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Promoting Philosophy, Undermining Philosophical Ideals: The Case of the Radio Show “Gozba” and its Treatment of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the War in Ukraine

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Abstract

According to philosopher Anthony Cashio, radio possesses a power to create a deep and intimate connection between speakers and listeners, and therefore to forge strong communities. It is this power that makes radio a potent instrument both of populist propaganda, disinformation, conpirology and fear-mongering, on the one hand, and of public philosophy fostering critical and reflective capacities of its listeners, on the other. Following Cashio’s insight and drawing on Jason Stanley’s work propaganda, I will analyze one of the longest running philosophy themed radio shows in Serbia, “Gozba”, which airs every week on Radio Belgrade Channel 2 (RB2). By focusing on the way “Gozba” has covered two significant recent events – the COVID pandemic and the Ukrainian war, I will demonstrate that in dealing with these topics, the show undermines the philosophical ideals it claims to promote, and instead serves primarily as an instrument of spreading conspiracy theories, dangerous anti-science views, vaccine hesitancy, fake news and Russian war propaganda. Also, I will analyze the dangers of promoting such deeply anti-philosophical stances under the guise of philosophy and critical thinking.

Keywords: philosophy, radio, propaganda, conspiracy theories

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Introduction

Anthony L. Cashio, philosopher and the co-host of the award-winning radio show and podcast: Philosophy Bakes Bread, begins his article on philosophy on the radio by offering a stark contrast between what radio is so often used for in USA today, and the typical methods and aims of philosophy. Using the example of Rush

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Limbaugh, a famous right-wing shock jock, whose widely popular Rush Limbaugh Show spread conspiracy theories, fear, xenophobia and extremist politics for more than three decades, Cashio points out the power of the radio to bypass our rational and critical capacities. As he writes: “Radio hosts like Limbaugh give word and form to a chaos of emotions and vague ideas. They don’t worry about telling the truth, except by accident, and they don’t encourage thoughtful engagement with ideas except to give the listener a sense of power and certainty that comes from believing they have already arrived at the right conclusion. Playing off the illusory intimacy of the radio broadcast, they provide the appearance of engaging in intellectual conversation. In other words: they are sophists. They offer worldviews and answers to difficult and important questions, but the substance of their answers is shallow and misleading, and works to undermine a spirit of philosophy that is marked by serious, humble, critical inquiry. In short, they use the radio for demagoguery and manipulation instead of as a medium that encourages critical engagement with the world” (Cashio, 2022, p.211-212).

In spite of the fact that radio can be, and often is, used in this deeply anti-philosophical way, Cashio believes that the power of the medium can be articulated in a completely different way – “to create the space for reflection and dialogue key to a philosophical community that values a pluralistic and democratic approach to community building” (Cashio, 2022, p.212), and in order to show this, he goes on to review the work of Walter Benjamin in the 1920’s Germany, but also contemporary radio shows and podcasts dedicated to promoting public philosophy.

In this article, however, we will not deal with one of the numerous examples of successful public philosophy on the radio, but with something else – a radio show putatively dedicated to promoting philosophy, reflection and critical thinking, but that in many cases promotes “demagoguery and manipulation”, not dissimilar to those Cashio identifies in Limbaugh’s show. In the first part of the article, I will present the show and its treatment of two topics of public significance, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, and also, demonstrate why this treatment is inappropriate for a show dedicated to promoting philosophy and critical reflection. In the second part of the article, I will use Jason Stanley’s concept of “undermining propaganda” to explain how it is that a show that is supposed to promote critical reflection and reasoned debate, actually subverts the very thing it is supposed to promote. In the third part I will give a speculative explanation for the conditions that are conducive to the development of this kind of subverting propaganda, and also offer some concluding thoughts on the consequences and dangers of such propaganda, especially when it is being promoted under the label of philosophy.

“Gozba” and its Treatment of the Covid Pandemic and the War in Ukraine

Radio show “Gozba” (Serbian for “Symposium”), dedicated to promoting philosophy on the radio, has been aired on Radio Belgrade 2 (Channel 2 of the national public radio) for more than a decade (RTS, *n.d.*). During this period, it has covered a

range of topics and hosted hundreds of different guests, not all of them philosophers. Its author and host from 2011 till 2023 was Aleksandar Lukić, who left the position at the beginning of 2023 and was succeeded by Nikola Tanasić. Both Lukić and Tanasić have graduated in philosophy and Lukić even holds a PhD in the field (Daničić, 2016), which demonstrates the importance of authorial vision for the show itself: the author is not *just* a journalist talking to philosophers (or non-philosophers) on philosophically relevant subjects, but is a philosopher himself, actively choosing the topics and guiding the conversation. The radio channel the show is aired on is one of the most listened to radio channels in Serbia (RTS PR agency, 2023). The very name of the show, a clear allusion to Plato's famous dialogue, suggests a Socratic approach to philosophy and public discussion – based on open and free exchanges of arguments, not on rhetoric or sophistry. But as I will demonstrate, in practice, the show frequently betrays and even undermines this valuable ideal. In order to show this, I will focus on the period from 2020 to 2023, and two topics especially – the COVID-19 epidemic and the war in Ukraine. These two topics stand out both by their undisputable public importance, and by the attentiveness demonstrated by the authors of the show. Due to the abundance of material, I will offer a detailed analysis of only a few representative examples. It is however important to note the following: although the episodes of the show dedicated to the two mentioned topics do not represent the majority of the episodes aired in the period, the persistence with which the authors of the show return to them with a clear agenda analyzed in the following pages, gives a clear political bent to the identity of the whole show. So, although the conclusions that follow certainly do not generalize to all episodes of the show (many of which are much more standard discussions of academic philosophy), they do uncover something significant about the show itself and the way it is perceived.

On the topic of the pandemic, Aleksandar Lukić, the show's author and host at the time, held an openly skeptical line toward the official anti-pandemic measures, and targeted the medical authorities that stood behind them. Although not all of the guests invited to the show to speak on the topic shared these views, most of them did. For instance, among the guests in the period from 2020 to the end of 2022, there were many infamous vaccine skeptics and COVID conspiracists, such as Jovana Stojković, Branimir Nestorović, Valentina Arsić-Arsenijević and Alek Račić (*Etika i pandemika*, 2020; *Filozofija i medicina*, 2020; *Pandemija, nauka, etika*, 2020; *Filozofija, medicina i politika*, 2021; for a history of their conspiracist and anti-vaccine statements see Komarčević, 2021; Tančić, 2021; Radojević, 2022). Short descriptions of some of these shows often clearly reveal their nature and intentions. For example, announcing the show with Jovana Stojković, a long-time vaccine denier and an extreme right-wing politician and activist, the short description on the official RTS website says the following: “The current global crisis which has been caused by the virus infection has a huge influence on economic, social, educational and moral realms. The situation is marked by numerous controversies and debates between experts and ‘non-experts’, to whom it is said that they should stop meddling into their own lives, stick to their jobs and ‘just keep hitting the ball’. However, the fact that the director of the World Health Organization is not a medical doctor, but

a microbiologist from Ethiopia, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, does not seem to present a problem, etc. It seems that a lot more attention is being paid to the medical and epidemiological, and a lot less to the ethical aspect of the current situation” (*Etika i pandemika*, 2020). In this short text there are clear implications that Novak Đoković’s opinion on COVID is being unjustly disregarded by experts, while at the same time it is implied that the director of the WHO is not an expert in the relevant field.

In other cases, the guests are themselves neither vaccine skeptics nor conspiracy theorists, but are in different ways “drafted” by Lukić to support his own position. This is the case with Divna Vuksanović, an accomplished Serbian philosopher working in the fields of aesthetics and philosophy of media. The short description on the RTS website wears its conspiracist intentions on its sleeve, starting from the title of the episode, “The Global reset and the New Totalitarianism”: “History has its own crucial periods in which the old paradigm that lays in the foundations of social relations changes and the new one arises. The declared pandemic resembles such a crisis which is caused in order to establish a new normality in which what was previously abnormal or even intolerable, because of endangering freedom and the foundations of civic society, becomes normal. In the social conditions such a condition, if it would ever get established, could be defined as the new totalitarianism” (*Globalni reset i novi totalitarizam*, 2021). To claim that that pandemic was caused with an intention of producing certain social changes is already a conspiracist claim by definition, but the phrases used in the description, such as “The Global Reset” and “new normalcy” are also clear references to COVID-conspiracist narratives (ADL, 2020; Siraki & Mohammad, 2023), and the same goes for the hypothesis that the pandemic has been declared in order to curtail some crucial individual freedoms (Arnold-Forster & Gainty, 2022). Although in the show itself, Vuksanović never engages in spreading conspiracism or misinformation, but rather deals with ideology criticism of the Klaus Schwab’s document on the “great reset”, her contributions are garnered with Lukić’s explicitly conspiracist comments that remain unchallenged.

On the topic of the Ukraine war, the situation is similar, although slightly less explicit. Here, the prevailing strategy seems to be the following: in the face of brutal Russian aggression in Ukraine and the simultaneous crackdown on opposition and anti-war voices in Putin’s Russia (Amnesty International, 2023), it is important to point out only the faults and hypocrisy of the West. For example, the short description for the episode that aired four days after the beginning of Russian invasion of Ukraine, titled “Totalitarianism of Liberal Democracy”, says the following: “Totalitarianism as a social arrangement is not necessarily connected to the poor and so-called undemocratic states. Contemporary history demonstrates that such an order based on violence that is turned both outward and inward, also appears in the so-called democratic states of the Western type. A possible justification of the Western imperial wars by the liberal political order of these states is difficult to defend, taking into account the obvious fact that that these societies are increasingly becoming ideologized societies of quasi-liberal dogmatism, imperial towards the outside and very aggressive towards their own citizens” (*Totalitarizam liberalne*

demokratije, 2022). This exercise in applied Orwellianism in which democracies are totalitarian, and authoritarian regimes are “so-called undemocratic” is a good illustration of the method that the show uses to address the war in Ukraine.

The rest of the episodes dealing with this topic follow the same pattern. For instance, the episode with sculptor and philosopher Dragan Radenović, on the topic “History as a Struggle of Good and Evil” is described thusly: “Evil often wins, but only temporarily, until it gets uncovered or unmasked as evil. That is why evil has always presented itself as good. Many evils were committed in the name of the good”. (*Istorija kao borba dobra i zla*, 2022) Although this sounds extremely abstract, by listening to the show itself, it becomes evident that abstract metaphysical concepts of good and evil are just thinly veiled stand-ins for Russia (good) and the West (evil disguised as good). Radenović, who is presented as a freshly awarded winner of a medal by the “Russian International Peace Fund”, explains that he got the medal due to his active struggle for “world peace”, and expresses his hope that “this Special Operation will be finished as quickly as it can... and that the children that represent the future of this planet will get a chance to grow up in a spirit like the one after WWII... outside these newly invented needs that are a sign of a perverted value system” (*Istorija kao borba i zla*, 2022). The “Special Operation” is, of course, nothing else but the Russian propaganda euphemism for invasion of Ukraine (Arkhipova, 2023; Spišiaková & Shumeiko, 2023, p. 377.) – the “peace activist” Radenović is actively cheering for the victory of the aggressor, and repeating another Russian propaganda cliché about the “perverted West” (Rettman, 2023). This is applied Orwellianism once again – war is peace, at least if it is the Russians who are waging it. To this, the author and host, Aleksandar Lukić, replies that in the Russian language, there is still a symbolic connection between concepts of peace and world. If the listener still had any qualms about whether Russia is on a side of peace, this etymological argument should settle it once and for all (*Istorija kao borba i zla*, 2022).

The episode with philosopher and publicist Nikola Tanasić (who will later become the author of the show, replacing Lukić), with the title “Philosophy, Politics and International Relations”, is described this way: “The world is in a crucial time of crisis, but also of hypocrisy, that consists in moving away from the proclaimed values of the West. Democracy, human rights, media freedom and the like, it turns out, apply only if they are in accord with the Western interests. Otherwise, they are just of secondary importance” (*Filozofija, politika i međunarodni odnosi*, 2022). The episode itself brings us many well-known elements of Russian propaganda, such as those that the West has provoked the war in Ukraine, and that it fans the flames of conflict, but also some original contributions by Tanasić who claims that the war in Ukraine is best described as a “civil war” between “Russian speaking people”, thus relativizing the crime of aggression. To leave no space for guessing, Tanasić concludes: “Westerners may believe that Russians are conducting an invasion of the Western city of Kiev, but when Russians say – we are going to take Kiev, that is just as if Serbians would say – we are going to take Bjeljina, or Podgorica, or Banja Luka... or Sarajevo” (*Filozofija, politika i međunarodni odnosi*, 2022). The point being – Russian invasion of Ukraine isn’t an invasion at all, but “a civil war”.

As if all this was not enough, Aleksandar Lukić asks Tanasić whether Ukrainians are informed about biological laboratories operating on their territory (*Philosophy, Politics and International Relations*, 2022) – another conspiracy theory, this time originating in Russian war propaganda and being spread by the US extreme right (Chappell & Yousef, 2022). Tanasić appears to disbelieve this conspiracy, and does not agree with Lukić on the existence of the laboratories, but he does not challenge him on it either, so the listener is likely to leave convinced that this claim is not really up for debate (*Filozofija, politika i međunarodni odnosi*, 2022).

Unreality and Undermining Propaganda

All this is very far from Socratic thinking as “the idea that one will take responsibility for one’s own reasoning, and exchange ideas with others in an atmosphere of mutual respect for reason, is essential to the peaceful resolution of differences, both within a nation and in a world increasingly polarized by ethnic and religious conflict” (Nussbaum, 2010, p.54). On the contrary, what these fragments reveal are deep anti-intellectualism and distrust towards experts and expertise, science and scientific institutions, as well as an abundance of conspiracy theories and conspiratorial thinking in general. Both of these – distrust towards epistemic authorities and conspiratorial thinking – undermine the possibility of meaningful public debate about important issues, and in order to show this I will turn to Jason Stanley’s account of fascist propaganda in his book *How Fascism Works* (2018).

According to Stanley: “Intelligent debate is impossible without an education with access to different perspectives, a respect for expertise when one’s own knowledge gives out, and a rich enough language to precisely describe reality. When education, expertise, and linguistic distinctions are undermined, there remains only power and tribal identity” (Stanley, 2018, Anti-intellectualism, para. 1). What we have in the cited excerpts from the show are good examples of exactly this kind of undermining of intelligent debate. When the opinions of scientific authorities are casually put into question, while scientific institutions are intentionally maligned, informed debate on complex issues becomes impossible.

Furthermore, by replacing scientific expertise and verified data with conspiracy theories, the show does something else that Stanley recognizes as crucial for destroying the preconditions for reasoned debate: it undermines the sense of shared reality. As Stanley argues, the so-called marketplace of ideas, of which John Stuart Mill famously claimed that it will always lead to knowledge, only does so if the public in which different opinions are being aired is already receptive to reasons and attuned to reasoned debate. Otherwise, flooding the public sphere with misinformation, paranoia, impassioned rhetoric and propaganda, will leave the citizens unable to find firm ground in shared reality, and thus unable to deliberate together. Stanley’s example for this kind of intentional creation of “unreality” with an obvious goal of undermining trust in democratic institutions is the Russian television network “Russia Today”. Explaining the challenge that media like RT present for Millian optimism regarding the exchange of ideas, Stanley writes: “Mill seems to think that knowledge,

and only knowledge, emerges from arguments between dedicated opponents. Such a process, according to Mill, destroys prejudice. Mill would surely then be pleased with the Russian television network RT, whose motto is ‘Question More.’ If Mill is correct, RT, which features voices from across the broadest possible political spectrum, from neo-Nazis to far leftists, should be the paradigm source of knowledge production. However, RT’s strategy was not devised to produce knowledge. It was rather devised as a propaganda technique, to undermine trust in basic democratic institutions. Objective truth is drowned out in the resulting cacophony of voices. The effect of RT, as well as the myriad conspiracy-theory-producing websites across the world, including in the United States, has been to destabilize the kind of shared reality that is in fact required for democratic contestation. What did Mill get wrong here? Disagreement requires a shared set of presuppositions about the world. Even dueling requires agreement about the rules. You and I might disagree about whether President Obama’s healthcare plan was a good policy. But if you suspect that President Obama was an undercover Muslim spy seeking to destroy the United States, and I do not, our discussion will not be productive. We will not be talking about the costs and benefits of Obama’s health policy, but rather about whether any of his policies mask a devious antidemocratic agenda. In devising the strategy for RT, Russian propagandists, or ‘political technologists,’ realized that with a cacophony of opinions and outlandish possibilities, one could undermine the basic background set of presuppositions about the world that allows for productive inquiry” (Stanley, 2018, *Unreality*, para. 23-25).

We can easily recognize the same pattern of producing “unreality” in the previously cited examples from “Gozba”³. No doubt, the COVID-19 pandemic presented a serious challenge for whole societies, and the anti-pandemic measures presented a legitimate and urgent topic for public discussion, but spreading conspiracy theories about the “Global Reset” was no way to make such a debate possible, much less to further it in any meaningful way. On the contrary, it was a way to further deepen the citizens’ distrust in institutions, and weaken their sense of shared reality, and all this in an extremely vulnerable moment in which collective compliance with anti-pandemic measures was necessary. Similarly, the war in Ukraine is a tragic and world-changing event that allows for different legitimate interpretations, but spreading the belief that there are “biolabs” in Ukraine aimed at producing viruses that specifically target Russians, is not one of them – it is a bizarre conspiracy theory that puts into question the very sense of what is and is not possible and realistic. By promoting this and similar theories, “Gozba” effectively makes reasoned public debate on the issue of the war in Ukraine much less likely.

In his book *How Propaganda Works* (2013), Jason Stanley makes a distinction between two basic types of propaganda – supporting propaganda, which he defines as “a contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to increase the realization of those very ideals by

³ Incidentally, both Aleksandar Lukić and the current author and host of the show, Nikola Tanasić write for the *Russia Today Balkan* (see Lukić, 2023; Tanasić, 2023).

either emotional or other nonrational means”, and undermining propaganda, which is defined as “a contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals” (Stanley 2013, p.53.). As Stanley himself notes, the second type of propaganda is certainly more interesting and more puzzling of the two. While the phenomenon of supporting propaganda seems to be relatively straightforward (Stanley’s example is waiving the national flag in order to strengthen patriotism in the audience) there seems to be something paradoxical about the undermining propaganda, since it undermines the very thing it is supposed to promote. One of Stanley’s examples is a Nazi propaganda message presenting Jews as a public health threat (“Jews are the Black Death”) – this message was presented as promoting public health, but was actually undermining it by working directly against the health of all the Jewish citizens of Germany (Stanley 2013, p. 62.). A less drastic example, also offered by Stanley, are studies on climate change funded by the fossil-fuel industry, which are presented as promoting the ideal of scientific objectivity, but which are in reality undermining this ideal by presenting biased research and results that put into question the reality and seriousness of climate change (Stanley 2013, p. 60.).

What makes undermining propaganda puzzling is the fact that the audience does not notice the contradictions between its stated ideals and its actual goals. Stanley solves this puzzle by introducing the concept of “flawed ideology”. According to him: “Flawed ideological belief masks the contradictions of undermining propaganda by erecting difficult epistemic obstacles to recognizing tendencies of goals to misalign with certain ideals: for example, obstructions to understanding liberal democratic concepts and what they entail” (Stanley 2013, p. 57). For instance, flawed ideology of Nazism that rationalized the inhumane treatment of Jews by inculcating dehumanizing beliefs about them (Stanley 2013, p. 3), made it possible for many Germans to overlook the contradiction in the message equating them with Black Death. At the same time, this message further strengthened the dehumanizing ideology of Nazism, which is according to Stanley, what undermining propaganda typically does – after being enabled by flawed ideology, it further strengthens it in return (Stanley, 2013, p. 4).

The analyzed episodes of “Gozba” are, I would argue, a clear example of Stanley’s undermining propaganda. Starting with its very name, the show presents itself as promoting Socratic ideals of reasoned debate and rational reflection, but in the analyzed cases, it actually undermines these very ideals by spreading fear, paranoia, misinformation, conspiracy theories and distrust of experts. However, as with undermining propaganda in general, the most interesting question is – how does it work in spite of its own contradictions? Here, it is important to note that “Gozba” is aired on the national radio, and that among its guests are some of the prominent academic philosophers in Serbia, so the question naturally arises of how its contradictions manage to pass by unnoticed? Following Stanley, we should assume that there is a flawed ideology at work which produces necessary preconditions for smoothing out these contradictions or not recognizing them as such. Just like biased climate reports funded by corporate money manage to pass as promoting

objective science due to a flawed ideology that has already laid the groundwork for believing that “climate change legislation is not in the service of doing anything about the climate, but rather in the service of changing lifestyles to accommodate a socially progressive agenda: climate change policy as gay marriage” (Stanley 2013, p. 19), so the flawed ideology at work in the case of “Gozba” has obviously made at least parts of the public receptive to the idea that scientific organizations and most Western media sources are tools of a conspiracy, and that critical reflection consists in uncovering conspiracies such as these. To try and give a detailed account of this flawed ideology would go beyond the scope of this article, but existing literature on the issue could help us make some tentative assumptions about it.

Conclusion

In his book *Teorija zavere: Srbija protiv “novog svetskog poretka”* (2006)⁴, Jovan Byford notes that in Serbia during the 1990’s, a decade which was otherwise marked by wars, militant nationalism and international isolation, there was a surge in conspiratorial thinking and a proliferation of conspiratorial explanations. Byford treats conspiracy theorizing as a specific ideological tradition, and describes this tradition as “a loose network of ideas, arguments, beliefs and rhetorical instruments that conspiracy theorists around the world use to construct and explain the idea of an insidious plot intent on world domination” (Byford, 2006, p. 1). However, although Byford recognizes that this tradition is a worldwide phenomenon, he also notes that there was something specific in the way it was treated in Serbia under the regime of Slobodan Milošević – while in most other countries in the West, conspiracy theorizing was on the margins, in Milošević’s Serbia it was a part of the mainstream: “In Milošević’s time, Serbian conspiratorial discourse did not have a subversive or rebellious spirit typical for contemporary conspiracy theories in the western world. This was due to the fact that unlike their western colleagues, Serbian conspiracy theorists did not feel threatened in their environment. Milošević’s Serbia proclaimed itself to be the last bastion of resistance to the world conspiracy and the New World Order, so it was an ideal base for conspiracy theorists of different stripes. While Milošević was in power yelling a thunderous ‘no’ to the New World Order, conspiracy theorists were in the very epicenter” (Byford, 2006, p. 171). Numerous examples Byford cites in his book, of conspiracy theories published in mainstream media in Milošević’s Serbia, some of them verging on explicit antisemitism, prove that this was indeed the case (Byford 2006, p.108-114). Byford ends his book on a cautiously optimistic note, stating that after the fall of Milošević’s regime, on October 5. 2000, the situation has changed for the better, and that conspiracist discourse has largely withdrawn to the margins. However, there is reason to believe that this frail progress has been rolled back during the last decade which has witnessed the return of many political and media actors from the 1990’s into the mainstream, together with the

⁴ *Conspiracy Theory: Serbia Against the „New World Order“*

conspiracist discourse they openly promote (for example, see Pavlović, 2022). There is, therefore, a reason to believe that the flawed ideology from the 1990's had so thoroughly permeated Serbian society and its public sphere that contradictions present in cases of undermining propaganda such as the one we see in "Gozba" easily go unnoticed.

Cashio ends his text by noting a clear connection between Rush Limbaugh, who was awarded a Medal of Freedom by Donald Trump in 2020, and the insurrectionist attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Cashio concludes: "The transformative power of radio has real-world consequences that can surpass its ethereal medium" (Cashio 2022, p. 219). It would be much less convincing to claim that there is a similarly clear line between "Gozba" and some other real-world consequences such as vaccine hesitancy (Tuvic, 2021) or relatively high levels of support for the Russian war of aggression (Bjeloš et al., 2022). While it is true that "Gozba's" influence can hardly compare to some other shows and media that spread similar type of content (Prešić, 2022), what sets it apart and makes it especially significant is the fact that it does this in the name of philosophical ideals of reasoned debate, critical thinking and rational reflection. That modern public sphere leaves little space for philosophical reflection and is constantly in danger of being hijacked by powerful special interests is hardly a new insight (see Habermas, 1991), but the situation becomes doubly problematic when what little space is left for philosophy's participation in the public sphere is being used to undermine key philosophical ideals and to replace them with their counterfeit versions based on fear, paranoia, propaganda and sophistry.

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**Promovisanje filozofije, podrivanje filozofskih ideala:
Slučaj radijske emisije „Gozba” i njen pristup pandemiji
Covid-19 i ratu u Ukrajini**

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Apstrakt

Prema filozofu Antoniju Kešiju, radio kao medij poseduje moć da stvara duboke i intimne veze između govornika i slušalaca, a samim tim i da gradi snažne zajednice. Upravo ova moć čini radio moćnim instrumentom za širenje populističke propagande, dezinformacija, konspirologije i straha, ali isto tako i za javnu filozofiju (public philosophy) usmerenu na razvoj sposobnosti kritičkog mišljenja i refleksije. Sledeći ovaj Kešijov uvid i oslanjajući se na rad filozofa Džejsona Stenlija na temu propagande,

analiziraću jednu od najdugovečnijih filozofskih radio emisija u Srbiji, „Gozba“, koja se emituje svakog ponedjeljka na Drugom programu Radio Beograda. Fokusirajući se na način na koji se „Gozba“ bavila pandemijom kovida i ratom u Ukrajini, pokazaću da, kada su u pitanju navedene teme, ova emisija podriva filozofske ideale koje navodno promovise i da služi pre svega kao instrument za širenje teorija zavere, opasnih antinaučnih gledišta, antivakcionalnih stavova, lažnih vesti i ruske ratne propagande. Na kraju ću se osvrnuti na posebnu opasnost koja vreba u promovisanju ovih duboko antifilozofskih stanovišta pod krinkom filozofije i kritičkog mišljenja.

Cljučne reči: filozofija, radio, propaganda, teorije zavere

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