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"MY EXPERIMENTS HAVE TAUGHT ME GREAT RESPECT FOR ALL CREATURES": RICHARD ADAMS'S *THE PLAGUE DOGS* AND THE ANTI-VIVISECTIONIST MOVEMENT[1]

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Abstract

Relying on historical research by A. W. H. Bates, Hilda Kean, Harriet Ritvo, and others, the paper examines Richard Adams's 1977 novel *The Plague Dogs*, its stance on scientific experimentation on animals, and its depiction of human−animal relations, against the background of the nineteenth-century anti-vivisectionist movement in Great Britain. Though writing in the 1970s, Adams, it is argued, appropriates, and replicates the anti-vivisectionists' specific concerns and rhetorical devices – primarily the focus on the human experimenter's virtue, and the suffering of the animal during experimental procedures – with the general aim of painting animal research as an exercise in sadism with little to no scientific value.

Keywords: animal experimentation; anti-vivisectionist movement; Richard Adams; *The Plague Dogs*

1. Introduction

Over the course of Richard Adams's *The Plague Dogs* (1977), Rowf and Snitter, the traumatized and disabled canine protagonists, occupy distinct yet always precarious positions of lab animals, starving strays, and (supposed) biohazards hunted down by the British army. Each of these positions is accompanied by their own bodily and mental terrors, detailed, and delivered, so effectively (through the mixture of

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realism and "Gothic tropology" (Höing, 2020: 59)), that the happy end, in which the drowning dogs are rescued from the sea by real-life British naturalists Sir Peter Scott and Ronald Lockley, and Snitter is reunited with his beloved, falsely-presumed-dead master, is impossible to believe. Preceded by the metafictional "colloquy" (Adams, 2015: 481) between the reader and the author, in which the reader begs "dear author" to "bring lost dogs home" "on some miraculous breeze!" (ibid.), the happy end, moreover, is explicitly referred to as a dream by the narrator himself. Namely, after recounting the tearful reunion between Snitter and his "vanished" man, the narrator continues, "[n]ow I saw in my dream that they had gone only a very little way…" (Adams, 2015: 505); a few passages later, Snitter comments, "It's jolly being dead, isn't it?" (ibid: 507). The harrowing novel thus concludes appropriately: there is no real happy end for the dogs in the world which is "bad for animals", as Rowf repeatedly asserts throughout Snitter's and his ordeal.

The Plague Dogs employs the talking animal trope associated, from the eighteenth century onwards, with children's literature, but this is an emphatically adult text, not merely because it frequently depicts animal and human death in all its brutality (the sheep, ducks, and hens that the starving dogs devour on occasion; the tod being torn apart by the foxhounds; Kiff, a fellow lab dog who dies by cumulative electrocution and is constantly in Snitter's broken mind, speeches, and songs; Mr. Ephraim and Geoffrey Westcott). Rather, it is in the gradual recognition of the inevitable destruction of the innocent that the adult nature of the text lies: in this aspect, and in its emotional impact, *The Plague Dogs* is comparable to *King Lear* (1606)*, Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1892), and *Grave of the Fireflies* (1988). "Gradual" is an important qualification, as the greater part of the narrative is not concerned primarily with the dogs' death – nor with the experiments to which they have been subjected – but with their prolonged, hopeful-then-desperate struggle to survive in the Lakeland hills throughout October and November, after their escape from A.R.S.E. (the satirical acronym for "Animal Research Scientific and Experimental", the fictional research station situated at Lawson Park in the Lakeland area). The novel, especially in the beginning, does detail instances of deliberate mental and bodily harm to which "man's best friends", and countless other nonhumans, are put in the context of scientific research, and in the name of human knowledge, human health, and human safety. Human knowledge, health, and safety, the long-debated yet, nowadays, largely honored arguments in favor of scientific experiments on animals, are from the very start of *The Plague Dogs* treated merely as excuses for the soul-degrading exercises in sadism over the disempowered, the innocent, and the disposable – very much in line with the views held by the nineteenth-century opponents to animal experimentation, as well as contemporary animal rights activists.

Adams's novel depicts human–animal relations at their worst, yet the tradition to which *The Plague Dogs* belongs and continues as a text which is firmly against animal experimentation, that of the nineteenth-century anti-vivisectionist movement in Great Britain, sheds a different, arguably more positive light on these relations. This paper, therefore, examines *The Plague Dogs*, its stance on scientific experimentation

on animals, and its depiction of disposable lab animals, in the context of the anti-vivisectionist movement in Great Britain, "an anti-cruelty movement unequalled anywhere in the world" (Bates, 2017: 197) whose specific concerns and rhetorical devices – primarily the focus on the human experimenter's virtue (Bates, 2017: 1), and the highlighting of animal suffering during experimental procedures – Adams appropriates and replicates for similar ideological and political purposes.

2. Anti-vivisectionist movement in nineteenth-century Great Britain

Experimentation on live, disposable animals, including human ones, is as old as science itself – and nearly as old are the objections raised to it. In *De Anima* (c. 210), for instance, Tertullian calls Herophilus "a butcher", who, along with Erasistratos, was the first to practice both human and animal vivisection in third-century BC Alexandria (Geller, 2010: 4),. Tertullian also gives a scientifically valid argument against vivisection, repeated by contemporary critics of animal experimentation such as Andrew Knight (2011): pain and violent death which human and nonhuman animals experience during experiments cannot possibly result in any reliable insights.

> There is that Herophilus, the well-known surgeon, or (as I may almost call him) butcher, who cut up no end of persons, in order to investigate the secrets of nature, who ruthlessly handled human creatures to discover (their form and make): I have my doubts whether he succeeded in clearly exploring all the internal parts of their structure, since death itself changes and disturbs the natural functions of life, especially when the death is not a natural one, but such as must cause irregularity and error amidst the very processes of dissection[3].

Some of the early animal vivisectionists themselves, moreover, were evidently bothered by the nature of their work. Writing in the second century, Galen specifically recommended the use of pigs rather than apes for studying the larynx, in order for the experimenter to avoid "the loathsomeness of the [facial] expression in vivisection" produced by the apes (Persaud, Loukas & Tubbs, 2014: 43). In the seventeenth century, however, Descartes' revolutionary "monstrous thesis" of bête-machine relieved experimenters from their concerns, having defined the animal as an irrational, non-feeling automaton whose cries of pain are comparable to "the creaking of a wheel" (Visvanathan, 1997: 24). A direct result of such conceptualization was the rich tradition of vivisection in France throughout the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. Yet in Great Britain, the "monstrous thesis" was not unanimously accepted. According to Philip Armstrong, Descartes' reinforcement of the human–nonhuman

[3] Knight (2011: 33, 36) also discusses "pain-related physiological, psychological, and behavioural distortions" in experimental animals, which often result in "statistically significant distortions in a range of physiological parameters, including cardiovascular parameters and serum concentrations of glucose and various hormones".

binary on the basis of reason rather than the older, Christian criterion of an immortal soul, was tested and rejected in British literature, primarily in the work of Jonathan Swift (Armstrong, 2008: 49-61). Swift's fellow eighteenth-century author, Alexander Pope, already a vegetarian, became a passionate anti-vivisectionist having witnessed the blood circulation experiments of Reverend Stephen Hales. While Swift was suspicious of the Enlightenment's infinite faith in human reason, Pope raised the issue of the limits of human power over animals: "…he [Rev. Hales] commits most of these barbarities with the thought of its being of use to man; but how do we know that we have a right to kill creatures that we are so little above as dogs, for our curiosity, or even for some use to us?" (Monamy, 2009: 17).

British critical approach to French philosophy and science became even more pronounced in the next century, in the responses to the work of Francois Magendie: according to A. W. H. Bates, it was Magendie's public lectures, always involving vivisection since he "repeated his experiments as demonstrations" (Kean, 1998: 96), that initiated the British anti-vivisectionist movement in the 1820s. It is not insignificant that Magendie, who is regarded as the founder of modern physiology, competed for this title with a Briton, Sir Charles Bell, as they "both claimed to have been the first to identify separate motor and sensory nerve roots, a discovery acknowledged by their contemporaries as one of the most important of the age" (Berkowitz, 2006: 98). Their claims are nowadays recognized in the name of the law that expresses their common findings, the Bell-Magendie Law, but the two scientists employed radically different approaches in their research: Bell relied on deduction based on dissection, while Magendie performed numerous vivisections (ibid., 99). Magendie's preferred experimental subjects, moreover, were six-week-old puppies whose spines he cut without anesthetics. According to some sources, Magendie killed over 4000 dogs in these experiments (Visvanathan, 1997: 24). Like Tertullian, sixteen centuries earlier:

> Charles Bell, who accepted a limited role for animal experimentation, criticized Magendie's experimental approach to physiology from both a methodological and an epistemological point of view. He not only highlighted the pointless cruelty inflicted on an unreasonably large number of animals, but he also pointed out that vivisection disrupted the system of the animal's body, causing an abnormal behavior which might differ from the natural state which physiologists wished to assess. (Bertomeu-Sánchez, 2012: 15)

Wider public's objections to vivisection, however, were not raised to its epistemological merit, or lack thereof, but to its undeniable cruelty. It was Magendie's public lecture in London, in 1824 – the same year in which the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was founded – when he "nailed a greyhound to the dissecting-table before cutting it open", and left it overnight, that "provoked a vociferous anti-French outcry that marked the start of the organized anti-vivisection movement in Britain" (Bates, 2017: 16-17). What followed was the decades-long public campaign to bring about legal changes regarding animal experimentation, which eventually resulted in the less-than-satisfactory 1876 Cruelty

to Animals Act: the passing of this act, moreover, marked the beginning of the end of the anti-vivisectionist movement[4].

Spurred by the centuries-old tension between the two nations, particularly pronounced in the age of competitive nationalisms and imperialist struggles, British nineteenth-century anti-vivisection movement, led mostly by socially conservative Christians, was thus informed by:

> concerns that vivisection would exert a demoralizing effect on individual experimenters, and on society as a whole. The potential benefits to medical knowledge, and whether the animals used were physiologically, intellectually, or spiritually comparable to ourselves, were issues of lesser importance than the feeling that inflicting pain on helpless creatures was *a morally dangerous business*. (Bates, 2017: 196, italics added)

In "Some Popular Fallacies about Vivisection" (1875), Lewis Carroll expressed these concerns eloquently:

> The hapless animal suffers, dies, and 'there an end': but the man whose sympathies have been deadened, and whose selfishness has been fostered, by the contemplation of pain deliberately inflicted, may be the parent of others equally brutalized, and so bequeath a curse to future ages. And even if we limit our view to the present time, who can doubt that the degradation of soul is a greater evil than the suffering of bodily frame?

The degradation of the experimenter's soul and the consequent social unravelling – the potential for directing vivisectionist violence against fellow humans – were explored in sensationalist detail in the anti-vivisectionist literary works, such as *St Bernard's: The Romance of a Medical Student* (1887). Written by Edward Berdoe under the pseudonym Æsculapius Scalpel (Waddington, 2013: 246), the novel depicted monstrous acts of human vivisection taking place within London's teaching hospitals (ibid., 247). Wilkie Collins's *Heart and Science* (1883) is another example: Dr Benjulia, who vivisects dogs in his laboratory, "insinuates himself into Carmina's sick-room and uses her […] for his experiments" (Kean, 1998: 101). Yet the suffering of the experimental animal's bodily frame was not ignored by the anti-vivisectionist campaigners – at least when the animal in question

[4] Cruelty to Animals Act was, in fact, "a legislative victory for scientists" (Ritvo, 1984: 59). The Act represented a compromise between the opposing demands from the anti-vivisectionists and British Medical Council; it "required that any person wishing to perform experiments using live vertebrates must first be licensed, and all experiments involving cats, dogs, horses, mules and asses, or those conducted to illustrate lectures, be certified by the British Home Secretary" (Monamy, 2009: 24). The use of animals in science was thus not abolished, only regulated. In addition to placing great power in the hands of Home Secretary, the Cruelty to Animals Act, ironically, resulted in increasing the number of experiments and the animals dying in them: "[t]hree times as many vivisectors were licensed in 1878 as were practicing in 1875" (Kean, 1998: 105). Further blow to the abolitionist cause came in 1881, when "a high-profile legal case suggested the 1876 Act could be ignored with impunity", which was followed by "increasingly confident statements on the value of animal experimentation from the medical profession" (Waddington, 2013: 252). By that same year, "a survey conducted by *The Zoophilist*, an antivivisection periodical, found that almost no local RSPCA chapters were actively anti-vivisectionist" (Ritvo, 1984: 59).

was a dog, a cat, or a horse[5]. In addition to emphasizing the morally corrosive effect that vivisection might have on the soul of the individual who engaged in it, anti-vivisectionist speeches, pamphlets, and literary texts devoted their attention to the agonies inflicted upon the innocent animal. Frances Power-Cobbe's *Light in Dark Places* (1883), for instance, reproduced scientific images from physiology textbooks which showed the "tools of the trade" used by the vivisectors, and animal bodies in pain during experiments (Cronin, 2018: 3). Especially relevant for *The Plague Dogs* are animal "autobiographies" which include works such as Ouida's *Puck* (1870); Anna Sewell's *Black Beauty: The Autobiography of a Horse (*1877); William Gordon Stables's *Sable and White* (1893), and, across the Atlantic, *Beautiful Joe: An Autobiography* (1894), a novel by Margaret Marshall Saunders, as well as Mark Twain's short story, "A Dog's Tale" (1903). In opposition to the dominant depiction of animals as mute and innocent victims, in all of these "autobiographies", the animal characters narrate their lives and the lives of the fellow horses and dogs, and inevitably come to describe the ill treatment they receive at the hands of humans. A section of "A Dog's Tale", moreover, explicitly discusses vivisection; in *Sable and White*, also, there is a passage that denounces vivisection as the cruelty of "that proud biped":

> We [the dog who is narrating and the fellow dogs] were to undergo the torture I had often heard poor Professor Huxley speak about, the torture of vivisection; that, in a word, we would be tied to a bench or stool and cut to pieces alive, and all for the supposed benefit of that proud biped, the microbe man. (quoted in Kean, 1998: 98-99)

Separating vivisection from its scientific or medical promises, and seeing it only as torture, is in keeping with the key philosophical underpinning of the nineteenth-century anti-vivisectionist movement. Vivisectionists relied on the Cartesian concept of the animal as a beast-machine; the opponents found support in Jeremy Bentham's footnote to *An Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation* (1789). The now-famous passage, very much alive in present-day animal rights activism, stated that:

> The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. […] What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (quoted in Monamy, 2009: 18-19)

[5] Not all experimental animals were deemed equal in the eyes of the nineteenth-century reformists: "the experimental frog had few defenders" (Woods, 2019: 150). Victoria Street Society fought for the use of anesthesia for surgical experiments, and pushed for the legal abolition of experiments on dogs, cats, and horses, demonstrating that the "concern for the welfare of animals in experiments is hierarchical" (Monamy, 2009: 53).

Published in 1977, and influenced, as explicitly stated in the *Preface*, by Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* (1975) and Richard Ryder's *Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research* (1975), *The Plague Dogs* revives the nineteenth-century tradition of focusing on the "degradation of soul" of the experimenter, and the suffering of the nonhuman test subjects, to condemn animal experimentation as mere cruelty. Without explicitly invoking Singer's equal consideration of interests, Adam's text is nonetheless deeply influenced by Bentham's and Singer's shared notion of the animal's capacity to suffer as the criterion on which to judge the morality of human actions: "If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration" (Singer, 2001: 8). Moreover, following in the footsteps of Ouida, William Gordon Stables, Mark Twain, Anna Sewell, and Margaret Marshall, Adams, too, "unmutes" the animals – his Snitter, in particular, never stops talking.

3. "I wouldn't want you to suffer avoidably": Lab animals and animal experimentation in *The Plague Dogs*

Commenting on the scene from Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* (1611) in which the Queen announces she will test the doctor's compounds "on such creatures as we count not worth the hanging, but none human", and Cornelius replies, "Your Highness shall from this practice but make hard your heart", Dr Johnson writes:

> There is in this passage nothing that much requires a note, yet I cannot forbear to push it forward into observation. The thought would probably have been more amplified, had our author lived to be shocked with such experiments as have been published in later times, by a race of men that have practiced tortures without pity, and related them without shame, and are yet suffered to erect their heads among human beings.

It is these two quotations that Adams uses as epigraphs for *The Plague Dogs*, and they effectively convey the two major thematic concerns of the novel – on the one hand, the "tortures without pity" inflicted on disposable nonhumans; on the other, the hardening of the hearts of those who conduct them, to such a degree that their very humanity becomes questionable and their cruelty turns against fellow humans.

In keeping with Dr Johnson's quote, and the nineteenth-century anti-vivisectionist rhetoric, scientific experimentation on animals in the novel is from the very start, and consistently, depicted as sadism with little to no scientific value, causing irreversible damage to those who are "not worth hanging" but are, nonetheless, capable of great suffering. The novel opens memorably, with the metal tank filled with water and "gilded streaks of urine and floating, spawn-like bubbles of saliva" (Adams, 2015: 3), containing a drowning dog. As in Upton Sinclair's depiction of industrialized slaughter in *The Jungle* (1906), the human-created spaces into which animals are forced for human use – here in the name of science and the advancement of knowledge – are phantasmagoric and downright Gothic: the tank is black, and the

turgid movement of saliva and urine creates the "illusion that this was not water, but perhaps some thicker fluid, such as those concoctions of jam and stale beer which are hung up in glass jars to drown wasps, or the dark puddles splashed through by hooves and gumboots on the concrete floors of Lakeland cattle sheds" (ibid.). Making this comparison, Adams seems to place experimentation on animals within the wider tradition of animal (ab)use: the elimination of pests, the use of cattle for meat and dairy products. It is only from the dialogue between Mr. Powell and Dr Boycott that the reader learns this deliberate drowning of the dog is, in fact, a scientific experiment, the sole purpose of which is to qualitatively measure the effect of expectation of survival on the dog's struggle for life, expressed through the precise time kept, to the last second, with the help of Mr. Powell's stop-watch. The Gothic setting with which the novel opens is additionally emphasized by the invocation of ghosts: when the dog (Rowf, as will be revealed later) sinks down to the bottom of the tank, "[t]here were further sounds of splashing from inside the tank, but faint, like metallic echoes, rather as though a ghost were trying, but failing, to come down and trouble the waters" (Adams, 2015: 4). The scene aptly conveys the ghost-like status of the lab animals, which is contrasted with their intense physicality and thus the capacity for suffering: the ghost failing to trouble waters, Adams (2015: 5) informs the reader, also has "the black, delicately lyrated nose".

The attempted killing of the dog by drowning (one in a series of such attempts) is neutralized through language, both colloquial and disrespectful ("I think it's packing in, chief" (Adams, 2015: 3)), and scientifically detached:

> It's rather remarkable how regular the increase appears to be. At this rate the graph will work out as a straight incline, although obviously we must reach a diminution somewhere. There must come a point where the additional endurance induced by the dog's expectation of removal is counterbalanced by the limits of its physical capacity. (Adams, 2015: 6)

This exchange between Dr Boycott and his assistant illustrates a familiar insight that "discourse has the power to legitimize relationships in which one group causes immense suffering to the other" (Stibbe, 2012: 50); immense animal suffering, the issue that was central to Jeremy Bentham, the nineteenth-century anti-vivisectionists, and Peter Singer, inter alia, is not even acknowledged as such by the A. R. S. E. scientists. However, Dr Boycott helps Mr. Powell extract the dog from the tank, as the younger man's wrist has been injured, stating, "I wouldn't want you to suffer avoidably" (Adams, 2015: 5). The irony of such a statement, uttered over the tortured body of the dog, is impossible to miss: suffering is, indeed, recognized as undesirable, but only in humans. This split in the scientists' perspectives on nonhuman and human suffering continues throughout the novel, as does the narrator's ironic approach to it; significantly, the narrator's irony and sarcasm are never directed at the dogs or any other nonhuman victim of science, but towards greedy fear-mongering journalists like Digby Driver, self-serving politicians, and most of all, sadists like Dr Boycott.

The narrator's irony is particularly pronounced in the otherwise realistic, and well-researched, descriptions of the experiments conducted at A. R. S. E. – especially the ones that Francis Bacon would describe as "experimenta lucifera" or "experiments which shed light", as opposed to "experimenta fructifera" ("experiments which yield fruit", or applied science (Monamy, 2009: 58)). Namely, during their escape, Rowf and Snitter enter the various rooms in A. R. S. E., which allows Adams to provide the reader with the review of the research station's prisoners, from pigeons and mice, to rats, cats, and primates, and to satirize the utter futility of experiments, mostly through the narrator's sarcastic comments.

> They had entered the pigeon aviary, reservoir of one of the more eagerly watched, important and ambitious projects in which Animal Research was engaged. The object was nothing less than to discover how and by what means pigeons exercise their homing instinct—a Promethean undertaking indeed, since the birds themselves have always been content with ignorance in the matter. The thoroughness of the experiments, devised and conducted by Mr. Lubbock, a colleague and friend of Dr. Boycott, was impressive. Here, systematically divided into groups and caged in different compartments, lived hundreds of birds, each a grain of coral in that great reef of conscious knowledge to be built by Mr. Lubbock for the good, or the advancement, or the edification—or something or other, anyway—of the human race. Of those birds which had already been released to flight at greater or lesser distances from the station, some had had one eye or both eyes occluded by special appliances; some had been fitted with minute contact lenses, to distort their vision; others had had the sensitivity of feathers, feet, nostrils, beaks, mouths or lungs impaired or destroyed before setting out; others again had undergone carefully planned conditioning designed to confuse them when exposed to normal weather conditions. (…)
>
> The results of all the experiments so far had been most informative, yielding the basic information that while some of the birds succeeded in returning home, others did not. Many, in fact, in obedience to their defective stimuli, had flown straight out to sea until they perished; which was most interesting. One could draw the firm and valuable conclusions first, that birds whose faculties had been impaired were less swift and competent in getting home than birds whose faculties had not; and secondly, that in any given group, some succeeded in returning while others, who did not, presumably died. (Adams, 2015: 31-32)

"Experimenta lucifera" such as the one conducted on pigeons, seemingly (or truly) motivated by the pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, are not the only ones. In the cat block, Rowf and Snitter stumble upon cats that "were kept permanently in hoods covering their eyes and ears (in order to discover the effect upon cats of being kept permanently in hoods covering their eyes and ears)"; they pass octopi who are being electroshocked while fed certain foods, in order to test their memory; guinea pigs who have had their legs amputated only for the scientists to discover that they "possessed no power of adaptation, but continued to attempt to behave as though they had four legs" (Adams, 2015: 38). The dog block, also, houses a three-legged whippet with an ominous "bandaged stump" (Adams, 2015: 12); "a brown retriever with a great scar across its throat" (ibid.), and, of course, Rowf

and Snitter, the latter easily recognizable by a black cap on his head – "a surgical dressing made of stout oilskin and fastened securely to the head with cross-bands of sticking-plaster in such a way as to prevent the dog from scratching and worrying at the antiseptic lint beneath" (Adams, 2015: 13) – which he wears because he has been submitted to "experimental brain surgery" that has him confusing objective and subjective realities. In Snitter's own memorable words, "There's a mouse – a mouse that sings – I'm bitten to the brains and it never stops raining – not in this eye anyway" (Adams, 2015: 15).

To the reader unfamiliar with the specifics of twentieth-century animal testing, the experiments which the narrator lists might appear grossly exaggerated for the purposes of satire and the related moral criticism. Yet, in the Preface, Adams writes that, although A. R. S. E. does not exist ("[i]n reality, no single testing or experimental station would cover so wide a range of work"), "every 'experiment' described is one which has actually been carried out on animals somewhere" (Adams, 2015: xviii). Even cursory examination of the topic confirms Adams's claim. Thus, Rowf's being drowned and revived is modelled on real-life experiments by the biologist Curt Ritcher, who used drowning rats to measure the impact of hope ("survival expectation") on actual survival; Dr Boycott's social deprivation experiment on a rhesus monkey replicates the work done by the American psychologist Harry Harlow in the 1960s. The great conclusion of Harlow's experiments was that the infant monkeys, forcibly separated from their mothers immediately after birth, preferred cloth mother substitutes to the ones made of wire, before going psychotic and dying – "experimenta lucifera" indeed, especially when one sees the photos. Lodo, another dog from the A.R.S.E., talks about being forcefully addicted to tobacco, alluding to real-life experiments usually involving beagles; mice and rats that Rowf and Snitter come across as well during their escape are the most used lab animals for biomedical (genetic and cancer) research, and product testing. At one point, also, Mr. Powell directly references Radiation Research conducted by W. P. Norris et. al. in 1968, which concluded that "13-month-old purebred beagle dogs" deliberately exposed to radiation, died from "acute bacteremia, secondary to bone marrow damage" (Norris, Fritz, Rehfeled, & Poole, 1968: 681). Near the end of the novel, Snitter summarizes the death-oriented curiosity of animal experimenters – "I'm a whitecoat […] I need to find out how and in what way you two dogs are going to die under this particular crag" (Adams, 2015: 359). From the perspective of their victims, "whitecoats" cause suffering and death, observe suffering and death, and write about suffering and death: for the animals, as for Adams, there is no other dimension to scientific experimentation.

But it is Rowf and Snitter themselves who best exemplify the multifaceted harm done to the dispensable experimental animals in the name of increasing the questionable "sum of human wisdom". Most obviously, their two bodies, capable of feeling pain, of being flooded by adrenaline, and experiencing fear, hunger, and cold, are undeniably tortured in the "survival expectation experiment" and experimental brain surgery. The agonies of the body affect their minds as well. While he appears

mentally healthier than Snitter – to be fair, every animal character in *The Plague Dogs* does – Rowf, a huge black mongrel, is clearly traumatized by his repeated drownings. As the novel progresses, Rowf becomes increasingly weighed down by the cumulative stress of the past experiments and the present unrelenting hunger, as well as anxiety over his brain-damaged friend, until he reaches the point where he starts experiencing his hard-won freedom "like the whitecoats' tank. I feel just as though I were sinking, sometimes. And there's no avoiding it, either. We've got to eat. But I'm afraid the time's coming when I'm not going to be able to kill" (Adams, 2015: 312). Rowf's disability, however, is not only mental; his paw gets wounded during their escape from A. R. S. E., and the wound takes its toll every time he tries to hunt sheep or some other animal for food. Consequently, on the 13th November, twelve days before their suffering ends, Rowf returns to Snitter and the tod "bloody-mouthed, swollen with his kill but lamer than ever" (Adams, 2015: 284).

In Snitter's case, the damage done to him is meant to be both shocking and visible: thus, soon after escaping from A. R. S. E., Snitter loses his black cap, which in turn exposes the huge scar on his head. He appears like this before a local woman, Phyllis Dawson, whose reaction, while not praiseworthy, is understandable:

> It was indeed a terrible sight – the wreck of what had once been a pedigree, black-and-white, smooth-haired fox terrier. One paw was held awkwardly off the ground and the left flank was plastered with a mixture of dried mud and blood – whether its own or the other dog's was uncertain, for it had no discernible wound. The stitched gash in its skull was more than Phyllis could regard steadily. After one glance she turned away… (Adams, 2015: 226)

As with Rowf, moreover, the damage done to the once pedigree dog is not only physical. The outcome of Snitter's surgery has him confusing objective and subjective reality: "it [sic!] might see something objective and act as though it was nothing but the equivalent of some thought in his mind" (Adams, 2015: 251), Mr Powell explains to Digby Driver. This makes Snitter utterly incapable of surviving on his own as he cannot reliably interpret even the basic sensory input from the outside world: "I never can see anything straight when these humming fits come on. I wish I didn't feel so giddy and queer" (Adams, 2015: 318). In his fatal encounter with Mr Ephraim, Snitter is consumed by a ringing sound – "a vortex, a circling funnel of sound, broad and slow at the top, but descending rapidly inwards to a dizzy, spinning hole which was at once both the pierced centre of his own brain and the barrel of a gun pointed at his muzzle" (Adams, 2015: 182) – which results in the accident in which Mr Ephraim is killed. During the forty days they wander the Lakeland area, Snitter is dependent on Rowf and the tod, for a while, for (occasional) food, protection, and emotional support, just like a very young dog, or achild, for that matter – "he had pushed, like a puppy, deep under Rowf's side, [and] returned almost at once into a sleep even deeper than that in which his friend had left him" (Adams, 2015: 326). It is important to note, however, that in the best tradition of "wise madmen", Snitter has moments of lucidity, such as this one, when he comments on the "whitecoats" and their work, voicing the quintessentially anti-vivisectionist belief that animal

experimentation has a morally corrosive effect on the experimenters, and society in general: "But they never *look* happy, do they – not like – well, not like a chaffinch or a puppy. Perhaps they don't know what they're doing any more than we do. Perhaps they do bad things to each other, not just to us –" (Adams, 2015: 313, italics in the original).

4. "A race of men that have practised tortures without pity": Human experimenters in *The Plague Dogs*

The novel proves Snitter right: human beings capable of experimenting on animals do bad things to other humans. This other legacy of the nineteenth-century anti-vivisectionist movement – what Bates terms the virtue-centered approach to the personality of the experimenter – is to be found primarily in Adams's depiction and treatment of Dr Boycott, and, to a lesser degree, Dr Goodner, a former Nazi scientist hired by the British government to experiment with plague as a potential bioweapon. The names, obviously, are deeply satirical. In his first appearance in the novel, Dr Boycott appears attentive to human, as distinct from animal, suffering, although he is consistently dismissive of and condescending to his young assistant, Stephen Powell, while at the same time servile towards the Director – Adams perfectly captures the hierarchy of modern science and the treatment of junior researchers by the established scientific authorities. For the greater part of the novel, Boycott is clearly invested in reinforcing the human/nonhuman boundary through violence, which is called "research" in the scientific context. Those who are nonhuman, unsurprisingly, are subjected to all kinds of abuse in the name of human curiosity and knowledge – including the replication of Harry Harlow's notorious social deprivation experiment.

In Boycott's rendition of Harlow's real-life experiment, a young monkey is locked up in a cylinder, then placed in a balance-cupboard of a rarely-used room, and not exposed to even sights and sounds of any other living being. The scene that has Dr Boycott reading the report on one of the many experimental groups in A. R. S. E., the kittens deliberately infected with lung-worms who have died, is also illuminating. Not once does Boycott express any compassion or regret for having caused the young animals' painful deaths, only disappointment that the experiment did not yield expected results: "What a shame! 'Death of almost entire group' – h'm – 'preceded by' – h'm, h'm – 'excessive salivation, impairment of locomotion and vision, muscular twitchings, panting, respiratory distress, convulsions' – how disappointing!" (Adams, 2015: 428). Earlier, the narrator cynically comments that it took Dr Boycott "as short a time as three months" to make "the remarkable discovery that overcrowding, rough handling and prolonged thirst were beyond doubt the major contributors to higher-than-average death rates occurring among small mammals transported by air" (Adams, 2015: 37). The scientist driven by "intellectual curiosity" (Adams, 2015: 21), who extensively experiments on animals, apparently does not know the first thing about them, for instance, that they are living

beings and as such sensitive to stress and *thirst*. This lack of elementary knowledge problematizes Dr Boycott's scientific credentials and practices to the degree that he strikes the reader as an ordinary sadist relying on the complicated discourse of science and its mythology of "the benefit of humanity" (even worse, the alleged "respect for all creatures") for his brutal exploitation of the helpless. The reader's contempt for Dr. Boycott is helped along by passages such as this one:

> He was a qualified expert, initiative was expected of him, his subjects had no legal rights; and intellectual curiosity is, after all, a desire like any other. Besides, who in his senses could reasonably expect Dr. Boycott to ask himself, on behalf of the human race, not 'How much knowledge can I discover?' but 'How much knowledge am I justified in seeking?' Experimental science is the last flower of asceticism and Dr. Boycott was indeed an ascetic, an observer of events upon which he passed no value judgements. He represented, in fact, a most ingenious paradox, noble in reason, express and admirable in action, his undemonstrative heart committed with the utmost detachment to the benefit of humanity. *Something too much of this*. (Adams, 2015: 21, italics in the original)

Snitter, too, speaking in the voice of a "whitecoat", parodies the scientist's intellectual curiosity which, detached from even a hint of compassion, is deadly to the brutalized test subjects:

> You'll have noticed that I smell very smooth and clean, which is just as it should be: and that I cover everything up. You must understand that I'm not insensitive to the situation of my charges. My experiments have taught me great respect for all creatures. Your life certainly won't be wasted. Even your bones will have a use – you should feel proud and interested. Let me explain. There's a kind of buzzard that looks like a maggot – flying, of course – (Adams, 2015: 359).

After the launch of Sputnik II that carried Laika to her lonely, painful death among the stars in a matter of hours, Soviet chief engineer Sergei Korolev used identical language in an official statement: "the study of biological phenomena made during the spaceflight of a living organism – something done for the first time in Sputnik II – [was] of tremendous interest" (Caswell, 2018: 6). Phrases like "biological phenomena" and "a living organism" attempt but fail to obscure the fact that the study "of tremendous interest" is only the study of an animal's death: non-fictional Sergei Korolev is just another "whitecoat" watching the dog die. Snitter's use of "smooth and clean" while describing Dr Boycott, moreover, seems to echo Francis Power-Cobbe's conviction that there is no distinction between an animal experimenter and a butcher: "the smooth cool man of science [...] stands by that torture trough" (Kean, 1998: 103). Dr Jekyll, in Stevenson's celebrated novella, is also characterized by smooth facial features, hiding a lot of violence which will be externalized in Mr. Hyde. Unsurprisingly, Boycott's smoothness extends to his behavior as well. He knows that "dogs can't contract bubonic plague", but chooses to stay silent on the issue, amidst the media frenzy, so as to protect his position in A. R. S. E., assuming Rowf and Snitter will soon enough be eliminated by the Army. "Presumably we've only got to say so [that dogs cannot carry bubonic plague] and the whole thing'll die

down. But all the same, the quicker they're shot the better" (Adams, 2015: 295-6). But his moral deficiency, or, as Lewis Carrol termed it, "the degradation of soul", in line with the nineteenth-century anxieties, does not remain limited to animals: eventually it is turned against fellow human beings. In a confidential letter to the Director, Boycott recommends Stephen Powell for dismissal from A. R. S. E., on the basis of Powell's "inappropriately emotional feelings about a proposed experimental project", "on at least one occasion" (Adams, 2015: 432). Near the end of the letter, Boycott concludes: "In a word, he is expendable" (Adams, 2015: 433). As in *The Jungle*, the disposability of humans and animals is thus gradually revealed as shared, especially in those unexpected settings, such as meatpacking factories and research stations, that seem to strengthen the human/nonhuman boundary through massive violence. Powell, moreover, is informed by Boycott that he, too, is being subjected to an experiment, "an experiment in retrenchment" (Adams, 2015: 443).

Powell's final act as a scientist is highly significant. Taking his leave of A. R. S. E., he frees the young monkey, who has, by that time, spent over 41 days in total isolation. Finding the animal "crouching in a fetal posture, knees drawn up to chin and head bowed between them" (Adams, 2015: 445), unresponsive and surrounded by "a stench of ordure mixed with disinfectant" (ibid.), Powell tucks him under his coat, and takes him home. It is only after Powell's dismissal that the readers learn about his dying daughter, to whom he reads *Dr Dolittle* novels (the excerpt explicitly quoted in the novel concerns "an Association for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" (Adams, 2015: 497)). While still having faith in animal experimentation, even though he agrees with his daughter that it is "unkind to the animal" (Adams, 2015: 496), Powell announces he will move on from science to do something else: "Could be teaching, might even be farming" (Adams, 2015: 494). Though farming is not necessarily kinder to animals, being removed from Dr Boycott and his surveillance of the employees' emotional responses would certainly be kinder to Stephen Powell – not to mention the traumatized monkey.

5. Conclusion

Published in 1977, *The Plague Dogs* approaches animal experimentation from a firm anti-vivisectionist position. The central tenet of the Victorian anti-vivisectionist movement was that experimenting on animals was cruelty inflicted on the helpless nonhumans, which had a built-in potential for turning against human beings as well. The writings associated with the movement emphasized both the brutality of the vivisector and the suffering of the experimental animal in order to bring about specific legal changes, ignoring or denying the potential advances in medical knowledge that might result from vivisection. In a similar fashion, Adams argues against animal testing by focusing on the physical and mental harm inflicted on the canine victim-protagonists. Having given Rowf and Snitter voices and distinctive characters, Adams, moreover, deliberately echoes the nineteenth-century animal

autobiographies, which were generally critical of the human treatment of dogs and horses, and which were deployed by the anti-vivisectionists in the struggle to abolish, or at least limit animal suffering in the experiments. Another echo of the anti-vivisectionist debates is to be found in Adams's satirical treatment of the scientists, derogatorily termed "whitecoats", who are depicted as mere sadists with little actual knowledge of, let alone compassion for, the animals that they are experimenting upon. "Whitecoats", moreover, are represented as a danger to society because their well-practiced cruelty can, and does, turn against fellow humans as well.

Adams depicts animal experimentation in black and white terms; he does not see anything redeeming in the scientists, apart from Mr. Powell – and this is only after Powell is radicalized into direct action of liberating one experimental animal, and is, effectively, no longer a scientist. By introducing Powell's dying daughter late (and briefly) into the narrative, Adams hints at motives other than sadism that animal experimenters might have; however, he does not pursue this theme further. This, also, makes his novel in tune with the nineteenth-century anti-vivisectionist position. Ironically, though anti-vivisectionists ignored the potential advancements in medicine, the definite collapse of the antivivisection movement in the first part of the 20th century was, in fact, brought about by the demonstrable benefits of animal experimentation in the preceding period, first in the case of rabies, and then diphtheria. "The discovery of diphtheria antitoxin in 1894, which promised to save thousands of lives each year and which would not have been possible without experiments on live animals, was a decisive blow. Anti-vivisection lost its ability to mobilize public sympathy and came to occupy a position on the outer fringes of respectable opinion" (Ritvo, 1984: 62). In 1921, moreover, Sir Frederick Banting and Charles Best isolated insulin from canine pancreases, which became the first effective treatment for *diabetes mellitus* – a death sentence for humans before this discovery. While the suffering of the countless experimental dogs subjected to pancreatectomy cannot possibly be denied or exaggerated – "It was very difficult to keep diabetic animals alive for a long period of time due to infections in bad sanitary animal facility conditions. A lot of dogs died even if Banting's surgical technique improved" (Rostène & De Meyts, 2021: 511) – the significance of insulin (itself "filtered fetal calf extract") is impossible to overstate as well. Nor were all scientists indifferent to animal suffering in the name of human health. Sir Benjamin Ward Richardson, the nineteenth-century anesthesiologist, for instance, "developed carbonic oxide, chloroform and sulphuric ether specifically to prevent pain to animals" (Kean, 1998: 97). In 1959, also, William Russell and Rex Burch proposed the "3Rs" – the three rules that were intended to make animal testing more humane by *replacing* animals in research with other models, *reducing* the use of animals, and *refining* the research by relying on the "methods that alleviate or minimize potential pain, suffering, or distress and enhance animal welfare for the animals used" (Miller, 2023: 315). Russell and Burch also posited the so-called "high fidelity fallacy" i.e., "the incorrect assumption that, because placental mammals are similar to humans in some respects, they will always accurately reproduce key human responses, and

hence will always provide the best possible model for medical research and testing" (Knight, 2011: 211). Examples such as these problematize the black-and-white picture of animal experimentation that Adams paints, though properly addressing the moral ambiguity or the epistemological uncertainties involved with animal testing would require several separate papers, or a full-length study, at least.

The issues surrounding animal experimentation are not limited either to the nineteenth century or the 1970s, the experiments are still ongoing and more than 115 million animals worldwide die every year in them. Nowadays, however, the abolition of scientific experimentation on animals is not a separate matter as it was for the Victorians, but is rather subsumed under the general cause of animal liberation, which seeks to abolish all human use of all nonhuman animals. In contrast to both the British anti-vivisectionist movement and Adams, contemporary struggle for animal liberation, primarily in academia, is mostly rights-focused and takes the form of attempted "personhood attributions through biological, philosophical, and legal frameworks" (Tuck, 2020: 1). The rapidly developing field of posthumanism, especially the work of Donna Haraway and Cary Wolfe, has to be mentioned, too, though their branch of posthumanism is mostly oriented towards theorizing/historicizing the unstable and shifting distinction between human and nonhuman animals. Conversely, neither Adams nor the anti-vivisectionists ever attempted to argue for animals' legal rights, or abolish the nonhuman/human boundary and the human place in the hierarchy of living beings. Some of the key figures of the movement, like Frances Power-Kobbe, the founder of the Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, still ate meat; while speaking at an anti-vivisection meeting, George Bernard Shaw "was shocked to find himself sharing a platform with hunters and fur-wearers" (Bates, 2017: 22). Magendie's student, Claude Bernard, pointed to precisely this inconsistency in anti-vivisectionists' thought in 1865[6]. Throughout the novel, Adams, too, makes a distinction between "real masters" who love and protect their pet dogs, like Snitter's Alan Wood, and the "whitecoats" who torture dogs and other animals with their cruel experiments – but it is humans who are, unquestionably, the masters, and thus responsible for

[6] "Have we the right to make experiments on animals and vivisect them? … I think we have this right, wholly and absolutely. It would be strange indeed if we recognised man's right to make use of animals in every walk of life, for domestic service, for food, and then forbade him to make use of them for his own instruction in one of the sciences most useful to humanity. No hesitation is possible; the science of life can be established only through experiment, and we can save living beings from death only after sacrificing others. Experiments must be made either on man or on animals. Now I think that physicians already make too many dangerous experiments on man, before carefully studying them on animals. I do not admit that it is moral to try more or less dangerous or active remedies on patients in hospitals, without first experimenting with them on dogs; for I shall prove … that results obtained on animals may all be conclusive for man when we know how to experiment properly" (Claude Bernard quoted in Monamy, 2009: 12). Bernard practiced what he preached; a physiologist and a student of Magendie, he vivisected dogs, often in his kitchen, which eventually destroyed his marriage. Hilda Kean (1998: 101) writes that "it was the sight of dogs mutilated by her husband, the physiologist Claude Bernard, wandering in and out of the kitchen of their own home, that led his subsequently estranged wife to establish an asylum for stray cats and dogs in Paris".

the wellbeing of their pets, or lack thereof. In the context of contemporary critical animal studies and the struggle for animal rights and liberation, Adams's position seems both old-fashioned and unforgivably anthropocentric: the term "master" or "owner" is frowned upon (the preferred expression is "guardian", just as "pets" are referred to as "companion animals"), and pet-keeping itself has been increasingly problematized by philosophers and thinkers ever since John Berger's "Why We Look at Animals" (1977) – not always without ground. Yet it is possible to argue that Adams advocates for dogs better than (some) critics and theorists: for the majority of dogs, "real masters" are truly the best they can hope for, especially bearing in mind their evolutionary preference for humans. Nor is human responsibility and duty of care for their (companion) animals merely an expression of human supremacy over the nonhumans – though, again, these lines of investigation should be the subject of future research in order to be properly developed.

As a final point, it is Adams's focus on experimental animal suffering that is the most relevant aspect of *The Plague Dogs*. While modern abolitionist efforts take place within a wide variety of philosophical and legal frameworks (Singer's utilitarianism, Tom Regan's and Garly L. Francione's animal rights, Christine M. Korsgaard's reworking of Kant's deontology, Matthew Scully's Christian ethics, Lori Gruen's care ethics, to name just a few), suffering is still the focal point and the motivation behind the call for animal liberation in the field of critical animal studies and animal rights activism in general. Experimental animal suffering, too, is the starting point of Donna Haraway's (2008: 69) attempt to justify, unsuccessfully, "instrumental relations between laboratory animals and their people"[7]. It is worth noting, also, that the key

[7] In the chapter "Sharing Suffering" from her 2008 study *When Species Meet*, Haraway finds inspiration in the YA novel by Nancy Farmer called *A Girl Named Disaster*. In the excerpt Haraway (2008: 69) quotes, Baba Joseph, an employee of a small scientific post in Zimbabwe tasked with caring for the guinea pigs which are deliberately exposed to the painful bites of the tsetse flies, places his own arm in the cage holding these insects, in order "to learn what the guinea pigs are suffering". He continues, "It's wicked to cause pain, but if I share it, God may forgive me". From this single paragraph in a YA novel, Haraway weaves a complicated and verbose fantasy of human caretakers sharing suffering with the experimental animals, which somehow justifies what she incorrectly terms the "labor" of lab animals. Redefining lab animals as "significantly unfree partners" [sic!], and attempting to move the discussion of their suffering away from the framework of sacrifice, Haraway states that "[w]e are in the midst of webbed existences, multiple beings in relationship, this animal, this sick child, this village, these herds, these labs, these neighborhoods in a city, these industries and economies, these ecologies linking natures and cultures without end. This is a ramifying tapestry of shared being/becoming among critters (including humans) in which living well, flourishing, and being 'polite' (political/ethical/in right relation) mean staying inside shared semiotic materiality, including the suffering inherent in unequal and ontologically multiple instrumental relationships. In that sense, experimental animal research is, or can be, necessary, indeed good, but it can never 'legitimate' a relation to the suffering in purely regulatory or disengaged and unaffected ways" (Haraway, 2008: 72). As long as the vivisector is not disengaged from or unaffected by the suffering of the lab animal, therefore, experimental animal research is morally good and justified. This is not the end of Haraway's fantasy: "The animal caretaker is engaged not in the heroics of self-experimentation (a common trope in tropical medicine histories) but in the practical and moral obligation to mitigate suffering among mortals – and not just human mortals – where possible and to share the conditions of work, including the suffering, of the most vulnerable lab actors" (ibid: 70). Several serious objections can be raised against Haraway's concept of sharing suffering: lab animals are

theorists propagating animal rights, Tom Regan and Gary L. Francione (2005: 174-177), effectively revive the anti-vivisectionist rhetoric in their twenty-first century work. Denying all benefits of animal experiments, Tom Regan (2005: 177), for instance, concludes: "Vivisection is just the sort of evil we should not do". Francione's (2009: 174) position is more moderate, though he, too, is suspicious of the benefits of animal experimentation: "I do not share the view of some animal advocates that we have learned nothing useful from vivisection, although I do maintain that claims about what we have learned are greatly exaggerated". Much of the anti-vivisectionist mute-and-innocent-victim iconography, moreover, including the famous "Can they suffer" quote, is also alive and well in contemporary vegan street and online activism which, while not limited to the scientific abuse of animals, utilizes "the visual culture of animal advocacy" (Cronin, 2018: 22) from the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century exemplified by Power-Cobbe's *Light in Dark Places*. Present-day activists show graphic images and videos not only of lab animals, but also animal slaughter, gestation crates in factory farms, chained calves kept in isolation and minimal space, chickens being transported to slaughterhouses, fattened foxes in tiny wire cages on fur farms, etc. Animal suffering is relentless and unending; although Adams lacks contemporary theoretical sophistication, he should be applauded for protesting against some forms of it, however morally simplified his position appears to be.

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certainly not actors, "significantly unfree" human partners or laborers; the sharing of suffering between humans and experimental animals is impossible (even in the fictional example, the arm of a grown man exposed to the bites of the tsetse flies does not experience pain in the same way as the guinea pigs' entire bodies). Nor are animal caretakers (or the majority of researchers) interested in mitigating the suffering of lab animals. "Justifying the use of animals in experiments is viewed as a waste of time: 'Why do I have to bother with these things? It's just getting in the way of the science'" (Miller, 2023: 15). Had she read another piece of fiction – Adams's *The Plague Dogs* – Haraway would have come across the following sobering description of the animal caretaker employed in a research station: "He [old Tyson] understood dogs well enough, his attitude towards them being equally valid for the purposes of A.R.S.E. or for those of a Lakeland hill-farm – namely, that they were pieces of technological equipment which one needed to know how to maintain and use properly" (2015: 33).

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„MOJI EKSPERIMENTI SU ME NAUČILI DA POŠTUJEM SVA STVORENJA": *KUŽNI PSI* RIČARDA ADAMSA I POKRET PROTIV VIVISEKCIJE

Apstrakt

Oslanjajući se na istorijska istraživanja A. V. H. Bejtsa, Hilde Kin, Harijet Ritvo i drugih, rad razmatra roman Ričarda Adamsa iz 1977. godine, *Kužni psi*, prevashodno njegov stav prema naučnim eksperimentima na životinjama i prikazivanje odnosa između ljudi i životinja, u kontekstu pokreta protiv vivisekcije iz devetnaestog veka u Velikoj Britaniji. Iako piše sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka, Adams, kako se u radu dokazuje, prisvaja i reprodukuje specifične teme i retoriku boraca protiv vivisekcije – ponajpre fokus na moralne vrline ljudi koji eksperimentišu na životinjama, ali i na patnju životinja tokom eksperimenata – sa ciljem da istraživanje na životinjama prikaže kao čin sadizma čija je naučna vrednost niska, ili nepostojeća.

Ključne reči: eksperimenti na životinjama, *Kužni psi,* pokret protiv vivisekcije, Ričard Adams