

## ЕВРОПСКА РЕВОЛУЦИЈА (1789 – 1989)

*Сажетак:* „Европска револуција“ као синоним промена на Старом континенту у току два века није заједнички појам. Да ли можемо говорити о таквој револуцији? Спонтани одговор је пре негативан. Да ли имамо не „европску револуцију“, већ револуције у појединим европским државама? Њихов резултат је национална консолидација, „нације-државе“. И још важније, револуције су различите: либерално-демократске, комунистичке, фашистичке. Шта више, оне се узајамно искључују до мере када од позиције једне револуције друга може да се разматра, и реално је разматрана, као контрареволуција – фашистичка револуција са тачке гледишта комунизма, комунистичка – са либералне тачке гледишта, и обрнуто. И револуције се одвијају у различито доба, у различитом контексту. Ти су аргументи били довољни до 1989. Одрас су реалних особина историјског процеса. Сада, у XXI веку, постаје јасно да су непотпуни. Приказује се неколико ствари: *као прво*, регионалан, наднационалан резултат европског процеса; *као друго*, значај интеракције у току тог процеса; *као треће*, сличност у финализацији поларних по усмерености и обележавању револуција. Основ Европске интеграције, оно што је чини могућом и јој даје снагу и виталност, јесте *хомогенизација социјално-политичких и вредносних система* земаља Старог континента. Сама подела у XX веку је непосредан резултат различитих револуција. Хомогенизација такође је резултат – очекиван или неочекиван – тока револуционих процеса који мењају мапу континента у току двеста година и стварају данас доминантан либерални простор. Можда је то формирање предуслова будућег постекономског друштва у перспективама XXI века.

*Клучне речи:* Европска револуција, револуционарни процес, револуционарна експлозија, хоризонталне и вертикалне везе, Маркс, антикапиталистички развој, постекономско друштво, култура слободе.

### 1. The topic

The wording of the topic is odd not because of a journalist trick but in order to emphasize a crucial necessity: to look, from a new historic distance, at and *reconsider* some key events such as the chain of heterogeneous revolutions in the course of European modernization. Such a process of reconsideration determined by the temporal position is going on spontaneously upon the change of generations and is well-known in the sociology of youth. It is called “a new access.”

In philosophy there is a methodological principle argued by Hegel: the higher, and in particular, the final phase of a process contains "the truth" of preceding development. This principle was used by Feuerbach and by Marx who gave it an aphoristic wording: "*Human anatomy contains the key to the anatomy of the ape.*"

What's new that can be seen from the historic height we have get to in the now second decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century?

We are contemporaries of two respecting and quite different future-oriented visions. Francis Fukuyama saw a triumph of liberalism and an "end of history" as a change of social systems. On the contrary, Immanuel Wallerstein saw liberalism as doomed and a new, post-capitalist system. What is common (in addition to the fact that both authors are American scientists of world renown) is that in both cases it is presumed that certain historic cycle is completed. Moreover, the year of 1989 stands out as a point of intersection of several different cycles of development. They are described in the literature but their interrelation has not been sufficiently analyzed. **Geopolitical** cycle (1945-1989) – from the division of Germany and Europe to (the premises) for their unification. **Military & political** (1914-1989) – from the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Cold War, a kind of Third World War. **Communist** (1917-1989/91) – from the emergence of USSR to its reduction to Russia plus „ближние зарубежье“, Russia's "near abroad". **Revolutionary** (1789-1989) – from the storming of the Bastille to the fall of the Berlin wall. Wallerstein also adds and emphasizes on the *macro-historical* cycle (1450-1989) – from the formation of a capitalist "world-system" to the turning point when it reaches a certain limit. The events are viewed differently if taken out of that context and depending on the perspective in which we view them.

I would like to turn your attention to the revolutionary cycle. This is understandable given that the field in which I have worked the most is the history of revolutionary and reformist ideas in their philosophical, sociological and political aspects. But not only for that reason. The revolutionary cycle is especially important for political science, while at the same time it remains insufficiently developed on theoretical level.

Revolutions are a strange, astonishing allow of expectations and apprehensions, an explosion of hopes mixed with fears, a demonstration of selflessness and meanness, of adherence to principles and unscrupulousness, of rise and fall. Now, as a rule civilized revolutions do not eat their own children but rather do eat their children's rating. But for the researcher they remain a problem field with methodological traps. On of the most prominent revolutionaries of 20<sup>th</sup> century, Sun Yat-sen, the first president of Chinese Republic, left a remarkable summary of revolutionary experience: "*Action is easy, knowledge is difficult.*"<sup>1</sup> To state quite the contrary and to look down on certain philosophers would befit a practitioner like him more. But for Sun this is not an aphorism but a thoroughly well-founded thesis. In this case, knowing is not an appeal for indulgence, nor

<sup>1</sup> Сунь Ятсен. 1985. *Избранные произведения*. Москва: „Наука“.

a manifestation of self-confidence. This is an appraisal of theoretical *status quo*. The studies of revolution gathered a pile of empirical data, put them to analysis produced different theories: psychological, sociological, macro-historical, political, interdisciplinary. They missed even *the possibility* for the events of 1989/91.<sup>2</sup> Twenty years later, the “Arab Spring” is another surprise.<sup>3</sup> And again arises the question of *spatial-temporal continuum* in which the changes are examined. In the short term, the course of revolutions is even more surprising than their start.

“*Ça ira! Les aristocrates à la lanterne!*” One day Balzac will describe *what happened*: Crevel and Rigou, Nucingen and Cuente have taken the place of aristocrats, and the former convict Vautrin has become prefect of Paris police. Sounds familiar? Yes, from *Illusions Perdues*.

“*Вся власть Советам!*” One day power will turn out in NKVD/KGB. But on a day afterwards the KGB boss will give the green light to changes and will promote an initiator of changes that will lead to “perestroika” and disintegration of the system. A General Secretary created the system. A General Secretary led to its destruction. The leader of the “empire of evil” was awarded a Nobel peace prize. For some it sounds curious, for others ridiculous, for third suspicious. In fact, as a great revolutionary and heir to German philosophers once said: “*Well dug, old mole!*” The revolutionary progress goes on and disproves the revolutionary power as ruthlessly as the Ancien régime did before.

What is almost impossible to be seen in the start and is difficult to be understood in the course of revolutionary cycle should be clearer after its relative end. Let us check.

## 2. The space: the european revolution

“European Revolution” as a synonym of the change in the old continent for two centuries is not a generally accepted term. Can one talk about such revolution?

<sup>2</sup> 1989 provoked a critical balance. In mid 1990s, after the *Aurora's* salvo faded away in the Białowieża Forest, Seymour Lipset (Lipset, S. M. 1994. *Why Didn't We Anticipate the Failure of Communism?*) summarized things as follows: the main question that social scientist have to deal with in reacting to the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union is why did they and, we must admit, other non-academic experts such as the intelligence agencies of the great Western powers, as well, did not anticipate that this would happen, or even it could happen. (See: Капустин, Б. Г. 1998. *Современность как предмет политической теории*. Москва: РОССПЭН). The heuristic collapse of sovietology that was discussed in the West but practically didn't get to our public, coincided with the ideological triumph of the system and probably this concealed its theoretical deficiency.

<sup>3</sup> “Four months ago no one would have thought that this year would turn out to be a turning point for the region. We knew all about the pent-up tensions, the discontent and the poverty. We knew that our hopes for revival were falling apart and that our region was being dismembered and washed down the river. But neither scholars nor analysts saw this coming. A storm has swept over the region, and it hit us without warning. It is hard to attribute it solely to poverty or repression, to the lack of democracy or justice. It's much more than that.” (Nassar, Galal. 2011. *The Arab Spring and the crisis of the elite*. *Al-Ahram*, 02-08. June).

The spontaneous response is rather negative. What we have is not a "European revolution" but revolutions in individual European states. Their result is the national consolidation, national states or, as the more exact imported term is, "nation-states." Secondly, and more importantly, revolutions are heterogeneous: they are Liberal-Democratic, Communist, Fascist. Moreover, they are mutually exclusive to such extent that from the point of view of one revolution the other can be seen, and was actually seen, as counterrevolution. For example, the Fascist revolution from the communist point of view. Or the communist one from liberal point of view, as well as vice versa. Thirdly, revolutions take their course at different time, in a different context.

These arguments were perfectly sufficient until 1989. They reflect real peculiarities of historical process. Now, it becomes clear that this is incomplete, Hegel would say *abstract*, in the dialectical sense of one-sided.

What do the last 20 years complement?

A couple of things have become visible: *firstly*, a regional, supranational result of the European process; *secondly*, the importance of interaction in the course of that process; *thirdly*, a similarity in the finalization of revolutions of polar orientation and labeling.

The European Union was born out of a number of individual European states. The historical scale is lost in the routine, and the problems of the actual state of affairs frequently distort the view of the perspective. But whatever difficulties the EU may experience we can be sure that Europe will not go back to 1914, 1939 or 1946. Now we hear "*Allons enfants de la Patrie...*" from one side of the Rhine, and "*Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles...*" from the other. But we also hear a common anthem whose author is a German composer inspired by the French Revolution. There will never be another Somme, Maginot line and Siegfried will not stand against each other, and Kurfuerstendamm and Unter den Linden will not be divided by a state border.

Some claiming to be witty say that the only lesson from history is that nations do not take any lesson. There are such examples but the generalization is one of the falsest pseudo truths. The victors' behavior with respect to Germany after the end of World War II took into account the strategic mistake after the end of the First World War.

Well, but doesn't precisely that mean that EU is a geopolitical result of "realpolitik" that takes into account the unbearable expenses and risks of opposition having reached the limit, the imperatives of global pressure; the conditions in which cooperation and integration are the only reasonable alternative.

That's the way it is. But in history the reasonable alternative is far from being always the winning one. The question concerning the miracle of European unification is not only *how did it happen?* but also *how does it become possible?* I say "miracle" because until now Europe has always been divided by the most difficult to overcome ideological borders. Without going into the jungle of history, without going back to the times when Europe was simultaneously Catholic,

Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim, we see pre-war Europe divided as Liberal, Fascist and Communist Europe under dominating political ideologies, and the post-war Europe as a bi-polar, Liberal and Communist Europe.

The basis for integration, what makes it possible and gives it strength and vigor, is *the homogenization of socio-political and value systems* of the countries from the 'vieux continent'. Please note that the very division in 20<sup>th</sup> century is an immediate result of different revolutions.

And what about homogenization? The same. It is also the – expected or unexpected – result of the revolutionary processes that have changed the map of the continent for two hundred years and have established the liberal space that is dominating today.

The European countries have come a long way that includes interaction in a wide range: from dialogue of intellectuals to the clash of armies, from the catching force of example to the examples of force; this is evident in the impact of the Great Revolution, in the collective "Vienna" experience to stop it, in the "Spring of Nations" (1848), in the formation of a European revolutionary party, later a chain of parties, in the Russian "October" Revolution which would not be possible without the French and German revolutionary experience, and which is in itself just the beginning of a European revolution (with the subsequent world-scale scope), in the Nazi attempt for a "New Order in Europe" and its disapproval, in the post-war opposing unions: the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and the revolutionary wave of 1968 and the 1989 revolutions that put a full-stop above the „and“.

The ideological interrelation is quite indicative but the competence of the audience deprives me of the pleasant opportunity to trace out the revolutionary spirit that springs out of the French bottle, passes across the English Channel and, not less importantly, comes back, strengthened and/or challenged, across the English Channel, flies over the Rhine and gets to German philosophers who, in the silence of their studies, interpret the noisy and dramatic events on the streets of Paris to get to the logical peak of liberalism in Kant and a large-scale philosophical and historical account of the new epoch in Hegel. And this is only the beginning. One can boldly say that there is not a single ideological matrix of national revolutions which is "purely national", without European roots, outside the European context.

### 3. The time: 1789 – 1989

The temporal localization of revolutions is a methodological problem that has entered the reference publications. In the authoritative *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics* we read:

"It is difficult to identify when revolutions begin and end"<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Russian edition: Политика. Толковый словарь. 2001. Originally published by Oxford University Press. Москва: „Весь мир“.

The French Revolution causes striking disagreements in terms of its dating. According to one opinion (maintained by the Soviet historiography but not only by it) it ends by Thermidor (1794), by the guillotining of Robespierre and Saint-Just. According to others it ends five years later by the Consulate (1799). According to third (such is the opinion of Marx) the Restoration (1815) puts the end of revolution. We should not be surprised that Eugene Kamenka, a famous specialist of the history of ideas authored a study in which he put a question mark instead of an end date: "*The French Revolution (1789 – ?)*"<sup>5</sup>! François Furet, probably the most important of contemporary historians of the Revolution, wrote in his most recent big book (*Le Passé d'une illusion*):

"Less than anyone else I am inclined to argue that the point at which the French revolution "ends" can be easily determined: the uncertainty is preserved in French domestic policy at least until the Third Republic."<sup>6</sup> "Third Republic" means the last one-third of 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Furet avoids the theoretical and political scientific generalizations. So much the indicative is his attempt to reproduce the general transformation of French society in the monograph *Revolutionary France, 1770-1880*.<sup>7</sup> Please pay attention to the dates. The first one is Turgot's attempt for reforms when everything is still "under control." The second one is ten years after the Paris Commune when political system is *already* stabilized. It was not 110 years of storms and cataclysms, of reforms and revolts, of restorations and new revolutions before "Place Louis XV" renamed "Place de la Révolution" (Dr. Guillotine's invention was mounted exactly on that place) not only received but also deserved its third and last name: "Place de la Concorde," "Concord Square." I am not retelling Furet, I am just illustrating the intention expressively manifested in the name.

It is not difficult to see that such approach can be applied to "*Revolutionary Germany*" by including six revolutionary turns (1848, 1871, 1918/19, 1933/45, 1949/50, 1989/91), or to "*Revolutionary Russia*" (where figures as different as Alexander II and Chernyshevsky, Stolypin and Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin, Stalin and Khrushchev, Gorbachev and Yeltsin will take their places). But, first and foremost, the question is: can an empirical study like Furet's lead to theoretical generalization?

We get to the key methodological question concerning the essence of revolution, its scientific definition.

The French Annales school and, in particular, Fernand Braudel, boldly and successfully entered the research of "*longue durée*"<sup>8</sup>, of long-term processes. I think that political science has not yet made sufficient use of that heuristic break-through.

<sup>5</sup> See also: Hinrichs, Ernst. 1994. *Ist die Französische Revolution beendet?* In: Bilder einer Revolution. Riemenschneider, R. (Hrsg.). Frankfurt/Main, Paris: Moritz Diesterweg, L'Harmattan.

<sup>6</sup> Фюре, Франсуа. 1998. *Прошлое одной иллюзии*. Москва: „Ad Marginem“.

<sup>7</sup> Furet, Francois. 1995. *Revolutionary France, 1770-1880*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>8</sup> Бродель, Фернан. 1992. *Время мира*. Т. 3. Москва: „Прогресс“.

The paradoxes of *the ambiguous, evading end* and of *the contradictory identification*, the same event is being judged as coup d'état by some, as revolution by others, as counterrevolution by third, find a solution if we make more precise our conceptual apparatus by which we comprehend a complex and dynamic event. We can use a "*long-term concept*" of revolution covering a continuous period of passage from vertical to horizontal type of social relations and (the traditional) "*short-term concept*" which limits revolution to revolutionary outburst. There is a *revolutionary process*, there is a *revolutionary outburst*. (I am not quite sure that "outburst" is the most exact term but I do not find a better one; and it smells of gunpowder, it evokes associations of revolution). The revolutionary outburst is replaced by months and years, the revolutionary process can take more than a century. The revolutionary outbursts change *power*, power relations in political and social aspect. The revolutionary process transforms *action* and thus there are structural reforms organically intertwined in it. Reform and revolution are opposites, alternatives in the case of the "*short-term concept*" of revolution; they are closely intertwined and interrelated, mutually determining when we use the "*long-term concept*."

The *longue durée* definition of revolution gives us an opportunity to better understand its peculiarities which seem like paradoxes.

- (1) A paradoxical *duplication of revolution* or presence of more than one *revolutions in the revolution*. The revolutionary outburst overcomes or sweeps away (stage-by-stage) the vertical relations typical for the ancien régime and together with that (or because of that) it sets up revolutionary power, i.e. a new type of vertical relations. Robespierre called them "despotism of freedom." Lenin called them "dictatorship of the proletariat." The longer the revolutionary institutions are at work the more they begin to meet their own requirements and to recruit a privileged stratum. The outcome is a new act of revolution. Different types of vertical relations are overcome and thus the revolutionary process gets pulsating.
- (2) A paradoxical *diversity, multidirectionality* of revolutions – liberal, communist, fascist. The difference is so great that questions the correctness of the common denominator. In all three cases certain horizontal connections are established and new spaces for social mobility are created. Their value is another question. It is naïve to think that the force of Nazism lies simply in Gestapo or the one of Stalinism in NKVD. The horizontal relations are measured by the access to statuses. The Aryan blood is the first case, and the class origin in the other, ensure such access.
- (3) *Complex, multi-aspect and contradictory* nature of transition determining its duration. In the family there are also vertical relations. *Pater familias* is a power position. Here, we are speaking about multi-layer changes affecting some fundamental relations in society: ones between the sexes, between young and adults, among different races and ethnicities, social classes.

**The gender revolution**, or if you wish, the *Feminist revolution* (some do not want to, especially after SCUM – Society for Cutting Up Men emerged in the US). Men tore down the Bastille but women forced the king to return in Paris. Olympe de Gouge, a beautiful and clever woman (feminism, dear colleagues, is not the brainchild of ugly women) initiated *Declaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne* [*Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen*]: if women have the right to go to the scaffold they must have the right to get onto the political tribune. Only the first right was recognized and she ended on the scaffold. But *Les droits des femmes*, silenced in Paris, became even more well-grounded as *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, the extended platform of the British Mary Wollstonecraft. Condorcet from France, Mill from Britain, Bebel from Germany, Ibsen from Norway, the list can be extended, contributed in different ways and – note! – from different ideological positions, to the change of public opinion in favor of equality of powers for women. Nevertheless, women were not given voting rights in France until 1944, in Germany suffrage was reinstated after the Second World War. In Great Britain, suffrage was made equal for men and women in 1928. Well, in late 20<sup>th</sup> century *sexism* became an obscenity.

**The race revolution.** To get an idea of how deep the change of public attitudes is I will quote the opinion of Montesquieu, a great enlightener and liberal:

“It is hardly to be believed that God, who is a wise Being, should place a soul, especially a good soul, in such a black body...” [Maybe if it were at least “dark-skinned” but utterly black...] It is impossible for us to suppose these creatures [negroes] to be men, because, allowing them to be men, a suspicion would follow that we ourselves are not Christians.”<sup>9</sup>

The Revolution is a manifestation of liberals of a new generation. Brissot, who was to become Girondist leader, founded a *Société des amis des Noirs* on the eve of the revolution.

The legislative action (1791) of the National Assembly to give citizen rights to all Jews had key importance. The response came later, anti-Semitism, which found its ideologues in the leading European countries: France, England, Germany, Russia.

It is of fundamental importance that the revolutionary process also includes reverse actions, counteraction and overcoming of counteraction that leads the entire development to a new phase. Vendée is part of the French Revolution. The Nazi racism is part of the European racial evolution, an attempt for radical counteraction that lead to the radical condemnation of *racism* as a crime against humanity. The intolerance to racism, the sensitivity to racism would not be the same without the Holocaust.

**The colonial revolution.** On 16 Pluviôse, year II, the Convention voted to abolish slavery in French colonies. But there is a long way from here

<sup>9</sup> Montesquieu. 1961. *De l'esprit des lois*. Paris: Garnier.



to decolonization. Horizontal relations in European states facilitate their development and simultaneously stimulate their expansion. Imperialism means the establishment of a world network of vertical dependencies. It is precisely that nature of imperialism that gave Lenin reasons to predict the end of the entire system. Decolonization freed not only the colonies, it also freed the very metropolises from the dead-weight of vertical relations. England and France created their own worlds and only the dissolution of their empires and their transformation into cultural and economic ties makes the European integration possible.

**The age revolution.** Again, I will start from a pre-Revolution point of view, from the great Montesquieu:

“Nothing contributes more to the preservation of morals than an extreme subordination of the young to the old.”<sup>10</sup>

And I will mention the final outcome. Young people turned 18 were given voting rights in 1969 in UK, in 1970 in Germany, in 1974 in France. Please note that in all three cases the legislative acts came after 1968. In the end of the century the term “ageism” stigmatizing discrimination based on age become popular.

**The stratification revolution.** I use this strange concept to designate the transition from class society to a society of class mobility in which the class differences turn into stratification ones without having disappeared.

1789 established a society of citizens but along with that it divided them into “active” and “passive” by means of a property qualification. In mid 19<sup>th</sup> century (before 1848) the number of people with right to vote was 170 thousand out of a population of 35 million people. Not only women but also the workers did not get to the ballot boxes. The master and servant relations under the Manchester capitalism are quite violent. They actually became also horizontal when worker’s labor was protected by law, when a trade union stood behind the worker and when the latter got political representation. If we designate class discrimination by “classism” we can say that in 19<sup>th</sup> century we actually see a practical conservative classism. In 20<sup>th</sup> century, and especially after the Russian Revolution, on the contrary, a revolutionary, radical, ideologically motivated classism came to the foreground. The Russian Revolution (1918 Constitution) stripped the “bourgeoisie” of the right to vote. And Stalin stripped many of them of their right to live as well (“liquidation of the Kulaks as a class”). Property restrictions in Germany were removed in 1919, in Great Britain in 1918 for men.

**The national revolution.** The Revolution established and affirmed as new identity. *Vive la nation!* – this is a slogan from 1789, which is not less popular than *Liberté, égalité, fraternité!* And which is closely connected to it. Civil equality released a striking consolidating energy which has no substitutes.

The fall of USSR seems a geopolitical miracle, one considerably bigger than its emergence if one takes into account the colossal military power and the

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<sup>10</sup> Montesquieu. Ibid, p. 54.

strategic positions on three continents and even in outer space. One can easily say, and we have heard recently: if Khrushchev had succeeded with the draft of a new constitution... One can continue: if Kosygin's reforms were not frozen..., if Andropov had not died suddenly..., if Gorbachev had removed Yakovlev and had not made easy concessions... It is understood that there were available different options to preserve "the first proletarian state."

The long-term concept of revolution minimizes the role of contingencies and personal factors. It disavows the conspiracy theories. National revolutions end in nation-states. A Soviet nation did not emerge. The reason is not the internal ethnic distances. They are even greater than the African Americans and European Americans but an American nation does exist.

There is also a Mexican nation. On the Plaza de las Tres Culturas where the last battle between the Spanish conquistadors and the Aztecs led by Cuauhtémoc took place, now there is an inscription: "No fue ni triunfo ni derrota, fue el doloroso nacimiento del pueblo mestizo que es el México de hoy" [English: "This was neither a triumph nor a defeat, but the painful birth of our mestizo people that is Mexico today"]. In the "longue durée" history of the Mexican Revolution the key figure is not the liberal Madero or the leftist Zapata but rather Benito Juárez, the first president of American Indian origin...

A nation can not emerge based on vertical relations, it does so only in case of horizontal relations. The presence of tolerated, non-tolerated and repressed ethnicities excludes the establishment of a nation of citizens.

The affirmation of nations of citizens makes possible both the regional and supranational unification. The Czech Republic and Slovakia separated as nation states in order to get united in the common EU. It is even more indicative that the separatist movements, the most radical of which is the Basque separatism, want to leave the nation state and not the EU. These are facts of common knowledge which have not been theorized enough. In 1989, the national individuation, even ethnic formation in Europe, was not yet finished. But it takes place under other conditions and this provides, in principle, an opportunity to resolve ethnic national matters that have not been fully resolved or that are insoluble. The European revolution is not just the sum of national revolutions but a new type of horizontal relations that give birth to a new identity.

**1789 – 1989.** Now, I hope, it is clearer what I am speaking about.

1789 created the very concept of revolution in the contemporary sense.

1989 set a new beginning.

Hence we can cast a retrospective look on history of revolutionary idea and on the perspective.

#### 4. A retrospection: the enigma of marx

##### Why enigma?

Marx is a theorist who views ideology as an illusory, false consciousness. His name was embedded into a powerful and violently imposed ideological system. *"The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."* And not the vice versa. Personality is the criterion. This is his definition taken not from long unknown manuscripts but from the celebrated *Communist Manifesto*.

*"Freedom is always the freedom of dissenters [Freiheit ist immer Freiheit der Andersdenkenden]!"* The author of that vivid defense of dissent is a revolutionary from the Marian school, Rosa Luxemburg. This is the same line of thought. Well, how does one get along that line to the GULag where another rule is at work *"Шаг влево, шаг вправо считается побегом!"* Society was aligned under the same camp rule: left-wing deviation and right-wing deviation were considered CRTA/CRA.<sup>11</sup>

There is also a second question. How is it possible that the Marx discredited by "real socialism" be recognized as the "thinker of the millennium"? And this is not just a matter of inquiry. There are only two thinkers who are devoted more space in Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia: Plato and Aristotle. Both are from another millennium.

Many answers have been proposed to the enigma. The question is: does the European revolution cast a new light?

Let us go back to the *Manifesto*.

„Proletarier aller Laender vereinigt euch!"

It can be given two different interpretations.

- (1) *"Stop the process!"* Stop the polarization, impoverishment and enrichment, insecurity, capitalist development. Jacobins made the first attempt: they affirmed the right to private property but did not allow for the accumulation.<sup>12</sup> Babeuf made the next step. Simply there must not be any private property. The political communism was born in the course of the French Revolution on the crest of the left-wing Germinal wave as a continuation of Jacobinism.<sup>13</sup> The enthusiasm of that communism is equality brought to the extreme ("L'égalité parfait"). This is an *anti-capitalist or pre-capitalist communism*. Egalitarian, leveling

<sup>11</sup> CRTA: "counter-revolutionary Trotskyist activities"; CRA: "counter-revolutionary activities." Both were subject to the provisions of article 58 of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Penal Code.

<sup>12</sup> The Law of the Maximum (General Maximum) of 29 September 1793 introduced state regulation of prices of all basic commodities.

<sup>13</sup> After the Thermidorian coup the "General Maximum" was repealed, and an "orgy of owners" ensued. Then followed a sense of nostalgia for the Jacobins and the revolts in Germinal and Prairial, year III.

one. The life program is satiation. A violent, repressive, barrack-room communism.

Marx put it to fierce dissection and discovered: "envy constituting itself as a power", "the *preconceived* minimum", "definite, limited standard", "regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor*, unrefined man who has no needs and who has not yet even reached the stage of private property, let alone gone beyond it." I am citing only a part of that criticism which, in terms of its categorical stance, does not differ from the anti-communist one and which, in its depth, considerably surpasses it. Not to mention that this was 100 years before the notorious post-war 45 years started. This is known to the experts but not to the general public. Probably it would confuse, in different manner, the voters both to the right and to the left. Engels, in his turn, writes how dictatorship ambitions and "a kind of communist Islam" were rising among these "sentimental Communists". (This is from a publication from 1885, it is not from a private letter.<sup>14</sup>)

Marx started a serious confrontation with the "communist Islam", thus splitting and putting an end to the first international communist organization. His *theoretical* starting point is a forecast for an upper historic limit of capitalist system. In such case private property must not be discontinued but outlived to such a limit where the law of value ceases to be the engine of development and leisure time, and not working time, becomes the measure of public wealth. The horizontal ties got their end: to the withering away with the state, overcoming alienation, self-realization of personality. It is not until that final that we get an answer to the fundamental philosophical-anthropological question: what is society: a super-system with respect to the individual, like a termite-hill, or an optimal environment for his/her realization. *A post-capitalist communism which is "naturalism-humanism."* High theory. How to land it down in *political* terms?

- (2) „*Optimize the process!*“ This can happen in two different ways. By means of a reformist expansion of horizontal relations (thus, for instance, Bebel writes about the emancipation of women) to a system change (Marx assumed it for England and USA). Or by means of forced revolutionary end to the entire process where violence plays (not more than) the role of a "midwife:"

The subsequent history of revolutionary idea is a political thriller. "*Optimize the process!*" in the West became "*Stop the process!*" in the East, and its stopping in the East became an impetus for its optimization in the West. I am sorry that I can not trace out the vicissitudes and I will have to limit myself to the final balance. It is striking to what extent the attitude to 1793 plays a key role. It is quite possible that when Lenin was accused by the Mensheviks (but also by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky) of Jacobinism and he responded "you are Girondists" this looked just

<sup>14</sup> Marx, Karl und Friedrich Engels. Bd. 21. 1973. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. S. 220.

like a political exchange of “compliments.” Time shows whether political “epithets” have real value.

I will use an example from outside the European history because it is closer in time and because it is especially illustrative.

During the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” Liu Shaoqi was declared “No. 1 capitalist roader”, and Deng Xiaoping – “No. 2 capitalist roader”. It sounds strange, even ridiculous. Deng Xiaoping, a participant in the Long March who marched 10,000 km and who headed the biggest communist party so that it head along the capitalist road. Commentators interpreted: a struggle for power employing the use of ideological discrediting information. And the informal echoes were “Red Guards’ nonsense!” Liu perished, Deng survived and conducted the Reform. Now it is clearer if “capitalist roader” was a mere word. The “Cultural Revolution” was a crossroads in the development of Chinese revolution. The dilemma was the same: “*Stop the process!*” or “*Restore and optimize the process!*”

What does the balance show?

- The European revolution did not go beyond the limits of capitalist system. Not even one post-capitalist revolution did take place.
- “Real communism” of 20<sup>th</sup> century implemented by means of Stalin’s command-administrative system turned out to be very close to the primitive communism described by Marx, to “the *preconceived minimum*”, to its “*definite, limited standard*.” I would add that the very Stalinism fits the definition of a “communist Islam” (given by Engels). But the main question is not about Stalin’s personality. Russian workers and peasants can not build a post-capitalist society.<sup>15</sup>
- The process of capitalist development can not be stopped by administrative or oppressive measures. The logic of history turns out to be an irony of history: “Non-capitalist” development turns out to be a peculiar path to capitalism. “Socialist revolutions” – a peculiar kind of non-capitalist development, one could say, *anti-capitalist development*, an asynchronous modernization.<sup>16</sup> Marx’s theoretical communism became the fig-leave of Stalin’s practical communism. Marx who even did not want to consider himself a “Marxist” became a Marxist-Leninist.

<sup>15</sup> Lenin and Trotsky were convinced that Russian Revolution would be the detonator of the European one. Even as late as mid 1920, in a report delivered before the Second World Congress of the Communist International, its head G. Zinoviev asserted: “in reality not one year but probably two or three years will be needed for the whole of Europe to become a Soviet republic.” (See: Сироткин, Владлен. 2005. *Почему проиграл Троцкий?* Москва: „Ексмо“, „Алгоритм“).

<sup>16</sup> The very formula of Socialism given by Lenin “*Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country*” does not contain anything post-capitalist. “Electrification” (this means “new technologies” in the beginning of the preceding century) is being carried out successfully by capitalist companies and states. And “Soviet power” is the provisional name of a repressive institutional system which would implement a forced egalitarian collectivization and industrialization. The Soviet nomenclature took on the historical role of the middle class.

There is also irony in theoretical aspect. Marx's thesis that relations of production are "scattered" under the pressure of development of productive forces was confirmed and vividly demonstrated, however not in the development of capitalist states but in the one of the socialist ones.

We can understand why the actual movement towards a society of free individuality predicted by Marx swept out of the scene of history precisely the societies where his portrait enjoyed the pride of place. And along with that it revived the interest in his theoretical legacy.

In the context of the Cold War Marx was perceived and assessed, first and foremost, as the ideological flag of one of the parties. Now we can look at him as a theoretician without the ideological commitments, both assumed and imposed. .

The *old mole* is still at work, digging. The European revolution ended, however conditional this may seem. Now, a global revolution is underway. The new historical context motivates new assessments and re-assessments.

In late 19<sup>th</sup> century Eduard Bernstein pointed out that the conclusions in the "Capital" as regards the polarization, the absolute and relative impoverishment of working class, were not corroborated. In 20<sup>th</sup> century this became a commonplace example of Marx's errors. In the end of the century the question was posed for reconsideration, however, not in a European but in a global scope. Arguments have been brought for conclusions such as "Marx was completely right" (Wallerstein<sup>17</sup>). I will not go into that topic, I am just marking the methodology: the temporal and spatial continuum of which the analysis ensues is changing.

## 5. The prospects. The enigma of the future

We are witnessing a continuous, one could say, a century-long drift of ideologies. Liberalism in early 21<sup>st</sup> century is quite different from liberalism in late 18<sup>th</sup>. Its powerful and continuous impact transformed the ideological scale. Socialism grew liberalized. Conservatism became a special kind of liberalism. Fascism was refuted, communism is self-refuting itself. The extreme ideologies which were on the rise in 1930s are being marginalized. The drift ensures progress of political centrism. In the European political scale, the right turned *center-right* and the left became *center-left*.

However, there is a "but", an apostrophe expressed in its extreme form by Wallerstein. Let us put it as a question: can we, in the most liberal century, stand behind Kant according to whom human rights include the right to world citizenship regulated by the rules of universal hospitality.

In 1989 fell the Berlin wall. In the meantime, the Spanish wall was constructed against the Moroccan immigrants: it is higher and longer than the Berlin wall. In both the direct and the figurative sense of the word because it separates Europe

<sup>17</sup> Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1995. *After Liberalism*. New York: The New Press.

from the Third World. It seems that we are going into a dead-end street. Neither is Europe ready to open its door, nor are the immigrants ready to stop knocking at them.

A new anti-liberalism is gaining speed. This is not a part of the European revolutionary cycle but of the global revolution. Wallerstein sees a post-capitalist society on the horizon, Fukuyama sees a "post-human" but liberal future. In both cases, however, there is room for a "but." History is polyvalent. The very prospect of the *Homo sapiens* species is problematized as demonstrated by my teacher, the sage Bernard Muntyan. The chances to reach a new level of human freedom are actual but not predetermined.

The solution to global problems calls for another level of thinking.

The outcome of the European revolution is not just a victory of one ideology over another. Neither is it an ideological synthesis. This is the tracing of a road to *supra-ideological thinking*, i.e. thinking beyond the national, regional, class, racial and other private interests. The transition to horizontal social relations includes the overcoming of the discrimination attitudes, of discriminating "isms."

The sum-up result from and the measure for the relative of the European revolution is a new *culture of freedom*.

Maybe it is a creation of the basis for future post-economic society in the perspectives of 21<sup>st</sup> century.