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The Concept of Lying in the Language Use of Hungarian Elementary School Students in Vojvodina: An Empirical Study Within the Framework of Coleman and Kay (1981)[1*]

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Abstract

This study examines the concept of lying among Hungarian-speaking elementary school students in Vojvodina, focusing on the relative importance of the three prototypical elements of lying: objective falsehood, belief in the falsehood, and intention to deceive. Following the methodology of Coleman and Kay (1981), we used a Hungarian translation of their stories, ensuring cultural appropriateness. Participants ($N = 256$) completed an online questionnaire, rating each story's prototypicality of lying. Regarding the characteristics of the sample, the gender composition was balanced, with the proportion of female participants being 47.5% and male participants 52.5%. The age of the participants ranged from 11 to 15 years, with an average age of M = 12.08 years. Results indicate that the sequence of lying elements, in order of importance, is objective falsehood > belief in the falsehood > intention to deceive. This contrasts with Coleman and Kay's original sequence, suggesting potential cultural differences in the perception of lying. The findings also indicate that belief in the falsehood plays a more significant role than intention to deceive among Hungarian-speaking students in Vojvodina. This study contributes to the knowledge of how elements of lying are prioritized in different languages and cultural contexts."

Keywords: lying, perception, Hungarian-speaking students in Vojvodina

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The Concept of Lying in the Language Use of Hungarian Elementary School Students in Vojvodina: An Empirical Study Within the Framework of Coleman and Kay (1981)

The aim of the research is to understand the concept of lying and its prototypical elements in the language use of Hungarian students in Vojvodina. The researchers sought to explore how these elements are perceived and ranked by the students, and how this differs or aligns with previous research findings from other cultures. Additionally, we discussed our results in the light of previous findings obtained on the Hungarian sample from Hungary that speak the same language but come from different cultural backgrounds, as studied by Vajtai (2013). Vojvodina is a multiethnic region where the diverse cultural influences affecting individuals are undeniable. We discussed our results in light of previous findings obtained from samples that speak the same language but come from different cultural backgrounds. This research is an integral, though smaller part, of a larger study focused on adolescent lying. Researching lying in this manner has educational relevance because, according to well-established findings from psychological studies, lying in childhood is positively associated with a wide range of other problematic behaviors, such as disruptive conduct, aggression, conduct disorders, theft, truancy, or criminal behavior (Gervais et al., 2000; Gervais et al., 1998; Rutter et al., 1970; Stewart & DeBlois, 1985; Stouthamer-Loeber & Loeber, 1986). Moreover, longitudinal studies show that lying at an early age plays a predictive role in criminal behavior or drug use in adolescence and adulthood (Pulkkinen, 1983).

Theoretical Background

Lying is a constant factor in our everyday lives because it holds socially adaptive significance. No one wants to hurt their relative, old friend, especially if they approach us with good intentions. At the same time, lying is generally considered antisocial behavior (Bok, 1989); despite moral condemnation, it remains common behavior among adults, used as a social strategy to achieve interpersonal goals, manage and maintain relationships (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). However, for some people, it becomes a maladaptive strategy that ultimately damages their relationships.

Lying is a statement that does not correspond to reality. In addition, for an untrue statement to be considered as a lie, it must have two other very important characteristics (Talwar & Lee, 2011). One is that it must be conscious, meaning that the person making the statement must be aware that their statement does not align with the facts; otherwise, they are not lying but mistaken. The other characteristic of a lie is that it is always motivated by some interest. Those who lie consciously seek to deceive others, and their statement, which distorts reality, is intended to gain some benefit, which cannot be enjoyed if the truth is revealed. According to DePaulo and Kashy (1998), both the intention to deceive and the deception itself must be present in

intentional deception. Similarly, Walczyk, et al. (2014) emphasize the deceptive intent, stating that lying means intentionally misleading others into believing something that the liar knows is not true. Coleman and Kay (1981) introduced a prototype semantic analysis of the term "lie" in English. They proposed that a prototypical lie consists of three elements: (a) the statement (P) is false, (b) the speaker (S) believes P to be false, and (c) in uttering P, S intends to deceive the listener (A). This means that a prototypical lie involves a deliberate falsehood intended to deceive. Their findings indicated that English speakers consider the second element, false belief, to be the most crucial for defining a prototypical lie (a), followed by the intent to deceive (b) and lastly, the objective falsehood (c). Experiments conducted by Coleman and Kay were replicated with native speakers of several languages, yielding both similar and differing results across cultures, e.g., Arabic (Cole 1996), Hungarian (Vajtai, 2013, Falyuna 2016) Ecuadorian Spanish (Hardin, 2010), Indonesian (Adha, 2020). While Arabic and Ecuadorian Spanish speakers evaluated lying similarly to English speakers, adhering to the belief > intention > falsehood hierarchy, Adha (2020) discovered that for native Indonesian speakers, the prototypical concept of lying proposed by Coleman and Kay (1981) does not hold. In Indonesian culture, the most crucial element of a lie is factual falsehood, followed by the intent to deceive, with the belief component not necessarily being part of the concept of lying. Regarding Hungarian native speakers, Vajtai (2013) carried out Coleman and Kay's (1981) experiment with the participation of 57 people. Although Vajtai did not definitively rule out that the concept of a lie is the same for Hungarian language users as for English and Ecuadorian Spanish language users, i.e. it contains all three prototypical elements proposed by Coleman and Kay (1981), with faith being the strongest, but he still came to the conclusion found that in the case of Hungarian native speakers, the main element in judging whether a statement is judged to be a lie or not in a given situation is the intention to deceive. Falyuna - like Vajtai - also places the intention to deceive first in the concept of a lie, followed by false statements and then awareness. This order is not surprising, since Falyuna (2016) treats lying as a subtype of deception. According to Vajtai (2013) and Falyuna (2016), for Hungarian language users, the intention to deceive plays the most important role in the concept of a lie, ahead of the belief in falsehood.

Research question and Hypothesis

The research questions for the experiment reported here on were as follows: 1. What is the sequence of elements of lying among Hungarian-speaking students in Vojvodina, in terms of importance as shown by the perception of lying, assumed by Coleman and Kay (1981)? 2. Is the intent to deceive the most important element of a lie in the language usage of Hungarian students in Vojvodina, similarly to the language usage of Hungarians from Hungary, as assumed by Vajtai (2013) and Falyuna (2016).

Method

Sample and Procedure

The sample for data collection consisted of a total of 256 participants who were surveyed in June and July 2022 using an anonymous online questionnaire on the Google Forms platform, primarily in the northern part of Vojvodina. The research was conducted online in the Hungarian language. Participation was voluntary and anonymous. Ethical approval for data collection was obtained from their parents/legal guardians. The link to the questionnaire was given to the students by their teachers. We present the background variables of the sample elements, which provided valid responses to the control questions Regarding the characteristics of the sample, the gender composition was balanced, with the proportion of female participants being 47.5% and male participants 52.5%. The age of the participants ranged from 11 to 15 years, with an average age of $M = 12.08$ years.

Measures

Our questionnaire follows the methodology defined by Coleman & Kay (1981). The authors created eight stories in which they combined the three elements of a prototypical lie: (a) objective falsehood, (b) belief in the falsehood, and (c) intention to deceive. Table 1 shows the combinations of these three elements appearing in the eight stories. In the table, a "+" sign indicates that the element is present in the respective story, while a "-" sign indicates its absence. The stories themselves can be found in the Appendix, with the table showing the names of the main characters in each story and the keywords necessary to recall the story.

Table 1
Combinations of the elements of a prototypical lie in the stories of Coleman and Kay (1981)

Story	Objective falsehood	Belief in the falsehood	Intention to deceive
1. Moe-cake	+	+	+
2. John-golf	-	-	-
3. Pigfat-swimming pool	+	-	+
4. Katerina-math test	-	+	+
5. Schmallowitz-dinner	+	+	-
6. Mary-ex-boyfriend	-	-	+
7. Nurse Braine-appendicitis	+	-	-
8. Superfan-food poisoning	-	+	-

In our research, we used the Hungarian translation by Vajtai (2013) of the stories formulated by Coleman and Kay (1981), who ensured that the linguistic formulation

of the stories would be culturally acceptable to Hungarian native speakers. He replaced the original English names in the stories with Hungarian names. The stories can be found in the appendix.

After reading each story in the experiment, the participants had to answer two questions in the same way as in the original Coleman and Kay (1981) experiment, in order to determine the degree of judgment of the lie and the certainty of the judgment. The first question aimed to determine whether the main character in the story lied or not, while the second question asked how certain the participant was in their answer to the first question.

Data Analysis

For data analysis, we used the same 7-point scale as suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981). The scores were determined by combining the responses to the two questions mentioned above. For example, if a participant was completely sure that the main character in the story lied, then we assigned 7 points, meaning that 7 points indicate that the story contains a prototypical lie according to the participant's judgment. If the participant was fairly certain that the main character lied in the story, they received 6 points. Finally, if the participant was not really sure if the character lied, we assigned 5 points. If the participant could not decide whether the character lied or not, we did not consider their response to the certainty question and gave 4 points. A respondent received 3 points if they were not really sure that the character did not lie, and 2 points if they were fairly certain. Finally, those respondents who were completely sure that the main character did not lie in a story received 1 point. Stories judged in this way contained the least prototypical lie. The average score was calculated for each story by adding the scores assigned to the validly responding participants and dividing by the number of validly responding participants. Table 2 shows the possible answers and their scores**.**

Table 2

The possible answers and their score in the questionnaire

Did he/she/it lie?	In my answer:	Score
Lied	I'm absolutely sure	7
Lied	I'm fairly sure	6
Lied	I'm not really sure	5
I can't decide	I'm absolutely sure	4
I can't decide	I'm fairly sure	4
I can't decide	I'm not really sure	4
He/she/it didn't lie	I'm not really sure	3
He/she/it didn't lie	I'm fairly sure	2
He/she/it didn't lie	I'm absolutely sure	1

The tests for valid response were similar to the original Coleman and Kay (1981) experiment for the 1st and 2nd stories. The expected answer for the 1st story was that yes, Máté lied, while for the 2nd story it was no, János did not lie. In fact, the 1st and 2nd stories functioned as control stories. If a participant did not respond as expected to either or both of these, we excluded them from the analysis, and their responses were not considered for the other stories. Out of the 446 respondents, we excluded the responses of 190 individuals and considered the responses of 256 individuals.

The data collected from the 256 respondents were analyzed using several statistical techniques to ensure the robustness and validity of the findings. Initially, descriptive statistics were calculated to obtain the mean scores, standard deviations, and standard errors for each story, which provided a foundational understanding of how the participants perceived each scenario in terms of lying. To determine the relationships between the elements of lying and the mean scores of the stories, we conducted correlation analyses. Specifically, we examined the correlation coefficients for the presence of each lying element (objective falsehood, belief in falsehood, and intention to deceive) against the mean scores. Furthermore, we performed ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) to assess the differences between the means of the scores across the different stories. This technique allowed us to identify statistically significant variations in perceptions of lying among the stories presented. Post-hoc analyses, specifically Tukey's HSD (Honestly Significant Difference), were utilized to determine which specific pairs of stories differed significantly from each other.

Results

The scores from 256 respondents were added up and then divided by 256 to obtain the average score for each story. Table 3 shows the degree to which Hungarian speaking students in Vojvodina considered each of Coleman & Kay's stories to contain a lie, with 7 being the perfect prototypical lie score. The scores in bold (with mean score ranging from 3.18 to 3.68) in the table mean that the respondents could not determine with certainty whether the stories contain either stronger or weaker lie.

Table 3
Results

Story	Element*	*M*	*SD*	*SE*
I. Cake	(+ + +)	6.84	.41	.03
II. Chess	(- - -)	1.25	0.53	.03
III. Video game	(+ - +)	4.56	2.27	.14
IV. Math test	(- + +)	**3.68**	2.34	.15
V. Dinner	(+ + -)	5.42	1.94	.12
VI. Sick ex-boyfriend	(- - +)	4.53	2.36	.15
VII. Surgery	(+ - -)	4.53	2.24	.14
VIII. Football match	(- + -)	**3.18**	2.14	.13

***** Column shows the combinations of the three elements of the prototypical lie in the eight stories. In the table, the + sign indicates the presence of the respective element in the story, while the - sign indicates its absence (objective falsehood, belief in falsehood, intent to deceive).

Story IV and VIII are almost in the middle of lie-values, meaning that Hungarians in Vojvodina are not certain whether the character was lying or not. IV and VIII stories do not have the element of falsehood, and also have the element of belief, the only difference is in third element Figure 1 shows stories ranked in ascending order where the one containing least prototypical example of a lie is on the left and the most prototypical example of a lie is on the right.

Figure 1

Order of mean scale scores (from non-lie to lie)



Least prototypical Most prototypical

Coleman and Kay (1981) stated that a story consisting of fewer elements would be the least prototypical lie. However, in table 3, the VII story, which contains only one element, the element of objective falsehood, is closer to the most prototypical lie than the IV story, which contains two elements but no element of objective falsehood. Moreover, the stories containing the element of objective falsehood have higher average scale scores than the most prototypical story in which this element is absent ($r = .71$, $p = .05$). Table 4 displays the correlation between the mean scores of the stories and the presence of the elements in them, However, the story with only the belief element (VIII Story) is positioned lower on the continuum than the stories with the falsehood (VII Story) or intention elements (VI. Story).

Table 4

The correlation between the mean scores of the stories and the presence of the elements in them

Mean	Element	*r*	*p*
Mean (M)	Objective falsehood	.71	.05
Mean (M)	Belief in the falsehood	.35	.40
Mean (M)	Intention to deceive	.43	.29

Based on the results of Coleman and Kay (1981), if a story contains only one of the three components of lying or two of them, it is considered a weaker lie than if all three components are present. Accordingly, in Figure 1, the lie containing less than three prototypical elements should approach the left end of the lie-value scale, indicating that it should be considered less of a lie.

Comparing objective falsehood and belief in the falsehood, we can say that the 7th story (+ - -) has the same value (4.53) as the 6th story (- - +) (4.53), suggesting that

objective falsehood is equal to intention to deceive: objective falsehood = i*ntention to deceive*. The 3rd story (+ - +) (4.56) and the 4th story (- + +) (3.68) show that the objective falsehood is more important than the belief: objective falsehood > belief.

In comparing the other elements of lying, when comparing objective falsehood and intention to deceive, as we said, the 7th story (+ - -) (4.53) has the same value as the 6th story (- - +) (4.53), indicating that the element of objective falsehood is as strong as the element of intention to deceive. When comparing the two stories with the two prototypical elements of lying, we see that the 5th story (+ + -) has a higher average score (5.45) than the 4th story (- + +) (3.68), indicating that the element of objective falsehood is stronger than the element of intention to deceive. Overall, based on our study, it seems that among the three elements of lying, objective falsehood is the strongest.

For the hypothesis which aimed to determine whether the most important element of lying in the language use of Hungarian students in Vojvodina is the intention to deceive, as a first step, we compared the average scores of the 7th story (+ - -) (4.53), which is higher (by 1.35 points) than that of the 8th story (- + -) (3.18). This suggests that for the Hungarian-speaking students in Vojvodina, the objective falsehood plays a more important role in the concept of lying than the belief in the falsehood.

In the second step of the comparison, we get similar results. However, the difference between the average scores of the 5th story (+ + -) (5.42) and the 3rd story (+ - +) (4.56) is 0.86. Based on all these, it can be concluded that for our participants, the belief in the falsehood proved to be stronger than the intention to deceive, with objective falsehood being the strongest element in the concept of lying.

The results were calculated by performing ANOVA and Tuckey's HSD analysis, where the p values confirm that the differences described above are statistically significant (Table 5 and Table 6).

Table 5
ANOVA analysis results

Index	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	*F*	*p*
C (Story)	4797.66	7	182.73	.00

Table 6
Tukey HSD analysis results

Story 1	Story 2	*Mean difference*	*p*
I. Cake	II. Chess	-5.59	.00
I. Cake	III. Video game	-2.39	.00
I. Cake	IV. Math test	-3.17	.00
I. Cake	V. Dinner	-1.43	.00
I. Cake	VI. Sick ex-boyfriend	-2.31	.00
I. Cake	VII. Surgery	-2.32	.00
I. Cake	VIII. Football match	-3.66	.00

II. Chess	III. Video game	3.20	.00
II. Chess	IV. Math test	2.42	.00
II. Chess	V. Dinner	4.16	.00
II. Chess	VI. Sick ex-boyfriend	3.28	.00
II. Chess	VII. Surgery	3.27	.00
II. Chess	VIII. Football match	1.93	.00
III. Video game	IV. Math test	-.78	.00
III. Video game	V. Dinner	.96	.00
III. Video game	VI. Sick ex-boyfriend	.07	.99
III. Video game	VII. Surgery	.07	.99
III. Video game	VIII. Football match	-1.28	.00
IV. Math test	V. Dinner	1.74	.00
IV. Math test	VI. Sick ex-boyfriend	.86	.00
IV. Math test	VII. Surgery	.85	.00
IV. Math test	VIII. Football match	-.50	.07
V. Dinner	VI. Sick ex-boyfriend	-.89	.00
V. Dinner	VII. Surgery	-.89	.00
V. Dinner	VIII. Football match	-2.24	.00
VI. Sick ex-boyfriend	VII. Surgery	-.00	1.00
VI. Sick ex-boyfriend	VIII. Football match	-1.35	.00
VII. Surgery	VIII. Football match	-1.34	.00

Discussion

The aim of our study was to replicate the experiment of Coleman and Kay (1981) in order to answer our formulated research questions. These were as follows:

1. What is the sequence of elements of lying assumed by Hungarian-speaking students in Vojvodina in terms of importance as shown by Coleman and Kay (1981)?

2. Is the intent to deceive the most important element of a lie in the language usage of Hungarian students in Vojvodina, similarly to the language usage of Hungarians from Hungary, as assumed by Vajtai (2013) and Falyuna (2016)? Based on our results, a combined answer can be given to the two research questions. The sequence of the three prototypical elements of lying assumed by Coleman and Kay (1981) is: belief in the falsehood > intention to deceive > objective falsehood. The same sequence was shown in experiments repeated with Arabic speakers (Cole, 1996) and Ecuadorian Spanish speakers (Hardin, 2010) and in this case the most important, in Hungarian speakers from Hungary (Vajtai, 2013). According to the current study, the sequence of lying elements for Hungarian students from Vojvodina is as follows: objective falsehood > belief in the falsehood > intention to deceive. This order does not match the order established by Coleman and Kay (1981) based on judgments of English speakers, nor does it align with the work of Vajtai (2013), which replicated the study in Hungarian and revealed the structure belief > intent > falsity. In Adha's (2020) study with Indonesians, the most crucial element of a lie

is factual falsehood too, but it is followed by the intent to deceive, with the belief component not necessarily being part of the concept of lying. It can be said that from the sequence, it is evident that for our participants, belief in the falsehood proved to be stronger than the intention to deceive, and objective falsehood is the strongest element in the concept of lying. Additionally, Sakaba (2020) cites the work of Yoshimura (1995), who found that the conceptual prototype for the Japanese term "uso" is falsity > belief > intent. This last finding corresponds with our results. The differences in the ordering of these elements may stem from cultural and linguistic factors that shape how lying is conceptualized in different contexts. For instance, Hungarian students might prioritize the objective falsehood due to cultural norms emphasizing factual accuracy over the intent behind a statement. In contrast, English speakers might focus more on the belief and intent, reflecting different societal values around communication and trust. These variations highlight the importance of context in understanding the concept of lying. Recognizing that different cultures may interpret and prioritize elements of lying differently can lead to a more nuanced understanding of how language influences perceptions of honesty and deception.

Conclusion

Based on our research, we conclude that the interpretation of lying among Hungarian students in Vojvodina differs from that of Hungarians in Hungary, particularly regarding the importance of the elements of lying. The results indicate that, among the Hungarian speakers in Vojvodina, objective falsehood is prioritized over belief in the falsehood and intention to deceive. This difference is particularly noteworthy given that previous studies, such as those by Coleman and Kay (1981) and Vajtai (2013), suggested that belief and intention might hold greater significance. The cultural and linguistic environment in Vojvodina likely influences the conceptualization of lying, thereby affecting the prioritization of its elements. Our future research aims to gain a deeper understanding of these differences. By comparing the Hungarian sample in Vojvodina with Serbian and Croatian samples, we can explore how local cultural influences shape perceptions of lying. This comparative analysis will help us gain a more nuanced understanding of how cultural norms and societal values affect communication and trust among different ethnic groups. This research contributes to the understanding of the complexity of lying and the role of culture, especially in multilingual and multicultural contexts. Recognizing that individuals from diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds interpret the elements of lying differently can provide new perspectives on the discourse surrounding communication and ethical norms. However, the study does have its limitations. For instance, the sample size may restrict the generalizability of the findings, and the cross-sectional design limits our ability to assess changes over time. Furthermore, reliance on self-reported data may introduce biases regarding students' understanding of honesty and dishonesty.

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Koncepti laži u jezičkoj upotrebi mađarskih učenika osnovnih škola u Vojvodini: empirijska studija u okviru Koulman i Kej (1981)

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Apstrakt

Ova studija ispituje koncept laganja među mađarskim govornicima u osnovnim školama u Vojvodini, fokusirajući se na relativnu važnost tri prototipična elementa laganja: objektivna laž, verovanje u laž i namera da se prevari. Prateći metodologiju Colemana i Kaya (1981), koristili smo mađarski prevod njihovih priča, osiguravajući kulturnu prikladnost. Učesnici (N = 256) su popunili online upitnik, ocenjivajući prototipičnost laganja svake priče. Što se tiče karakteristika uzorka, polna struktura je bila izbalansirana, sa udelom učesnica od 47,5% i učesnika od 52,5%. Uzrast učesnika kretao se od 11 do 15 godina, sa prosečnom starošću M = 12,08 godina. Rezultati ukazuju da je redosled elemenata laganja, po važnosti, objektivna laž > verovanje u laž > namera da se prevari. Ovo je u suprotnosti sa originalnim redosledom Colemana i Kaya, što sugeriše potencijalne kulturne razlike u percepciji laganja. Takođe, nalazi ukazuju da verovanje u laž igra značajniju ulogu od namere da se prevari među mađarskim govornicima u Vojvodini. Ova studija dopunjuje znanje o tome kako se u različitim jezicima i kulturnom kontekstu prioritetizuju elementi laganja.

Ključne reči: laganje, percepcija, kulturne razlike: mađarski govornici u Vojvodini

Appendix

1.Hungarian translations of Coleman and Kay's (1981: 31–32) stories in Vajtai's (2013: 12–13) experiment:

1) Máté megette a tortát, amit Júlia a vendégek számára sütött. Júlia megkérdezi Mátét: Te etted meg a tortát? Máté azt feleli: Nem. Hazudott Máté?
2) Dávid, János és Ádám épp golfoznak. Ádám rálép Dávid labdájára. Mikor Dávid odaér és észreveszi, hogy a labdája bele van nyomva a tőzegbe, azt kérdezi: János, te léptél rá a labdámra? János azt feleli: Nem, Ádám volt. Hazudott János?
3) Patrik abban a hitben van, hogy el kell mennie a cukorka bolt előtt ahhoz, hogy eljusson a billiárd szalonhoz, de téved, mert a cukorka bolt elköltözött. Patrik anyja nem szereti a billiárdot. Ahogy Patrik el akarja hagyni a házat, hogy billiárdozni menjen, Patrik anyja megállítja és megkérdezi, hogy hova megy. Patrik azt mondja: A cukorka bolt felé megyek. Hazudott Patrik?
4) Egyik reggel Katalinnak aritmetika vizsgája van, amire nem tanult és úgy dönt, hogy nem akar iskolába menni. Azt mondja az anyjának: Beteg

vagyok. Az anyja megméri a lázát és Katalin meglepetésére kiderül, hogy valóban beteg; aznap később kijön rajta a kanyaró. Hazudott Katalin?

5) Sándor hivatalos egy vacsorára a főnökénél. A komor vacsora után – amit senki sem élvezett – Sándor azt mondja a háziasszonynak: Köszönöm, remek parti volt. Sándor persze egyáltalán nem gondolja komolyan, hogy óriási volt a parti és nem is erőlködik bárkit is meggyőzni arról, hogy jól érezte magát, de úgy érzi, valami kedveset kell mondania a főnöke feleségének, attól eltekintve, hogy egyáltalán nem várja el, hogy elhiggye. Hazudott Sándor?
6) József és Mária nem rég kezdtek el járni. Vilmos Mária ex-barátja. Egyik este József megkérdezi Máriától: Láttad Vilmost a héten? Mária azt válaszolja: Vilmos mononukleózissal (Pfeiffer-féle mirigyláz vagy csókbetegség) gyengélkedik két hete. Vilmos valóban ebben a betegségben szenved két hete, de az a helyzet, hogy Máriának előző este randevúja volt Vilmossal. Hazudott Mária?
7) Két páciens arra vár, hogy betolják őket a műtőbe. A doktor rámutat az egyikre és azt kérdezi: Géza vakbélműtétre vár vagy mandulaeltávolításra? Betti nővér épp akkor olvassa a kórlapot. Bár nagyon igyekszik példás munkát végezni, a nővér véletlenül összekeveri a betegeket és azt feleli: Vakbélműtétre. Valójában szegény Géza mandulaeltávolításra vár. Hazudott Betti nővér?
8) Miklósnak vannak jegyei a bajnokságra és nagyon büszke rájuk. Megmutatja a főnökének, aki azt mondja: Nézd, Miklós, ha előfordul, hogy valamelyik nap kimaradsz a munkából, ajánlom, hogy jobb kifogásod legyen, mint ez a bajnokság. Miklós azt mondja: Rendben, főnök. A meccs napján Miklós betelefonál a munkahelyére: Ma nem tudok bemenni, főnök, mert nagyon beteg vagyok. Miklós a meccsre sem tud elmenni, mert a reggel érzett enyhe hasfájásáról kiderül, hogy ételmérgezés. Hazudott Miklós?

2. The stories from Coleman and Kay's (1981: 31–32) experiment

1) Moe has eaten the cake Juliet was intending to serve to company. Juliet asks Moe, 'Did you eat the cake?' Moe says, 'No.' Did Moe lie?
2) Dick, John, and H.R. are playing golf. H.R. steps on Dick's ball. When Dick arrives and sees his ball mashed into the turf, he says, 'John, did you step on my ball?' John replies, 'No, H.R. did it.' Did John lie?
3) Pigfat believes he has to pass the candy store to get to the pool hall, but he is wrong about this because the candy store has moved. Pigfat's mother doesn't approve of pool. As he is going out the door intending to go to the pool hall, Pigfat's mother asks him where he is going. He says, 'I am going by the candy store.' Did Pigfat lie?
4) One morning Katerina has an arithmetic test she hasn't studied for, and so she doesn't want to go to school. She says to her mother, 'I'm sick.' Her

mother takes her temperature, and it turns out to Katerina's surprise that she really is sick, later that day developing the measles. Did Katerina lie?

5) Schmallowitz is invited to dinner at his boss's house. After a dismal evening enjoyed by no one, Schmallowitz says to his hostess, 'Thanks, it was a terrific party.' Schmallowitz doesn't believe it was a terrific party, and he really isn't trying to convince anyone he had a good time, but is just concerned to say something nice to his boss's wife, regardless of the fact that he doesn't expect her to believe it. Did Schmallowitz lie?
6) John and Mary have recently started going together. Valentino is Mary's ex-boyfriend. One evening John asks Mary, 'Have you seen Valentino this week?' Mary answers, 'Valentino's been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks.' Valentino has in fact been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary had a date with Valentino the night before. Did Mary lie?
7) Two patients are waiting to be wheeled into the operating room. The doctor points to one and says, 'Is Jones here the appendectomy or the tonsillectomy?' Nurse Braine has just read the charts. Although she is anxious to keep her job, she has nevertheless confused the charts in her mind and replies, 'The appendectomy,' when in fact poor Jones is the one scheduled for tonsillectomy. Did Nurse Braine lie?
8) Superfan has got tickets for the championship game and is very proud of them. He shows them to his boss, who says, 'Listen, Superfan, any day you don't come to work, you better have a better excuse than that.' Superfan says, 'I will.' On the day of the game, Superfan calls in and says, 'I can't come to work today, Boss, because I'm sick.' Ironically, Superfan doesn't get to go to the game because the slight stomachache he felt on arising turns out to be ptomaine poisoning. So Superfan was really sick when he said he was. Did Superfan lie?

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