or networks of categories, and conceptualization stand as two mental processes, that can be perceived as fundamental for communication – on all levels of linguistic units: from a single word, utterance, to a fully developed narrative discourse.

Conclusion

Cognitive poetics, as discussed in the paper, focuses on the formal, semantic and syntactic levels of the discourse with the aim of uncovering such features of the text that reveal the manner in which reception functions. Moreover, it approaches narratives from the level of individual words representing concepts, the level of sentence, paragraph, to the level of the narrative discourse itself as a Gestalt whole. Evans and Green maintain that the “defining property of the cognitive model is that the characterization of

linguistic units as symbolic units is not restricted to the content system but also applies to the grammatical system” (Evans & Green 2006: 504), whereby the grammatical form too participates in the meaning. By examining the communicative situation on every level, with the view of also explaining the socio-cultural aspects of both narrative creation and reception, cognitive poetics offers a set of highly effective tools already established in cognitive linguistics for examining the creative use of language. Narratives pose a unique challenge and resource to cognitive linguistics being the product of both linguistic and non-linguistic faculties working together in an effort to communicate a subjective experience. Also, narrative reception offers new insight into how cognitive and cultural models are not only formed, but also decoded to produce new cognitive structures. The cognitive and rhetorical approaches to narrative seriously challenge not only the terminological distinctions formulated by formalists and structuralists persisting in contemporary narratology, but also the foundations of how narratives are understood in the first place, and by extension, the roles of such entities causing debate for decades, such as author or implied author, reader and implied reader, etc.

The most valuable contribution of cognitive linguistics, as well as cognitive psychology, to narratology and, specifically, cognitive poetics is the methodological basis which facilitates the investigation into the different aspects of human experience, and behavior, as communicated in the immense body of literature. Cognitive poetics, with the methodology now available, does not only analyze narratives with the view of uncovering underlying meaning from the point of view of the storyteller or reader, but rather with the aim of explicating how it is that humans *think*, and how it is that the production of narratives has such cultural, collective and individual significance. It is necessary to note that cognitive poetics, as an interdisciplinary approach to narrative, provides an invaluable resource to literary theory, but it is nevertheless a field in its development – unarguably both restrained and systematized by its linguistic methodology, appealing and yet delicate for its psychological insights which are either too subjectively or tentatively applied to literary works. Cognitive poetics, therefore, is not an evolutionary step from literary theory, figuratively speaking – it focuses on the processes within narratives and uncovers the manner in which we communicate. It is a novel and methodical perspective that rather than exclude what is native to literary theory extends its scope.

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ЛИНГВИСТИЧКЕ ОСНОВЕ КОГНИТИВНЕ ПОЕТИКЕ

Овај рад се бави испитивањем повезаности фундаменталних концепата (когнитивне) лингвистике и науке која је из ње настала – когнитивне поетике. Прецизније, рад истражује како су конкретно два процеса која омогућају комуникацију – концептуализација и категоризација – кључни за разумевање процеса којима се наратив и ствара, као и процеса рецепције текста и његове интерпретације. Затим, рад испитује утемељеност когнитивне поетике на когнитивним и културолошким моделима као релевантним за књижевну критику, а одговара се на питање како је то могуће постићи одређено значење у тексту; односно како когнитивне структуре утичу на и омогућавају разумевање текста како на нивоу појединачних елемената, тако и целине. Когнитивна поетика се у овом раду испитује као интердисциплинарни инструмент или метода за која олакшава интерпретацију одређених аспеката наратива, али која се никако не може сматрати „објективном“ или „научном“ заменом за књижевну теорију или критику.

Кључне речи: когнитивна поетика, концептуализација, категоризација, интердисциплинарни приступ, наратологија